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The main purpose of the thesis is the establishment of an 
improved system of logical types. The absolutist view, according 
to which there exists only one hierarchy of types which has to 
be found out by consideration of empirical facts and by logical 
analysis, has been abandonned, and the attempt has been made to 
raise the whole problem from the material into the formal, the 
syntactical, sphere. Thereby such pseudo-problems disappear as 
usually arise when the borderline between cognoscence and stipu­
lation is not strictly respected.
From the two alternatives of treating the various branches 
of science either within one and the same linguistic system (Car­
nap’s ’’Logischer Aufbau der Welt”; the "Unity of Science*’-thesis 
of Physicalism), or separately in the form of axiomatic systems,
I have chosen the latter; and accordingly, instead of erecting 
one system of types, conventions have been suggested for the 
erection of a special type-hierarchy for every given axiomatic 
system.
In the course of the investigation, it has been necessary 
to discuss more or less independently a number of special logical 
problems in greater detail. Thus one chapter of the thesis has 
been devoted to the syntax of axiomatic systems, another to the 
introduction of parameters as a counterpart to constants and
variables. Farther, I have studied the concept of a cardinal 
number closely, and I have tried to make a small contribution 
to the theory of identity.
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I. Introduction
In the following pages I want to deal with certain 
problems connected with the theory of logical types. Special 
attention will be paid to the requirements arising with 
respect to setting up axiomatically constructed theories.
Although the important step of introducing the concept 
of types into logic is due to RUSSELL his original 
treatment of the subject has not proved to be satisfactory 
in every respect and has given rise to many critical re­
marks and attempts at improvement, among which that of 
RAIiSEY* 8 is one of the most significant. The diffi­
culties accompanying every investigation on logical types 
are well Icnown; this concept appears resolutely to resist 
all our attempts, to clarify it. It is worth while, however, 
to try to discover the nature of these difficulties, for 
- even if one does not succeed in overcoming them complete­
ly - this may be the first step towards their removal.
-^ 1 B.RUSSELL, The principles of mathematics. Cam­
bridge 1903.
*2 F.P.RAIISEY, The foundation of mathematics. Proc 
London Math.Soc.(2) 25, part 5.
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Another logical concept of fundamental significance 
and of special importance in relation to the theory of 
types, is that of identity. The first of the follovmng 
chapters will deal with identity, since a preliminary 
treatment of this concept will facilitate our considerations 
on types in subsequent chapters.
11. Different usages of the identity concept
In all axiomatic investigations, especially in those 
concerning the foundations of mathematics, the concept of 
identityhlways plays a fundamental part, nevertheless, its 
definition or its introduction as an undefined symbol 
usually fails to have the necessary precision, and we find 
different and muddled opinions about the application of 
this concept within a logical calculus.
Let us survey the different kinds of occurrences of 
the identity concept. This will confirm what we said above.
We notice, first of all, that is one of those 
terms which are usually employed ambiguously, namely in 
relation to individuals as well as in relation to classes, 
sentential functions, and so on. This arabi.guity holds quite 
apart from the difference in type (which will be dealt with 
later) of the various categories just mentioned, for the 
introduction of *=* is not made in the same manner in all
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these cases* %ile for objects other than individuals a 
definition of can easily be given, for instance
(1) f = g =Df (x)(f(x) = g(x))
in the case of 1-termed predicates - and everybody consents 
to this form of definition - the situation is very problem­
atic with respect to identity of individuals. We shall 
therefore in the following pages of this chapter restrict 
ourselves - v/ithout mentioning this continually - to the 
consideration of this latter case.
According to LElBITlZ*s classical definition, two things 
are considered to be identical if they agree in all their 
properties (’'Pi^ iziciple of Indiscernables”). As is well 
known, this definition has been formalized by IWilTEIISAD and 
RUSSELL in "Principia Mathematica" as follows:
(2) X = y =]3f (F)(F(x) = F(y))
(where the variability range of F is restricted to the so- 
called elementary functions) . A criticism of this already 
much criticized definition will be given later on* In any 
case, it is not of great practical interest; for whenever 
in a theory a statement of the form ’a = b* is proved, this 
is never done by an actual application of (2 ). It is very 
important that, from ’x = y*, one can for any F infer 
*F(x) = F(y)*; but in order to establish the identity of 
X and y, one never refers to all their properties. An 
establishment of this kind is, on the contrary, frequently
_ Æ
effected in the following way. Let us call a sentential 
function *f(x)^ which is true for one and only one‘value 
of X, a "unit function". Then, one method of proving the 
identity *a = would be that of showing that a certain 
sentential function ’f(x)* has these three properties:
(i) it is a unit function; (ii) it holds for a; (iii) it 
holds for b. Can we give a definition of identity that is 
in accordance with this procedure? The answer is in the 
affirmative. Instead of first defining * = * and then the 
number 1^* (as is done in "Principia Mathematica"), we 
have only to proceed conversely. We begin by defining the 
term "unit function" :
(3) f & 1 (gx)f(x).
• (g)|[(x)(g(x) Df(x)^D^ 2 x)g(x) V (g(x) = f(x))j| 
and now, we can simply put
(4) X = y =j)f (gf) (f e l.f (x) .f(y) )
which is a definition of the desired form. Nevertheless, 
this definition (4) has in common with (2), that it is open 
to certain objections, mainly because it makes use of the 
higher functional calculus, that is to say, of variables 
which are not of the individual type. Later, when dealing 
with the theory of t^ noes, we shall return to this problem.
According to another point of view - that, for in­
stance, of B.A.BERNSTEIN - the sign *=* is a metalogical 
s^ rmbol, i.e. a symbol for the syntactical relation "mutual
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replaceability". Then any formula containing the sign »=’ 
must have the form of an equation = b' in order to be 
significant, not the form ^f(a=b)*, where ’f’ is an express­
ion containing the equation 'a = b* as a proper part. Such 
a formula 'a = b* may perhaps be read: "a has the same 
meaning as b". (Incidentally, the syntactical relation 
"equal by definition" - written - is then a special
case of  ^= %) But in his paper "A set of postulates for 
BOOLEan algebra in terms of the ^implicative* operation" 
BERNSTEIN makes the one mistake of vjriting dov/n the formula 
a = (a = u) * which is obviously uninterpretable. Here, he 
is apparently using *=* in the sense of ’^equivalent** (*%*), 
that is to say, of the relation of mutual implication. This 
instance clearly shows uncertainty in handling the identity 
concept.
In this connexion, the fundamental difference between - 
*=* and *^ * may be pointed out. *=* denotes (quite inde­
pendently of the above mentioned difference of opinion about 
it) a certain relation, more exactly, a 2-termed sentential 
function; which means that, if constants are put into its 
argument places, we get a sentence. From sentential functions
*3 * = is not a logical equality in the sense of
"Principia Mathematica". It is neither reflexive 
nor symmetrical nor transitive.
*4 Transactions American Math.Soc.36.
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v/e distinguish so-called descriptive functions ("functors" 
in CARFAP's terminology) which, to one or several given ob­
jects, correlate .a new object. '=' is of this kind. And
I
*a = b* happens, so to speak, only by chance to be a sen­
tence too (or a sentential function, if *a* and *b* are 
considered to be variables), because the objects of the 
calculus in question are usually interpreted as sentences; 
but there is no compulsion as to this interpretation, and, 
from the formal point of view, *=* is a pure functor, i.e. 
a descriptive function.
Further, TOTTGENSTSIF*s standpoint concerning the 
identity concept may be dealt with. The position here oc­
cupied by "’/ITTGEîTSTElN seems very peculiar at first sight. 
He believes T/HITEHEAD/RUSSELL* s definition to be inadequate 
because it does not allow the possibility of saying about 
two different things a and b that they agree in all their 
properties; this may perhaps always be false, but certainly 
not senseless. With T71TTGENSTE1H, * = * is an undefined and 
undescribed notion. But again, according to him it has no 
sense to call a thing identical with itself: *a = a*; nor 
has it sense to call tv/o different things a and b indenti- 
cal, for then it is only one thing, say a. This use of the 
identity sign seems, however, to be indispensable in prac­
tice; for often two distinct names *a*,*b* are given to 
the same thing (e.g. by means of tv/o different definite
- 7 -
descriptions), and yet it has some-sense to state 'a = b'. 
Example: a =pf the tallest person in this room; b the
youngest person in this room. Evidently the sentence 'a = b’ 
is now significant, for it will be easily possible to settle 
whether it is true or false This illustrative example 
also shows us how to interpret ■TETTGHTTSTEIN* s idea of iden­
tity and his criticism regarding the identification of two 
objects or of one object^ with itself* In fact, identity 
is not really a relation between objects, comparable for 
instance to that of "father", but a relation between names 
of objects, say * a*-and *b*; thus, instead of * a = b* , one 
really ought to Yjrlte **a* = *b* \  because a statement of 
this kind is intended to mean "the symbols * a* and *b* de­
note the same object". This careful differentiation between 
designations and designated objects renders the originally 
problematic situation quite clear. Let us, once more, go 
back to our example. The logical difference between a re­
lation liice "father" and the relation "identity" can ex­
pressly be taken into account by writing "the tallest person 
in this room is the father of the youngest person in this 
room" on the one hand, and "‘the tallest person in this 
room* is identical with ‘the youngest person in this room*"
*5 In the above example it may be assumed that the
room in question contains at least one person, and 
not two persons of exactly the same height or age.
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on the other.
Before discussing the consequences of this view, which 
appears to bring about a very adequate conception of the 
notion of identity, let us shortly consider what RAJiGEY '^ 6 
has to say on the matter. In his criticism of RUSSELL, "'fCTT- 
GSNSTEIN is nartly in agreement With RAIvISEY who also does 
not see an,y logical reason why two different things should 
not have all their properties in common. But RAI"!SEY does 
not want to renounce entirely the use of the identity sign 
in logistic; for it is indispensable in the following im­
portant case. Let us consider' the well Itnown correspondence 
between sentential functions and classes. If 'f(x)' is a 
sentential function, r. = xf(x) is the corresponding class 
which is called the extension of f (x) ; conversely, if Ar is 
given, we call *f(x)* an intensional characterization of 
Let* r. now he the class consisting of the elements X]_,X2 ,***? 
X]^ ; then we have
(5) f(x) = ZZx = x^
Va|
and this expression contains the identity sign; which means 
tha.t, if we ban this sign from our calculus, we are not 
always able to give an intensional characterization of this 
kind for a finite class; but this would be an intolerable
-^ 6 See footnote *2 on p*l.
*7 In accordance with the mathematical usage, we em­
ploy the symbols *21* and W  for designating (mathema­
tical or logical) sums or products (in^our case, 
disjunctions and conjunctions, respectively).
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hindrance to the whole of logic and mathematics. RAMSEY 
therefore has decided to retain the identity symbol in the 
logical calculus, and he defines it in a way which is form­
ally exactly the same as that given in "Principia Mathema­
tica"; only his interpretation of this definition is<^  diffe­
rent, and, as we shall discuss later, this disagreement 
between VJHITEHEAD/RUSSELL and RAMSEY only arises because 
the respective systems of types introduced by them are 
different.
From the preceding considerations v/e may gather this; 
It does not seem possible to give a satisfactory definition 
of identity. The reason for this is very likely to lie in 
the fact that - as has been pointed out by BERNSTEIN and is 
implied in V71TTGENSTE1N* s remarks - identity is not really 
a relation between objects, but between designations of ob­
jects, and is therefore a syntactical relation. Hence the 
appropriate place for the symbol *=* would not be the logic­
al calculus (or any formalism containing the logical cal­
culus), but the syntax-language of this calculus. In 
practice, however, one cannot possibly dispense with the 
employment of * = * in logistic, for the reason given by RAM­
SEY, for instance (see formula (5)), but also for many
*8 Compare: R.CARNAP, Die logische Syntax der Sprache; 
Vienna 1934. English translation: The logical syn­
tax of language ; Kegan Paul, London 1936.
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others (in fact, the whole work of "Principia Mathematica" 
would become a mere torso, if the use of the identity sign 
were forbidden). It is therefore the generally accepted 
practice to retain the identity sign in the logical calculus, 
in spite of its mere syntactical significance. Thus, identity 
turns out to be, as CARNAP would call it, a "quasi-syntacti- 
cal" relation, though he himself Uid not apply this teimi to 
identity.
Aiy symbol one cannot or does not wish to define, must 
nevertheless be given a definite meaning by an implicit cha­
racterization, that is to say, by some suitably chosen 
axioms. Tliis fact has been overlooked by many authors who 
use * = * as an undefined symbol. If, among the undefined fun­
damental concepts of an axiomatic system, the concept of 
identity occurs, one has to be (and often is not) consistent 
enough to consider the identity concept as entirely coordi­
nate with the other undefined ideas of the system in 
question, i,e. one has to formulate the axioms in such a 
way that it is possible to deduce from them all properties 
of the relation *='. For instance, it must necessarily 
follow from the axiom-system that *=* is a logical "equality" 
in the sense of "Princinia Mathematica", namely a reflexive, 
symmetrical, and transitive relation. The sense of an axiom- 
system always is to describe structurally the undefined 
notions which it contains If *=* is considered as be­
^  This description will be a definite one, if the
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longing to them, it wants a structural description as well 
as the others.
The lack of axioms of this kind is sometimes justified 
by the explicit remark that *=’ belongs to the so-called 
logical constants like and so on. But that only
means a transference of the problem, as these constants 
like *3*,* V*,... also need a definition (which in this case 
may be given by means of tables of truth-values) or a de­
scription by a system of axioms. And this same procedure is 
not in the least superfluous for the "constant" *=*.
One of the few authors on logistic subjects, who have 
clearly pointed out this necessity, is E.V .HUNTINGTON. In 
"New sets of independent postulates for the algebra of 
logicV he says, after having introduced several sets of 
axioms: "... in each of these sets (following the usual 
mathematical procedure), the use of the equality sign, =, 
is taken for granted. If preferred, however, the equality
system is consistent and definite (as to the 
meaning of these terms compare, for instance:
O.HZn.ER, Gn the theory of æciom-systems; Analy­
sis 3, 1935).
*10 Tlie concept of a "constant" must be taken with 
caution. In a calculus a so-called constant is 
either an undefined sionbol or a syinbol introduced 
as the name of an object definitely described by 
means of undefined symbols. But the undefined 
symbols are variables which only become constants 
if an interpretation of the calculus is given by 
means of correlative definitions ("Zuordnungs- 
definitionen").
*11 Transactions American Math.3oc.35.
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sign itself may be regarded as an additional undefined con­
cept, provided suitable postulates ane laid dov/n governing 
its use. An obvious set of postulates for = is as follows, 
where a,b,c,... are- understood to be elements of the class K. 
Postulate A. If a is in the class K, then a=a.
Postulate B. If a=b, then b=a.
Postulate C. If a=b and b=c, then a=c.
Postulate D. If x=y, then f(x,a.b, c,. • )=f(y,a,b,c,. ,
where f(x,a,b,c,♦.; is any element of the 
class K built up from the elements x,a,b, 
c,... by successive applications of the 
operators + and •, and'f(y,a,b,c,..) 
is the element obtained from f(x,a,b,c,..) 
by v/riting y in nlace of x throughout."
(Here, *K*, *+*, *•* are the three undefined concepts (be­
sides *=*) of the axiom-system referred to. If one considers 
different axiom-systems with different undefined concepts, a 
few slight and obvious alterations of the additional postu­
lates A,B,C,D are necessary.)
• This system of additional axioms for *=* can be re­
placed by a simpler one. As HILBERT/BEEHAYS showed, the 
following two axioms are sufficient to characterize ’=*5
( li : a = a
(6) <
( Ig: (a = b) 3 (A(a) DA(b))
They proved the sufficiency of this axiom-system in this 
way. Suppose, * = ' and *%* both satisfy (G); then the formula
1^3 dThiLBEHT and P.BERHAYS, Grundlagen der Mathematik, 
1 (edition Springer); Berlin 1934.
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(7) (a = b) = (a %;b)
is deducible.
Tlie second of the axioms (6 ) is a formula of the higher 
functional calculus, since it contains the variable * A* 
which is not of the individual type. This can, however, be 
avoided as HILBERT and BEPJ'TAYS expressly pointed out. For, 
instead of demanding that every A has the property expressed 
by Ig, it is sufficient to state that this property should
be possessed by certain fundamental functions of the theory
which one is about to axiomatize. They give the following 
example. If one undertakes to axiomatize arithmetic by using 
the two undefined fundamental concepts *+1 * and ’<* (besides 
*=*), all that is required as a substitute for Ig are the 
four axioms
a = b 3  (a = c 3  b = c)
a = b 3 a+1 = b+1
(8)
a = b 3 (a <  c 3  b c)
a = b 3  (c< a 3  c <b)
belonging to the elementary functional calculus. (8 ) to­
gether with I2 gives a complete description of the structure 
of the identity relation as employed within arithmetic. In 
the case of the axiomatization of any theory other than 
arithmetic, the axioms (8 ) have to be renlaced by similar 
ones.
The implicit characterization of '=' either by (6 ) or
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by I2 together with some axioms similar to (8 ) appears to 
be the most satisfactory introduction of identity. We shall 
adopt this method for our later purposes.
III. WHTEHEAD/RUSSELL*8 and RAIvEEY*s hierarchies of tyoes
T/hen we consider "Principia ?"[athematica", we have, on 
the one hand, the ideally developed formal apparatus which 
has fertilized all logical investigations since its publica­
tion; on the other, we have the question of how we have to 
interpret the formulae of this calculus. As concerns the 
logical connecting-constants, there is no difference of 
opinion about their interpretation. The same holds good for 
the concepts "variable", "sentential (or prepositional) 
function", "class", "every", "there is", as long as only the 
corresponding ranges of variability are determined. These 
ranges of variability are none other than the so-called 
types, and regarding these, we find in fact several possi­
bilities of interpretation. That of RAMSEY is, for instance, 
different from that originally given by the authors of 
"Principia Mathematica".
In order to discuss more easily these two interpreta­
tions and their differences, it will be better first of all 
to introduce some notations. As the basic calculus is the 
same, we can choose the same notations in both cases.
- 15 -
Let V be the individual range; it is the only type of 
the zero-level. At the first level, we have the classes and 
the 2-, 3-,... termed relations; the ranges of these may be 
called Vy, Vy^y, Vy^y^y,... (the suffixes indicating the 
types of the elements of the classes and relations) or, more 
briefly, Vg, Vg,... resnectively. Besides these there 
are the types of the 1-termed and the 2-, 3-,... termed sen­
tential functions; let us call them Py, Py^y, Py y y,... or 
again, more briefly, P^, Pg, Pg,....
The types of the classes and relations of the second 
level may similarly be denoted by 'V with suffixes which agree 
with the variability ranges of the corresponding variables; 
for the ranges of sentential functions of the second level 
we shall use the letter'P'in the same manner instead of'/'. 
Thus Vy^ consists of the classes of classes of individuals, 
Vyg of the classes of 2-termed relations between individuals, 
Py y^ of those 2-termed sentential functions whose
argument-places are to be filled in by individuals and 2- 
termed individual-relations respectively, re­
lations between 1-termed sentential functions and classes 
of individuals, and so on. The tjrpes of the third and the 
higher levels may be similarly designated.
The V-types are usually called extensional, the P-tj'pes 
intensional.
As to the interpretation of the symbols just intro-
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cLuced, we shall have to distinguish two steps: (i) the for­
mal or ostensive definition of the individual type V; (ii) 
the step by step interpretation of the types of the 1 ., 2 ., 
... level, under the assumption that V is already knovm. 
7Jhile, in "Principia Mathematica", step (i) is wrapped up 
in metaphysical darkness (nor has RAI'ASEY throvm any further 
light on this), rather clear directions are given with re­
gard to step (ii), - though of a different kind in "Princi­
pia Mathematica" from those in RAMSEY’s "Foundation". This 
difference forms, indeed, the essential alteration of RAM­
SEY’ s system in comparison with that of TdilTEBEAD/RUSSEDL, 
and it is made deliberately in order to avoid the complica­
ted and unplausible "branched" theory of types
In "Principia Mathematica" as well as in RAI^ ISEY*s "Foun­
dation", the concept which is fundamental for the theory of 
types is that of "atomic proposition". But vdiat an atomic 
proposition really is, is in both cases suggested only by a 
vague non-formal characterization or by some examples. And 
then, in "Princinia Mathematica", an individual is charac- 
terized as "anything that can be the subject of an atomic 
pronosition". It seems to me that at this particular point 
which is. of fundamental importance, metaphysics enters into
*13 It is not intended here to go into the details of 
this branched theory of types which consists in a 
further sub-division of each type into, ranges of 
different "order" by taking into account the dé­
finit ion- chains of the concepts involved.
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"Principia Mathematica" (and it is the unquestionable merit
of CAifTAP’o latest woric/'^ '^  to have eliminated this me ta- 
physical feature in the establishment of the logistic langu­
age). 'That which is intended to be understood by the indi- 
vidual range V is thus anything but clear.
This fact is in itself regrettable, because here the 
etteiiipt has been made and even been supposed to have succeed- 
ed, to give a clear and unambiguous description of .a certa.in 
concept, vhereas actually we cannot speak at all of a satis­
factory solution. Te shall, however, see that we can safely 
leave this lack of clarity on one side, since the establish­
ment of the concept "individual" will 'orove itself to be 
comparatively irrelevant for the erection of the hierarchy 
of types. Let us then assume, that the realm of individuals 
is 3- given and known manifold.
But before passing on to the consideration of step (ii), 
another short remark concerning this individual range may 
be made. It has often been maintained that the nuraber of in­
dividuals depends on the number of objects which are to be 
found in our actual world. But 1 cannot agree to that ; on 
the contrary, v/ith CARI^ AP 1 am convinced that the interpreta- 
tion of the lowest type depends solely on the choice of our 
language. Even if the world does not contain an infinite 
number of objects (say, electrons, protons, and neutrons).
*14 See footnote *8 on p.9.
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nobody can prevent us from describing the world by means of 
a language based upon an infinite individual range "^ 15. So 
the question: of whicli elements does the lowest type consist 
and what is their number? is a pseudo-problem; it wants no
4
empirical decision but an arbitrary convention.
As soon as the question of the fundamental type V can 
be considered as being settled, one may pass on to the de­
finition of the higher V- and P-types. Here, as mentioned 
before, we have several possibilities ; in particular, we 
shall have to distinguish the two cases in which the P-types 
and the V-types are, or are not, built up isomorphically,
i.e. whether or not there is a one-one-correspondence between 
the sentential functions f and the classes or relations R 
(compare p.8 ). In PAMSSY’s system, it is extremely doubtful 
if such a one-one-correlation subsists, and in VITITEHEAD/ 
RUSSELL’S system it is certainly not Possible. That is 
caused by the fact that, on the one hand, the extensional 
types are constructed purely extensionally in accordance 
with CANTOR’S theory of aggregates: V]_ is the class of all 
sub-classes of V (i.e. the "Potenzmenge" of V) ; Vg is the 
class of all lists of couples whose fields are contained in 
V, and so on. On the other hand, an intensional characteri-
*15 The individual type may, for instance, be a 4-
dimensional continuum of real coordinates, or - as 
in the illustrative languages I and II in CARNAP’s 
"Syntax" - the class of positive integers used as 
coordinates.
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zation is given for the tonies of sentential functions. The
functions thus obtained are called "predicative functions" 
by RAMSEY; according to him, consists of the truth-func­
tions of a finite or infinite number of 1-termed atomic 
functions, where an atomic function arises from an atomic 
sentence by replacing an individual name by a variable. 
Analogously, ^29^3 ? * # » and. the higher P-types are intro­
duced. These ranges certainly embrace all functions expres­
sible in terms of the logistic calculus. The corresponding 
types in "Principia Mathematica" are not quite so comprehen­
sive ; they consist only of those sentential functions which 
can be explicitly v/ritten dov/n; further, according to the 
branched theory of types, each of these ranges is divided up 
into a hierarchy of infinitely many sub-ranges, the funda­
mental range of such a hierarchy consisting of the so-called 
"elementary functions", i.e. those which can be produced 
without using universal or existential operators (these are 
exavtly the truth-functions of a finite number of atomic 
functions)•
Since the P-types pf "Principia Mathematica" only con- 
tain explicitly expressible functions, they are certainly 
denumerable; but in the case of V being at least denumerably 
infinite, the cardinal number, say of (since V]_ is the 
class of all sub-classes of V) is at least and there-
fore greater than that of P]_. Hence there is no possibility
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of a one-one-correlation between and V]_.
As to the P-types of "Foundation", the state of affairs 
is not so clear. Suppose, the sentential function *x= a’ is 
considered to belong to the atomic functions; then we have 
certainly an isomorphism between the P-types and the corre­
sponding V-t^mes; for if is any class, the logical sum of 
all ’x=a* with
n X ~ a
is obviously the sentential function belonging to «, and it 
is predicative in the sense of RAMSEY. Hence, for each class, 
there is an intensional characterization. But it is anything 
but certain whether ’x= a’ may really be counted as an ato­
mic function. And if this is not the case, I do not see with 
regard to RAi-ISEY’s system either that there is any possibi­
lity of establidhing a one-one-correspondence between P]_ 
and V]_, nor for any of the other types.
We now see - especially after what has just been said 
- the kind of indeterminateness that enters into the type- 
hierarchical language of miTEHEAD/RUSSELL and RAMSEY. It 
is, on the one hand, the uncertainty about the extent of 
the fundamental type V and, on the other, the indistinct­
ness of the concept "atomic proposition" which is so funda­
mental for the characterization of V and for the construc- 
tion of the higher types out of V. This then leads to modes
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of vSDeaJ.cing such as ''in case of V being denumerably infinite", 
"in case of belonging to the atomic functions", and
so on.
The indeterminateness of the higher types, caused by 
the unexactness of the concent "atomic proposition", has a 
particularly fatal effect upon the interpretation of the 
formulae of the higher functional calculus. (By the "higher" 
in contradistinction to the "elementary" functional calcu­
lus one understands - as mentioned before - that part of the 
calculus in rhich free or apparent variables of higher than 
the fundamental tyoe are employed.)
An important illustration of this is the definition (2) 
of identity (p.3). As long as it remains obscure which the 
range for the variable F in this formula is, there are 
doubts about the sense of tliis formula, and in particular 
we cannot think of the verification of an assertion of the 
form 'a =b' because the class of objects to be tested is 
not sufficiently determined.
Another illustrative example may be mentioned. This is 
rllLBFRT' s completeness axiom, v;ith Thich he concludes his 
a:;ciom-system of EUCLIDean geometry Let us here formu­
late the comnleteness axiom quite generally, without any 
reference to the special case of geometry. Say, we have an
-)^16 D.HILBERT, Grundlagender Feometrie; 7th edition 
1930.
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axiom-system with the unde fined fundamental concepts
let all of them be extensional and of the first 
level (the distinction "extensional-intensional" is here ir­
relevant; further, in none of the Icnown aociom-systems are 
fundamental concepts of higher than the first level involved, 
and fundamental concents of the zere-level, i.e. constant 
individuals, can certainly be replaced by the corresponding 
clcsses consisting of exactly one element). If then
a ( 9 h g , » *., T^ -^)
is the logical product of the axioms nr seeding the complete­
ness axiom, this can be formalized in the following form;
(9) (Sp (3g) ...  %C8^.
.~(%=Si .R2=S2---R^=Sj^ )]d
which means : the system of classes and relations
is in a certain sense the greatest possible one satisfying
the axioms preceding the completeness axiom.
Again we see that the sense of the formula suffers from 
a lack of clearness concerning the variability ranges of the 
variables Sq,8 2,...,S;n; that is to say, it is not sufficlent- 
ly determined with which systems of classes or relations 3j^, 
Sg,..., 8^ the fundamental concepts * F. are to be
compared in order to make out whether the completeness axiom
*17 In this formula, the sign 'C' is employed ambigu­
ously, namely for the relation "sub-class of" as 
well as for hie relation "(k-termed) sub-relation 
of" (for any k).
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is fulfilled. In my opinion the state of affairs is even 
worse. That the completeness axiom is expressible in the 
above stated form is only due to the obscurity about the 
variability ranges. For if one is considering a certain hy­
pothetically undertaken Interpretation of the given axiom- 
system, one surely has to assime that by virtue of this in- 
terpretation all the and P-tinpes- are determined too, 
especially therefore those V-types to :hich the chosen fun- 
damental concepts RgyRo,. . . belong. Thus the completeness 
axiom says simething about the result of a comparison of R^ , 
Ro,..., R^ with the other elements 3 1?%,... ,3^  ^of .the cor­
responding types, respectively. But that is certainly not 
the sense of the completeness axiom which was originally 
intended by HILBERT. He wants, on the contrary, to compare 
the interpretation in question of the axiom-system with 
quite arbitrary different internretations and not only with 
those vdiich are exnressible in the system obtained from the 
formal axiom-system by the considered interpretation itself. 
He does not make internal but external comparisons. But as 
soon as one starts comparing two interpretations of an. 
aociom-system which perhaps are essentially different, one 
is no longer within the domain of that theory which is sup­
posed to be axiomatized'by the axiom-system in question, ' biit 
one is now in the domain of the corresponding "metatheory", 
that is to say, one deals with "logical syntax". Thus, HIL-
« PA -
BSHT’s completeness axiom in fact represents a metalogical 
instruction directing our set of choice amongst the possible 
interpretations, and, with regard to the theory under con­
sideration, it is not an internal, i.e. in the case of geo­
metry not a genuinely geometrical, axiom. At first, one is 
deceived about this fact, because the higher functional cal­
culus - due to its lack of precision - gives the false im­
pression of being": suitable for an adequate formalization of 
what is wanted. (A similar critique applies to FltAEhïŒL' s 
axiom of limitation ("Beschrânktheitsaxiom")
IV. The axiomatic point of view
That can we learn from the preceding considerations?
Are there any actual defects in the theory of t^ rpes which 
are responsible for the difficulties we found?
It seems as if the logistic calculus used to be con­
sidered too isolatedly and not only as a mere formalism 
which, investigated independently of its applications, must 
appear to represent a very imperfect system. Logistics is 
not the formal representation of one theory, but it is meant 
to provide the means for the representation of many and, 
moreover, - after a suitable addition of supplements - of
*18 A.FRA2FK3L, Finieitung in die Mengenlehre (edition 
Springer) 5 3^ ^^  impression, Berlin 1928.
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all theories. Therefore we can only expect a solution of 
the difficulties which occurred to us with respect to setting 
up a hierarchy of logical types, if we give up the isolated 
consideration of the calculus and always keep in mind the 
fact that there must be a certain theory which is going to 
be -formalized by means of the formal apparatus of logistics. 
In general, this certain theory will only be completely 
formalizable if it is given in the axiomatic form, because 
only then no doubt is left about which concepts of this theo­
ry are'to be chosen as the undefined fundamental ones.
Let us therefore no longer consider the logistic cal­
culus in abstracto, but the formalized axiomatic erection 
of any theory. This accentuation of the axiomatic point of 
view will considerably advance the clarification of our 
ideas.
It is novr obvious that the fundamental t;/pe V cannot 
be fixed once and for all, but that it depends on the special 
theory T under consideration. Each theory T determines its 
own range V of individuals. The subject of T is, so to 
speak, the investigation of the elements of V. Besides V, 
a set of undefined fundamental concents, U, belongs to T.
We shall introduce special notations for them later on.
If U is given, a great many new concepts may be intro- 
duced by:definitions. Each of these concepts belongs to one 
of the P- or V-t}/pes of T, and the particular t^me of a con-
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cept is easily settled by considering the chain of defini­
tions leading back to the concepts of TJ. If we therefore talce 
anyone of the types of T, we are able to decide for any giten 
and well-defined concept of T whether or not it belongs to 
this type; but what we are not yet sure about is the exact 
extent of this t^ /pe. This needs some further determinations. 
We shall call those rules which determine exactly how to con­
stitute the higher tyoes if V and TJ are given, the constitu­
tion-rules for the types. Ihile V and U are, of course, de­
pendent on the theory T which is being considered, this is 
not necessarily the case with respect to the constitution- 
rules, and one will certainly tend to lay them dovai indepen­
dently of T and as generally as possible so that they guaran­
tee an adequate axiomatic reconstruction for as many theo­
ries as possible.
On principle, from the point of view of pure syntax, 
one system of constitution-rules is as admissible as another 
one (CAJRTAP's "Principle of Tolerance"). But in practice, 
as soon as one starts building up a special scientific theo­
ry, one has to make up one's mind and to choose more or leBS 
arbitrarily the initial material, an essential part of which 
is formed by the constitution-rules. Therefore, if later on 
we suggest constitution-rules of a certain kind for the 
practical usage, this does not in the least involve a contra­
diction of the Principle of Tolerance, but we only undertake
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a necessary preliminary step for the establishment of some 
scientific theory.
In case of the constitution-rules being such as to 
lead to an isomorphism between the V- and the corresponding 
P-t^ rpes in the sense described above, we shall call these 
constitution-rule8 themselves "isomorphic"; this notation 
is not very correct but short and not misleading. If the 
constitution-rules are isomorphic, there is no need for a 
formal distinction between the elements of V-types and the 
corresponding P-t^mes, i.e. between classes and relations 
on the one hand and sentential functions on the other. We 
may then employ the same letter, for instance, for a predi­
cate and its extension, e.g. 'b(x)' meaning "x is blue" and 
'xeb' meaning "x is an element of the class of blue things"; 
and in general we put
(1 0) f = xf(x) ; H = xyR(x,y) ; ...
and therefore get
(1 1) X 6 f = f(x) ; xRy = H(x,y) , ...
Tlie simplest example of isomorphic constitution-rules 
is the follov;ing. Let Vq be the class of a?_l sub-classes of 
V, the class of all sub-classes of V%, and so on; ana- 
logously the relation-types Vo,V3 ,... ? • • • ? so on,
may be formed; finally let the P-t:/pes be isomorphic to the
corresponding V-types. This is the case where all types are
chosen most comprehensively.
Ihicli general directions shell [glide us now in the 
choice of the constitution-rules and, with them, of the lo­
gical types? On the one hand, we ought to endeavour to make 
the lengn%e ricli enough to avoid restrictions of classical 
mathematics like those brought about by intuitionism. On the 
other hand, of course, certain finitistic claims are fully 
justified, and it would be necessary to take them into ac- 
count, firstly, in order to escape the danger of paradoxes, 
and further, because - as vie shall show more exactly later - 
logical types which are constructed too richly are only 
capable of metaphysical interpretation and had therefore 
better be offered up that useful razor of OGCAI.T. Our aim may 
hence very roughly be described as follows; we want to find 
the smallest possible types that can be introduced without 
loss of generality.
V. Axiomatic systems
Since our further considerations on logical types will 
be made under special accentuation of the axiomatic point of 
view, we. have to premise some general remarks on axiomatic 
systems.
A rough knowledge of the method of axiomatizing a theo­
ry may be presupposed. Only a few special points which are 
important for our purposes, may be emphasized. In particular,
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attention will*be paid to those requirements which result 
on account of GARHAP's "Syntax"; in one point, our suggest­
ions regarding the form of language to be chosen will de­
viate from those put fonvard by GARHAP.
(a) Sentential systems
A linguistic system is completely determined if the 
following is given: ' '
& the list of signs to be employed, 
b the formation-rules, i.e. stipulations about the 
conditions under which a combination of these signs 
is to be called a sentence, and 
Q the transformation-rules, i.e. stipulations about 
the conditions under which a given sentence is to be
^ “I Q
called a consequence of a given class of sentences.
In the following we shall only consider linguistic 
systems which agree with respect to their "syntactical ba­
sis" ; by this is meant'that for all of them the same forma­
tion- and transformation-rules hold (which may be imagined 
as stipulated once and for all at the beginning), so that 
two distinct systems can substantially differ only in the 
amount of signs admitted. For this common syntactical
*19 Cf. R.CARTTAP, Philosophy and logical syntax,
Psyche Miniatures, London 1935i and: Ihe logical 
sjrntax of language (see footnote *8 on p.9).
- 30 -
*20basis let us make the following restrictive assumtions. 
(i) Each of the linguistic systems to be considered shall 
contain the logistic calculus (with the usual rules of in­
ference), which means in particular, that it has the logical 
constants as well as variables of all types and the corre­
sponding universal and existential operators at its disposal. 
This does not only involve a restriction as to the rules h 
and g, but also a minimal condition for a. (ii) The forma- 
tion-rules shall be in accordance with RUSSELL's elementary 
theory of types; this does not concern the extents of the 
single types, but it is only meant to establish the fact 
that all the concepts are subdivided into a hierarchy of 
types, (iii) The extensional and the corresponding intension- 
al concepts (and hence the V-types and the corresponding P- 
types) are left undistinguished, that is to say, formulae 
(10) and (11) (p.27) are considered to be valid, (iv) Tiie 
formation-ru1es are of such a kind as to allow of those, and 
only those, descriptive definitions of the form
*20 In this assumption of a mere common syntactical
basis for the various linguistic systems, our sug- 
gestions differ from CARHAP's. He seems to prefer 
a universal basic language to which one may adjoin 
the undefined concepts and the axioms of a parti- 
cular axiomatic linguistic system as additional 
primitive symbols and sentences, respectively.
For a criticism of this conception, compare my 
paper "On the s^mtax of axiom-systems", read before 
the International Congress for scientific Philo­
sophy, Paris 1935.
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(1 2) a -jyf (ix)f(x)
for which the corresponding uniqueness condition
(13) (2 ,^^ )f(x)
("there is one and only one x such that f(x) holds") is 
true (see below) in the system in question "^ l^. f n^ay here 
be of any type whatsoever excent, of course, V. In particu­
lar, descriptive definitions of the form
(14) r. xf(x) (i.e. (lol) (x){x e (X % f(x)j)
(and similarly for relations) are unconditionally admissible, 
that is, the corresponding uniqueness condition is consideosed 
as a general logical principle *32^ Descriptive functions, 
say, 'R)x' may only be introduced, provided that the unique­
ness condition holds for every x (v) Regarding the
identity s^ mibol, the following may be assumed: the symbol
*21 In "Principia Mathematica" a method is described 
of hovf to avoid the above stated restriction, 
namely by the employment of a special descriptive 
operator; this operator ensures that, when the 
uniqueness condition is not fulfilled, every sen­
tence automatically becomes false which contains 
the symbol introduced in this way. This theoreti­
cally unobjectionable method has never been em­
ployed in practice, and such an attempt would 
alriiost be hopeless, because of the length and un­
readability of the formulae'X that would arise.
*22 Tliis assumption corresponds to some extent to
FR/îETtKEL's axiom of deterrainateness ("Bestimmt- 
heitsaxiom").
*23 If thé uniqueness condition holds in some but not 
in all cases, the introduction of 'Fdx' is accord­
ingly inadmissible. In a case like this, a sub­
stitute for 'R’x' will be introduced in Cha.pter 
VIII.
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' = ' either belongs to the common syntactical basis and is 
characterized by foimiulae (G) (p.1 2); or every single one 
of the systems under consideration contains as an un­
defined symbol for a 2-termed individual relation, which 
may eventually be characterized later on by some axioms si­
milar to I2 and (8 ) (p.13).
f The linguistic systems that can be constructed on a 
common syit ntical basis of this kind may be called senten­
tial systems o If one wants to distinguish one among the sen­
tential systems one can do it in this way. Let U be a class 
of undefined fundamental concents. This denotation is only 
chosen in accordance with the usual terminology of æcioma- 
tics ; the elements of U are nothing but certain symbols 
without any meaning, only distinguished by their logical 
tynoes. Example : U = ['g%^  ? ) where 'g^ ' is an
individual name, 'gg' and igg' denote classes ^of individu­
als, and is a relation between individuals and classes
of such; or shortly: where 'g % \ 'gg'? ^ gg^  ^ ' are of the 
types V, respectively. As onposed to this, it
has no sense to speak, for instance, of "the sentential sys­
tem with the relation of betv/eenness hZ(x,y,z)' as the only 
fundamental concept", since there is no meaning conferred 
on the fundamental concepts as long as it is not the case 
either that axioms are introduced or that an'interpretation 
is undertaken; one can here only, in analogy with the fore-
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going example, speak of U = ['g'] where 'g' is of the type 
V3 . - To U belongs, by virtue of the given formation-rules, 
a well-determined system Cy of definable concents - including 
those of U itself - (at this stage, only those among the 
descriptive definitions are admitted for which the
uniqueness condition is tautological, hence for instance 
those for which the descriptive operator is a classial or a 
relational operator); similarly, to Cy belongs a well- 
determined system Sy of significant sentences. Then, Sy is 
the sentential system belonging to, or distinguished by, U.
(b) Axiomatic systems
If we aim at erecting ah axiomatic theory, we have 
first of all to choose an aggregate U of undefined fundamen­
tal concepts, and to select an arbitrary sub-class A from 
the sentential system Sy which is determined by U; the 
statements of A are câled axioms.
The further development of the axiomatic theory in 
question consists in three processes which have to be carried 
out simultaneously: (i) the completion of the system Cy by 
means of additional definitions, to the system Cy of all 
concepts of the theory: (ii) the extention of the system Sy 
on the basis of the new concents of Cy into the system Sy 
of all sentences of the theory; (iii) the transition from 
the axiom-system A to its class T of consequences, that is
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to say, to the class of true (i.e. dedueible) sentences of 
the theory.
At first sight, it seems as if these three processes 
could be carried out one after the other in the given order, 
since the first seems to be independent of the rest, and the 
second of the last. But this is not the case for the follow­
ing reason. The additional definitions mentioned in (i) are 
just those which require for the adi&issibility of their 
establishment the truth of a certain sen^tence, namely of 
the corresponding uniqueness condition. Thus, not only does 
each of the three processes depend on the preceding one, but 
also (i) on (iii).
To T alv/ays belong the statements of A itself and, fur­
ther, the tautologies, i.e. the consequences of the null 
class of sentences. The negations of the sentences of T form 
the class F of false sentences, which contain the contra­
dictions, i.e. the negations of tautologies (also character- 
izable by the fact that any sentence is a'consequence of 
them).
If T and F have no element in common, the axiom-system 
A is called consistent, otherwise inconsistent. If the 
union of T and F exhausts the whole of %, A is called a 
definite axiom-system. But in general, there are undecidable 
sentences in Sy.
A sentential system in which an axiom-system A has been
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selected and for which, in accordance with (i), (ii), and 
(iii), an accomplishment and a sub-division into true, false, 
and undecidable sentences has been carried out, may be de­
signated as an axiomatized sentential system or shortly as 
an .axiomatic svstem.
VI. Object-type8 and STOtactical types
Returning from our axiomatic excursion to our previous 
subject, namely the problems concerning the theory of types, 
it is now necessary to draw our attention to a certain ob­
vious differentiation which we have so far neglected.
Let us consider any scientific theory - for the sake of 
simulicity, let us assume it as axiomatized upon a syntacti­
cal basis of the kind described in the preceding chapter, 
though this is irrelevant here; this theory will be concerned 
with certain objects, called individuals, and moreover - in 
a slightly extended sense - with the properties (i.e. classes 
and relations) of these objects, further with the nroperties 
of these nroperties (i.e. classes and relations of the 
second level), and so on. Tiiese "objects in the mder sense" 
(as opposed to the individuals as the "objects in the nar­
rower sense") for-^i a hierarchy of types which may now be 
designated more precisely as "object-times".
The theory of these objects (in the wider sense), on
- 3G
the other hand, "depicts" - as it is often and not very pre- 
cisely expressed - the range of these objects by means of 
sj^ anbols and combinations of symbols (expressions, sentences, 
proofs) in accordance with certain rules of formation and 
transformation (compare p.29). Some of these symbols and 
symbolial e:cpresalons - namely, the undefined and defined 
constants and the definite descriptions - are designations 
of certain objects; they are the so-called "constant ex­
pressions". Others - namely, the variables and the descrip­
tive functions - designate an "arbitrary" objects of a 
certain type ; they are called "variable expressions". Tiiese 
constant and variable eitpressions are, in accordance with 
the object-typial hierarchy, again sub-divided into types 
(see assumption (ii), -p.30). Let these t;rpes of expressions 
- in contradistinction to the object-tgoes - be denoted as 
"sj/iitactical tp~pes".
■^ efore, when talking about "concepts", it has not al- 
ways been clear vdiether we meant ah object or the name of an 
object; this vill in future be carefully differentiated.
The theory in question is exclusively concerned with
*24 This mode of expression is, of course, objection­
able as it stands. The correct characterization 
of a variable has to be given by reference to its 
snitactical properties. For a subtle analysis oi 
' this concent see CARFAP's "Syntax", Section 54.
In chapter VIII, we shall examine it more closely 
ourselves.
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the elements of the object-tiqies. if the elements of the 
s:/ntactical tyoes, i.e. certain expressions of the the ore - 
tical system, are desired to be made the subject of sn in- 
vestigation also, this has to be undertaken within-the cor- 
responding metatheory, that is to say, within the simtax of 
the theory in question. \
The symbols previously introduced ('V', etc.) are
denotations of the object-types which form the main subject 
of the present paper; but we shall also consider the'rela-'
tionship between object-tyoes and syntactical types. Let us 
denote the syntactical types in analog^ /", with the object- 
types by 'S' with the appropriate suffix attached tofit.
Tlius S is'the class of s;^ mibols, or symbolial expressions, 
designating individuals (constants as well as variables); 
we shall shortly say; S is the class of individual expres­
sions. Similarly, Sq is the class of classial expressions,
Sg the class of 2-termed relational expressions, and so on. 
Again, Sg^ is the class of classial expressions of the se­
cond level, and so on. It will be convenient to have also a 
notation for those sub-classes of the syntactical types at 
our disposal which are formed by the constant expressions 
alone ; if Sq is any of these tyoes, then by 'cSq' let us 
understand the corresponding "constant sub-t^ rpe". Similarly,
'vSq' will denote the "variable sub-tyoe" of Sq.
The syntactical basis will usually be of such a kind
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that, for any type whatsoever, infinitely many different 
variables are available. In this case, the variable sub-type 
vSiji of any Sq is an infinite class. The constant sub-types 
cSiji, on the other hand, consist of constant expressions, 
that is to say, of undefined and defined constants and of 
definite descriptions. Incidentally, the latter may be left 
out of account, since each of them gives rise to the possi­
bility of introducing a new symbol by means of a descriptive 
definition (only in practice, one often does not want to be 
bothered with writing dovni every possible definition). Thus, 
the extents of the cSq depend mainly upon the rules of de­
finition; these form part of the formabion-iniles of the syn­
tactical basis. (Earlier, by constitution-rules, we denoted 
those rules which determine the extents of the object-types ; 
it seems now justified to a certain degree to consider the 
definition rules as the correlate to the constitution-rules 
with respect to the syntactical tjrpes.)
In order to enhance the comprehensibility of the situ­
ation, let us compare the extent of an object-type Vq (t be­
ing any possible suffix) with the extent of the constant 
sub-type cSq of the corresponding syntactical type Sq.
TVery expression belonging to cSq is designation of one and 
only one element of Vq. It may occur that Vp is larger than 
cSip, but also the converse is possible. For, on the one 
hand, Vp may contain elements for which no designations
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are introducible In the theory in question (examples in HIL­
BERT'S ETJCLIDean geometry, no particular individual can be 
distinguished, that is to say, no individual name can be 
introduced by definition; hence the constant sub-type cS of 
the syntactical individual type S is empty); on the other 
hand, several elements of cSq may designate the same element 
of Vp (example: in elementary arithmetic (V = non-negative 
integers), for instance '1+1 ' and '2 ' denote the same in­
teger; every integer can be given a name ; hence cS is larger 
than V). The latter case has been dealt with before (see 
p.7) when treating the identity concept. As a result of our 
previous reflections we found - mainly on account of a 
''translation into the formal mode of speech" of WTTGEHSTEIH' s 
ideas on identity - that identity, though in practice quasi- 
syntactically treated as a'relation between the objects of 
the theory, is, as a matter of fact, only a relation between 
object-names. (In our examples ' 1+1=2' means "the constant 
expressions '1+1 ' and '2 ' are designations of the same ob­
ject", and - as pointed out before - and identity-statement 
of this kind ought to be v/ritten more strictly thus:  ^'1+1 '
= '2'\)
The question whether a syntactical type can possibly 
have more than denumerably many elements, should not be 
answered too quickly in the negative. It is a problem that 
wants further investigation, whether or not under certain
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circumstaiices a convention may be justified according to 
which the list of signs to be employed in the theory in 
question (see g on p.29) is more than denumerably infinite 
(contains, for instance, all the sjmibols where the suf­
fix 'r' runs through all real numbers). Usually - it is true 
- one confines oneself to the consideration of theories with 
a finite or a denumerably infinite list of initial signs, 
and in this case, since one always introduces expressions 
of finite length only '^ 25^  it follows easily from væll-lmown 
theorems of the theory of cardinal numbers that all possible 
combinations of symbols - hence all the more the possible 
definitions - form a denumerable class; which means that, in 
this case, every sjmtactical type is finite or denumerably 
infinite.
V7e have seen that cSq may be smaller as v/ell as larger 
than the corresponding object-type Vp. Here, another method 
of com%)aring these two t}"pes suggests itself. Let us sub­
divide cSm into dosses, of a kind such that two expressions 
of cSq belong to the same class if, and only if, they denote 
the same object; these classer are obviously the abstractive
*25 Even an exnreèsion' like ' • • • ' is neither
itself an infinite exoression nor an abbreviation 
‘ ■ of on infinite eicpression. The three dots, meanrng 
"and so on", certainly constitute an exoression of 
finite length, and the justification of their em­
ployment lies in the fact that a nrecise and, of 
course, again finite definition for them can be 
given.
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Classes in respect of the relation of identity (here, we 
make use of the fact that is actually s relation between
object-names). 7e have now a one-one-correspondence between 
these classes and. certa,in objects, namely the name able ones, 
ddiile, to every nameable object, there exists one corresobnd- 
ing class, mmely the class of its names, there may be ob­
jects without names. Thus, may be larger, but can never
be smaller, than the set of abstractive classes belonging 
to cSt .
Vxl. Finltization of the type concept
"Je have already (on p.27) stated one possibility of 
choosing the object-types, ns.mely most comprehensively in 
accordance with CA"irOR's principle of constructing the class 
of all sub-classes to a given vlass; let us call these types 
maximum-types. how, in order to comply with the programme 
formulated at the end of Chapter TV (p.28), it seems ad­
visable to consider the other extreme, that is. to say, tlie 
case where the extents of the types are as little as pos­
sible .
At the end of the last chapter, we obtained a minimum 
condition for the object-throes : they contain at least those 
objects for which designations (either undefined or defined) 
exist in the theory in question. We shall therefore get the
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least -oossible typés when we prescribe that they should 
consist only of these objects. As opposed to the maximura- 
tyrpes, these may be denoted as minimum-types.
If is any type *26 whatsoever, its sub-class of 
nameable objects - i.e. of those objects for which undefined 
or defined names exist - may be designated by 'V*'. Thus, 
the minimum-types are characterized by
(15) ^  ■
while, in general, we only have
(16) Vt c
Here and in what follows, special remarks concerning 
the P-t;/pes need not be added, since, by assumption (iii) on 
P.30, we decided to consider corresponding P~ and V-types as 
isomorphic, and, by accepting (10) and (11) on p.27, we left 
corresnonding P- and V-designations undistinguished, that is 
to say, we correlated only one syntactical type to each pair 
of corresponding P- and V-types. (This, of course, does not 
exclude the emnloyment of both the relational and the predi­
cate càlcûlus, according as, from case to case, the one or 
the other seems to be more convenient.)
We will now consider whether it is possible to choose 
• the constitution-rules for the'object-tjq)es quite generally 
in such a way that (15) holds. In PHAHO's axiom-system of
*26 By "t^ rpe" we shall now always mean "object-type", 
unless the contrary is stated.
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elementary arithmetic, for instance, the individual type 
does actually fulfil (15): every positive integer, is capable 
of being exnlicitly defined in terms of the undefined fun­
damental symbols '0' ("zero") and 'S' ("successor"). The 
same holds with respect to FRAEHKEL's axiom-system of the 
theory of aggregates, where, by the axiom of limitation ("Be- 
schrënktheitsaxiom"), the restriction to nameable aggregates 
has been ensured. Nevertheless, it is easily seen that the 
choice of the minimum-typés, that is, the stipulation of
(15), is too strong a finitization of the type concept. Tliis 
results from one of our previous examples v/hich may now be 
examined a little more closely.
In HILBERT'S axiomatic theory of ETJCLIDean geometry *27^ 
there are 7 undefined fundamental concepts, namely the 3 
classes (or 1-termed predicates) pt, si, pi of points, 
straight lines, and planes respectively, and the 4 relations 
inc(x,y), betw(x,y,z), cong(x,y;u,v), cong^(x,y,z;u,v,w) (in- . 
cidence, betweenness, congruence of segments, congruence of 
angles, respectively). All these are classes of, or relations 
between, individuals. Individual names themselves (i.e. 
names of points, straight lines, or planes) do not occur 
among the undefined fundamental concepts. One could only try
*27 D.HILBERT, Grundlagen der Geometrie; 7th edition
1930. Compare also: O.HEMTER, Axiomatischer Aufbau 
der Geometrie in formalisierter Darstellung; Ber­
liner Seminarberichte 2, 1935.
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to introduce some by means of descriptive definitions (defi­
nitions other than descriptive ones would not have the effect 
of lowering the tj/pe level). However, as mentioned before, 
it is well-knovn that, in ETJCLIDean geometry, there are no 
distinguishable individuals (ETJCLIDean snace is perfectly 
homogeneous); thus, cS, and hence V* are null and, by (15), 
it would result that V is null also : which is thoroughly 
absurd.
The finitization achieved by (15) is therefore equiva­
lent, so to speak, to turning out the baby with the bath, 
and the validity of (15) can only be expected in special 
cases, of which that of elementary arithmetic is an example.
A debilitation of the concept of minimum-t^/res is thus 
advisable. The individual type V which constitutes the range 
of objects in the narrower sense of the theory under con­
sideration, represents in a certain sense a special case in 
comparison with the other types; and in accordance with what- 
has been said earlier ?hen we distinguished between the 
ostension of the elements of the individual t^me and the 
subsequent constitution of the higher types, one might now 
decide to be satisfied with a mere ostension of the range .
V without a name-by-name, enumeration of its elements, and 
then to demand only in view of the higher types that they - 
should not contain any but nameable objects. A convention 
of this kind seems also justified; inasmuch' as. the question-
- 45 -
ability of logistic formulae only arises within the higher 
fuiictional calculus, and not as long as only such variables 
are admitted as run through the fundamental range V. The 
types just characterized may be denoted as weaker minimum-
type s .
Tmen one erects a theory on the Principle of the weaker 
minimum-types, one - to put it briefly - occupies the stand- 
point that the individuals treated, by the theory, represent 
certain objects which one need not waste any words about 
(they are considered as beiiqy given somehow by ostension), . 
while only such properties of these individuals are consi­
dered adjfiissible as one can really speak about, that is to 
say, as are singly enmierable by their names.
From the conmon-sense point of view, this conception 
of the logical times' appears, to be quite plausible.
And yet, we- can see$^ at once that the finitization involved . 
by it, still imposes too strong: a restriction. Let us, 
again, examine the case of geometry. The ran[:e V, i.e. the 
union of the classes of ooints, straight lines, and planes, 
is now being regarded as a given assemblage. fhich 1-termed 
predicates are definable? Or, which means the same: which 
sub-classes can be demarcated within V? In the first place, 
naturally, the fundamental classes pt, si, and pi; further, 
the null class A and the universal class V; and also the 
three trivial unions ptwsl, slw pi, pl'v/pt. Further sub-
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danses, however, are not producible - as one can easily 
verity, Tlie reason is this: the remaining undefined'concepts, 
namely Inc, betw, coiig, con^, cannot be utilized for the 
production of new 1-termed predicates (i.e. classes) because 
one has only the two possibilities of prefixing a universal 
or existential operator or of identifying some of the vari­
ables at the argument-places at one's disposal, but not that 
•of specialization by means of 'the substitution of constants 
into the argument-places ~ since, as we have seen, there are 
no constant individuals in the system. Tlie type thus con­
sists of exactly 8 elements; in particular, only 2 point- 
classes are contained among these, namely the null class and 
the class of all points. (If we had a single constant point, 
say p, we would be able to form the class with the one ele­
ment p, further, the class of straight lines tlirough p, the 
class of olanes tlirough p, and the appertaining unions and 
complementary classes; even so, væ only obtain a finite Vp. 
Only if there is a second constant point, say q, we can - if 
it is a question of 2-dimensional geometry - imagine p and q 
as being the origin and the unity point, and then construct 
a coordinate-geometry in the usual way, wherein then, on the 
basis of the coordinates, arbitrarily many designations of 
points, straight lines, and nlanes are introducible; in ad­
dition, special classes of noints, straight lines, and 
nlanes are characterizable in various manners.)
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We gather from this result .that even the choice of the 
weaker minimum.-types means the carrying of the planned fini- 
tization one step too far; which, incidentally, is mainly 
due to the fact that the existence of constant individual^ 
designations is not always guaranteed.
Thus, the choice of the weaker minimum-types - though 
at first appearing quite reasonable (at least one the basis 
of a finitistic standpoint) - still needs a certain revision* 
Let us analyse a little further the situation which, in the 
case og geometry, had been created on account of the assumed 
introduction of the weaker minimum-types.
We have already established the fact that, due to the 
lack of constant individuals, there are no narticular classes 
of points (or of straight lines, or of planes) for which 
snecial names might be introduced by definition. In other 
words : since there are no constant points, there are no 
constant point-classes either. So we are not in a position 
to speak of, say, "the points of the interval (a,b)" or of 
"the points of the circle about c with radius a,b", since 
we cannot speak of "a", "b", "c". The situation is very 
strange inasmuch as - in spite of the lack of constants of 
the zero or the first level - one may well introduce con- 
stants of the second level. The following terms are only a 
few examples of classes of point-classes that can be de- 
fined without the slightest trouble: "segments of straight
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lines", "linear point-classes", "circles", "classes of all 
points on a straight line",'half lines", "open classes of 
points", "closed classes of points", "interior of an angle", 
"corners of a cube", "classes of one point each" ("unit 
classes"), "pairs of points", and so on. To give a clearer 
impression, let us formalize the first and the third of 
these examples :
segm Ù (gx) (gy) ^ pt(x) .pt(y) .%+y.
 ^ .(z)(z & =  betw(x,z,y))}
circ r, (^ x) (gy) (2 z){pt(x) *pt(y) .pt(z) .y4=z.
.(u)(ua^ ir = cons(u,x;yz) )} 
There are thus infinitely many constant expressions designa­
ting classes of the second level (in other words; cSg is an 
infinite class). On our assumption, however, there are no 
more than 2 different point-classes, and these give rise to 
2^=4 classes of point-classes at most. Therefore, infinitely 
many of those expressions would have to denote the same ob­
ject - although it is deducible from the axiom-system of 
geometry that, for instance, any two of the classes mentioned 
of point-classes are different from one another.
Let us summarise the results of our assumption: there 
is no restriction concerning the fundamental type ; owing 
to the lack of sui^ficiently many designations (i.e. of ele­
ments of cS]_), consists of only 8 elements ; though cSo 
is infinite, Vg consists of a finite number of elements
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(incidentally, of 2^  elements at most). The statements about 
V]_ and Vg - similar statements are obtainable in résuect of 
the other types - are incompatible with the axioms of geo- 
metry.
This difficulty can only be removed by a transition to 
a wider t%rpe concept, "'^e shall have to avoid the waste of 
symbols expressed by the fact that Vg is finite in spite of 
cSg being infinite; as this feet is equivalent to the occur­
rence of identities holding^ between elements of 082, the ad- 
ditional requirement to be respected may'also be formulated 
in thi s way ; the. cons titution-rule s should hot imply any 
identities incompatible with the aociom-system of the theory 
in question. Or, to nut it in a less trivial form: if an 
axiom-system turns ou.t to be contradictory, this should not 
merely be due to the choice of the constitution-rules.
.Abstracting from the example of geometry, if T is any 
type, and hence Vgi the next higher classial t^ T^G, then T
consists at least of the objects conto.ined in the elements 
of that 1  ^to .say, the union of the elements of Vm iS a 
sub-class of T:
X18) s^VT c;T
*
But,- since
(19) ' T i v ^  ■; ' 1;';
is alvvsys accepted-as true, (18) ma.ÿ as Mell be' replaced by
T(20) s’Vm -
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unfortunately, in 'bulldin,; u-. the hiernrehy of types, one 
cannot possibly start '"'1th the higher types^ and then, golnr 
b<;dvvards, nroceed to the construction of tloe l0'"er t^ qoes ; 
for there is - ot lea.st in general - no liighest tjrpe level» 
Otheia'ise, one might use (2 0) as a definitional equation:
T =2f thereby automatically fulfilling the additional
requirement mentioned, above, however, (2 0) plays the part 
of a nece.osary condition, amounting to the following demand: 
the object-tj'^ oes should not only contain those objects whose 
names are directly constructible (minimum condition (16), p. 
42), but also those of "hich it is merely known that they 
are elements of a class occurring in the next higher type ^28 
(where this cIôlss is contained in its type for the very same 
reason, narnely because it is either directly constructible 
or contained in â class of the next higher t^ 'pe, where, in 
the latter case, the same applies to this class, and so on).
A necessary condition is not yet a. constructive prin­
ciple. Therefore we have now, first of all, to seek for a 
method of widening suitably the idea of weaker minimum-types. 
The example of geometry taught us the necessity of doing 
this; it is only sensible to exioect advice in this matter
*28 Here and before, the restriction to classes is
justified since, if R is any given relation, then 
we can sneak of the classes formed by the domains 
of E also; thus, an element occurring in a rela­
tion, is at the same time element of some class, 
and this class is nameable if the relation is.
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from sjiotlier consideration of geometry as it is. actually 
carried out. The difficulty was this: owing to the lack of 
constant individuals, we Jad no possibility of characteri­
zing special uoints, or point-classes such as intervals or 
circles etc. Tow let us have a look at the practical pro­
cedure in geometrical investigations.
."Let s be an arbitrary straight line; on s, two diffe­
rent points and pg may be chosen; let q be a third 
point, not lying ons;... "
This is a typical beginning of a geometrical proof, and it 
already shows us that one nevertheless does speak of single 
individuals - although there are none which can actually be 
characterized (by descriptive definitions); for one speaks 
of arbitrary elements, that is to say, one employs variables 
- which, however, are regarded as fixed during a certain 
consideration, say, a proof of some theorem. Variables of 
this kind, which designate an arbitrary but fixed element, 
are usually denoted as parameters. An important application 
is the one we have already mentioned: the transition from 
pure to coordinate-geometry (of 2 dimensions), which is 
nothing other than the introduction of two fundamental para­
meters (either origin and unity-noint, or two axes) which 
are henceforth considered as fixed.
This rough characterization of the concent of para­
meters will be followed by a more detailed analysis in the 
next chapter, together with an investigation of the terms
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"constant" and "variable".
Later, we shall utilize the idea of parameters for the 
construction of a more adequate t^ .me concept. The types thus 
obtained will be called "parameter-types".
VlII. Constants, variables, parameters
I will'start in this chapter from CAPlTAP's investiga­
tions in Section 54 of the "S;,uitax". - His aim is to establish 
a. distinct differentiation between wha.t is called a "vari­
able" on the one hand and a "constant" on the other. He is 
perfectly right in rejecting the explanation of a variable 
as a "varying concept" which has occasionally been offered.
A variable is not a concept but a s^ mibol. But also the view 
that a variable is a symbol with a varying meaning is inad­
equate. To denote a variable as a symbol with an undetermined 
meaning, as opposed to a constant as a s^ mibol with a deter­
mined meaning, is - as CAPHAP points out - already a slightly 
better characterization. It does not, however, allow of a 
third kind of symbols which occupy a sort of intermediate 
position between variables and constants; CARTTAP calls them 
"constants with undetermined meanings". This denotation 
suggests that we are concerned with a special kind of con­
stants; I should prefer a name which pute the accent on the 
affinity to vai^ iables, and I shall therefore use the dénota-
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tlon "parameter" instead. • .
"[be exact definition of the terras "variable", "constant", 
and "parariieter" can only'be';piven by reference to the sjni- 
tàctical rules for their employment. The Sj/mbol 'a' will be 
called a constant"if it is èither'an undefined name, or a 
name introduced by definition, or an abbreviation of a name 
of one of these kinds. On the basis of this definition, a 
variable 'x' may roughly be characterized'as a sjmibol with 
the followin,? syntactical nropertiesr'Ci) for 'x' one may, 
in accordance x'/ith the ' trahS'forraatiOn-irjle's of the sjrhtacti- 
cal basis. Substitute a constant 'a', that is to say, if 'P' 
is some constant oredicate, then, from ’P(x)', 'P(a)' may be 
derived (but not vicérersa); (ii) if the symbol 'x' occurs
I
at the argument-Place oT^ 'some 'bredicate, it may, In - accord­
ance with the formafoion- and tranaforMation-rules, be turned 
into an "an-narerit' variablé" by prefixing.â aentehtial (ire. 
universal or existential} or a'descriptive operdto^ " "
. This character i sat ion of a variable ■■'will be ^ suff ici e nt 
for our purposes. Tor a definition in full, the reader may 
be referred to the sections on "r^ enera,! %mta:k" in^ CviRTTAP's 
"Syntax"; : a-- : : ; ' . \ ^
- We Tfill how turn to an analysis Of the tei% ".}âaraméter" 
or - a^ -dlRHAP calls it :in his-material exolsnations - of 
the term -"name. i\^ th ahùiildetêr'^ ined meah^  ^ (the feet that 
this terhi coincides; with which we 7.d.sh to understand '
-  54 -
by "parameter" follows clearly from examples given by CARITAP). 
The syntactically distinguishing feature of parameters in 
comparison with variables is - according to CARNAP - the fact 
that they do not admit of substitution; that is, if we re­
place in our above example the variable ’x’ by a parameter 
'p*, then we are not allowed to infer 'P(a)* from 'P(p) '. 
Later on, however, CARNAP says about a parameter 'p' that, 
by it, a certain thing is designated, without however speci­
fying at first (but perhaps at a later stage) which. But 
what is the fundamental difference between substituting a 
constant 'a* (in the case of a variable ’x') and specifying 
which particular constant 'a' is to be taken (in the case of 
a parameter *p')? I do not see any. Except that, in the lat­
ter case, a certain restriction may be put on the range from 
which *a' has to be chosen, while, in the former, it is al­
ways the whole type that is at one’s disposal. In our ex­
ample on p.51, for instance, the parameter 's’ is restricted 
to the class of straight lines, 'p^ ' to the points on the 
line s, 'pg' to the points on this line different from p^.
And so on. But obviously, if a certain formula containing 
parameters has been proved, then it holds for all constants 
chosen from the appropriate domain; which means that, even 
in the case of parameters, derivation by means of substitu­
tion is admitted, at least in a restricted sense.
For the sake of clarity, we shall - in our syntactical
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considerations - attach the suffix 'f to the symbol 'p' of 
the parameter (thus 'p^') if the latter is restricted to the 
range f. Here, 'f has to be a constant or a parameter pre­
viously introduced; that is to say, 'f* must not be inter­
preted as a variable on which 'p' depends. In practice, of 
course, suffixes of this kind may be left out.
The problem of substitutability is only one aspect of 
the situation. Apart from the question of how to utilize 
further a formula with parameters, something has to be said 
about the procedure by which we arrive at a formula of this 
kind.
In order to be able to introduce a parameter 'p^ ' of 
which it is required that it fulfils a certain property f, 
we must first ascertain whether there is at least one element 
with this property; the validity of the formula 
(21) (gx)f(x)
is a necessary condition (and incidentally also a sufficient 
one) for introducing a parameter of the specific kind under 
consideration *29, This existential condition will be a tau­
tology only if f is the universal class (or property); in 
this case, the parameter 'p' would be introduced by a phrase
*29 We have deliberately left on one side the case 
where - in an indirect proof - a parameter 'pf' 
with the hypothetically assumed property f is 
introduced only for the sake of disproving the 
formula '(gx)f(x)' by deriving a contradiction.
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like this: "let 'p' be any individual whatsoever".
If - in the course of a derivation - a formula
(22) P(pf)
occurs containing the parameter 'p^ ' satisfying condition 
(21), then - in contradistinction to the case of a variable 
- we cannot infer '(x)F(x)' and further 'P(a)' for apy con­
stant 'a', but only "(x)(f(x)3F(x))' and hence »f(a)DP(a)'; 
for, the precise meaning of (22) is
(23) (gx)f(x). (x) (f(x) 3 F(x) ) *30
Similarly, if - instead of (22) - we are concerned with
a formula involving more than one parameter, say
*30 (23) is, however, only to be understood as a mate­
rial interpretation of (22); that is to say, (22) 
and (23) are not to be regarded as mutually de­
rivable formulae. While 'gx)f(x)' is a consequence 
of (23), it does not follow from (22), but it is a 
necessaiy condition for (22) to be significant. 
Another point which, without conment, makes the 
"translation" of (22; into (23) equivocal, is the 
following, which is quite analogous to the diffi­
culty that has to be overcome in the employment of 
descriptive expressions. If 'P* is a compound 
function, in the simplest case '~g', then we have 
the choice between interpreting
either as the negation of^23) with 'g* instead 
of 'P':
^{(qx)f (x) .(x) (f (x) 3 g(x) )} 
or as the formula which results from (23) by re- 
placl:« 'P-
•/.-g(p-)' is here intended to be understood in the 
latter sense ; or, in other words and more general­
ly, in order to interpret a sentence containing
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(24) F(pf,qg) *31
we may translate this into
(25) (gx) (gy) (f (x) .g(y) ). (x) (y) (f(x) .g(y) o P(x,y) ) 
which is an obvious generalization of (23) *32«(we can, by 
the way, arrive at this formula by eliminating first *p' and 
then 'q', or vice versa, by the method described above apply­
ing to one parameter only). From this we see that, again, we 
cannot infer '(x)(y)P(x,y)' and 'F(a,b)' for any constants 
'a' and 'b', but only '(x)(y)(f(x).g(y)o F(x,y))' and 
’f(a).g(b)3F(a,b)'.
This restricted generalization and substitution, re­
spectively, are the syntactical characteristics of a para­
meter, analogous to the properties (i) and (ii), stated 
above, which we regarded - in agreement with CARNAP - as 
syntactical characteristics of a variable.
So far we have only spoken of "formulae containing 
parameters", that is to say, of expressions of the fornn of 
sentential functions with parameters at their argument-
*31 We need not consider separately the case where two 
parameters *p* and 'q' are introduced simultaneous­
ly on the condition that they stand in a cejrtain 
relation, say R, to one another. It is true, one 
might - for the sake of clarity - write 'F(p,q)g* 
in this case (instead of (24)); but the condition 
mentioned may also be Indicated by writing
'F(pj)ig,qgipV which is of the form (24).
*32 The same applies, naturally, to (24) and (25) as 
that which has been said before regarding (22) and 
(23) (of. footnote *30).
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places. This kind of employment of parameters could easily 
be avoided in practice, without considerably lengthening 
the derivations, namely by virtue of the translations given 
above (see (23) and (25)) into formulae not involving para­
meters. Of greater practical importance is the employment of 
descriptive functions of parameters. Let us first consider 
an example. Let h be the class of human beings, and 'p^ ' a 
parameter appertaining to this domain; further, let de­
note the relation "father". Then the following formula holds:
(26) (x)(x£ h P (^2_y)y Fx)
Since, however, the individual type V need not be exhausted
by h (it may, for instance, consist of all physical objects),
we are not necessarily in a position to prove
(27) (x)(2iy)yFx
which would enable us to introduce the descriptive function 
'F*x'. (We agreed only to admit descriptions of such a kind 
as satisfy the corresponding uniqueness condition; see as- 
suniption (iv) on p.31.) But, by making use of
(28) (gx)x&h
which is obviously true, we can translate (26) into
(29) (]iy)yFph
("there is one and only one object y which stands in the 
father-relation to p^, no matter which object fï*om the range 
h is denoted by validity of (29) clearly sug­
gests the introduction of the "descriptive function of the
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parameter" 'F»Ph' ("the father of pj^ ", where 'p^ ' de­
notes some human being).
In the general case, we shall proceed in the same way. 
Always when we have a class 'f and a relation 'R* satisfy­
ing (21) and
(30) (x)(x £ f 3 (g]^y)yRx)
we shall consent to admit the introduction of the descrip­
tive function
(31) R*Pf
of the parameter 'p^'. (This rule may be regarded as a supple­
ment , to the formation-rules of the syntactical basis.)
In many cases not only (30) can be proved but, moreover,
(32) (x)(2iy)yRx
This may either follow from the specific properties of R, or 
it may even be a tautology; the latter does, for instance, 
always occur when 'R' is of the form , where 'S' may be 
any relation whatsoever. It is then permissible to intro­
duce the descriptive function in the usual sense
(33) R*x
where (31) may now be considered as a result of substituting 
'Pf' for 'x' in (33). (Again, it must be observed that, for 
the admissibility of a substitution of this kind, the valid­
ity of (21) is required.)
In general, if 'R' is any 2-termed relation, we may 
understand by the following sub-class of the converse
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domain of R:
(34) %  =cf y((3ix)xRy)
Let have a name of its own, say, the "characteristic do­
main" of R, The characteristic domain of R is the universal 
class only if (32) holds ; it may, on the other hand, also be 
empty. If, however, it is not the null class, it is admis­
sible to introduce a parameter 'p' in and, according to 
the definition of ' ,  to form the descriptive function
(35) R»p
of the parameter 'p'. Here, *p' runs through the greatest 
possible range for which 'R»p' is significant. We shall in 
general, if no suffix is attached to 'p', assume tacitly 
that, in an expression like (35), 'p' refers to this great­
est domain, i.e, to the characteristic domain of R. More 
generally, the introduction of 'R*Pf' is admissible if, and 
only if,
(36) A * f c
is true, (35) represents the best available substitute for
(33) which, according to our conventions, must not be employ­
ed unless (32) is demonstrable.
The expression (35) can itself be regarded as a kind of 
parameter, assuming the elements of R"%^ as its values; we 
shall speak of it as a "derived parameter". An ordinary pa­
rameter over the same range can also be introduced : 'Pr"*„'« 
For, firstly, 'R'W is always a significant description and,
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secondly, if is not the null class, then neither is 
empty.
Apart from introducing derived parameters, one may even 
reiterate the concept of a parameter, namely by introducing 
a parameter over a range whichfitself depends on a parameter 
previously introduced. If, for example, the parameter 'q' de­
notes any circle (for simplicity, we leave out the suffix 
designating the class of circles), then we may want to intro­
duce a parameter 'p' which denotes any tangent of q. Suppose, 
denotes the relation "tangent of"; then our parameter 'p' 
refers to the range ^q, where '^ »q' is itself a derived pa­
rameter, This procedure will be acknowledged as permissible 
in general, and we shall call 'p' (or, more precisely, 'Pgiq' 
or, still more precisely, 'l^»q^') an "iterated parameter". 
The idea of an iterated parameter as introduced here 
already includes the following two important special cases.
If the parameter 'q' denotes itself a non-empty class, a pa­
rameter 'p' can be introduced whose range is q. This is 
achieved by putting 'R' equal to since, for every class
01, we have
(37) cA
Examples let q be a circle (i,e, a certain class of points), 
and let p then be any point on the circle (i.e, an element 
of q). Further, to every class oc univocally determined by q 
by means of some relation Ss = S»q, we may introduce a
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parameter *p* having oC as its range. By putting 'R* equal to 
'£|S*, we see that 'S*q' is synoi^mious with 5 for, quite
generally,
(38) (2]!o() ((AS y) 3(S»y = Tf^y)
holds for every y [proofs t|8»y = x(x(t|s)y) = x(2<n.)(xt<X. 
.(XSy) = x(xtS’y) = S’yJ. To give an example, we simply 
alter the enunciation of our previous examples let q be a 
circle and let oc be the class of its tangebts; then *p* is a 
parameter with the range o<*
We have so far only considered descriptive functions of 
one variable or of one parameter, respectively. The
admission of many-termed descriptive functions does not bring 
about any new problems, and it is merely a question of choos­
ing appropriate notations. If 'R(x2,xg,...,Xg)' is an n-termed 
sentential function (n>l), we shall put - in generalization 
of the case n*2 -s
(39) ^(xg,...,%) =Df XiR(xi,X2,...,%)
and
(40 ) R '( x g , . . . ,X n )  ( l x i ) R ( x i , X g , . . . , % )
where the latter is again, of course, only admissible pro­
vided that
(41 ) (xg) « (Xjj) (g%X2)R(X]^,Xg,. . .  ,X jj)
holds. Similarly, the corresponding descriptive functions of 
suitably chosen parameters 'Pg'» • • •»'Pn* introduced:
•!?»(Pg,...»Pn)'» 'H*(pg,...,Pn)'» provided that, # again.
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certain obvious conditions are satisfied.
Example, Let *p' and 'q' be two point-parameters (more 
explicitly, we ought to write 'pp.,.' and 'qp,^ ' ; compare the 
notations of geometrical concepts introduced on p.43); then, 
if we define
(42) R(x]^,Xg,X3) betw(xg,X2,Xg) v %2=Xg v x^^Xg
the closed interval with the endpoints p and q can be de­
noted by (p,q) '. Since this class is not empty, we may
introduce a new parameter 'r' having it as its range*
'i^^p Thus *r' is a derived parameter, denoting any
point of the closed interval (p,q), i.e. an element of a 
class itself depending on two parameters.
The expediency of the notations here introduced will 
become clearer from the applications in the next chapter.
IX. Parameter-tvpes
(a) Preliminary remarks
Although the possibility of comparing an object-type 
with the corresponding syntactical type has already been 
pointed out, in our previous tentative procedure it has al­
ways been the object-types that have primarily been taken 
into consideration, while the syntactical types - due to 
their greater dependence on syntactical conventions - have 
appeared to be something of less significance. This view
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corresponds in a way to the older positivistic epistemology, 
according to whose correspondence theory of truth it was the 
main task of science to reconstruct the world linguistically 
and to verify its statements by comparison with facts, - 
which are extra-linguistic and, moreover, pre-linguistic»
This dualistic point of view whichjf put in opposition the 
"given" objects and facts on the one hand and the artificial 
symbols and sentences on the other, has been represented 
among others by WITTGENSTEIN, eight years ago by CARNAP, and 
still quite recently by SCHLICK Epistemology has now, 
however, developed into its syntactical stage, and the desire 
for an extra-linguistic justification of linguistic state­
ments has been recognized as metaphysical and therefore aban­
doned. Verification of a statement is carried out by con­
fronting it with other statements of a certain kind (for in­
stance, the protocol-statements of practical physicists) and 
is thus rendered intra-linguistic. The "given" are no longer 
the "facts" but certain individual experiential statements, 
and these, moreover, do not constitute the initial material 
from which scientific inference proceeds to general laws.
♦33 L.WITTGENSTEIN, Tractatus logico-philosophicusj 
London 1922.
R.CARNAP, Der logische Aufbau der Welt; Berlin 
1928.
M.SCHLICK, Ueber das Pondament der Erkenntnis; "Er- 
kenntnis" 4, 1934. Facts and propositions ; "Ana­
lysis" 2, 1935.
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but only the final test material that has to be in agreement 
with the results of "test-deductions" which have as their 
premises the hypothesis that is to be tested and certain 
already accepted statements.
Here, we are not so much concerned with facts and sen­
tences , but rather with objects and symbols (words), and in 
particular with their type distribution. Let us now try to 
apply a "syntacticalization" of the kind just described to 
our specific problems. Our considerations in previous chap­
ters will not/invalidated thereby; it only means a treatment 
of the subject under a slightly different aspect.
Instead of regarding the objects as the primarily 
given, we shall start out from the syntactical types which 
will be built up anew with the help of the idea of para­
meters. After having established in this way the complete 
system of object-designations, we may pass on to the objects 
themselves, - not, however, to their enumeration or to the 
establishment of the correlation subsisting between them and 
their designations (which could not be carried out within 
the linguistic limits of the particular scientific system 
under consideration). The only legitimate and, in general, 
non-tautological statements about the object-types which 
can be formulated with the means at the disposal of the 
object-language, are rather assertions about the cardinal 
numbers of the various types (as has been pointed out by
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HILBERT/BERNAYS *^,) Thus it will be a question of finding 
out the consequences in this respect of the syntactical con­
ventions of the employed language, in particular of those 
conventions on the basis of which the syntactical types are 
erected.
The main characteristics of our procedure - or, rather, 
of the tendency underlying our procedure - will therefore be, 
firstly, an inversion of the deductive order (syntactical 
conventions as the starting point, statements about objects 
as resulting consequences; rejection of the fonner, if the 
latter are not in agreement with the experiential require­
ments), and secondly, a conscious refusal to leave the domain 
of the linguistic. In particular, on account of the latter 
principle, we shall have to abandon unmentionable objects 
(as WITTGENSTEIN reconmended the abandonment of inexpressible 
facts); however, as we have seen as a result of our previous 
investigations, we cannot possibly get along with naraeable 
(i.e. definitely describable) objects alone. This is mainly 
a question of existential sentences, so that wexshall have 
to deal with the conditions under which it is expedient to 
call an existential statement admissible. Our standpoint in 
this respect will turn out to occupy an intermediate posi­
tion between the strictly constructivistic view (BROUWER)
*34 Cf. footnote *12 on p. 12.
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and the strictly formalistic view (HILBERT, before the 
publication of GÔde l's results).
From our revised point of view, the object-type designa­
tions, 'V, , and so on, appear to be mere auxiliary
symbols, serving mainly for the purpose of expressing cardi­
nal number statements such as 'Nc»V = ...', (It may be noted 
that the fact that a certain symbol, say 'a*, designates an 
individual cannot be adequately expressed by writing 'atV ; 
for, 'atV is always a tautology, - provided that it is a 
correctly formed sentence at all. Thus the fact mentioned 
can only be expressed in the syntax-language of the calculus 
in question. This confirms, or at least illustrates, our pre­
vious assertion according to which cardinal number state­
ments are essentially the only statements concerning the 
object-types that are expressible within the object-language.)
(b) Erection of the syntactical types
We shall again assume that we are concerned with a 
particular axiomatic system; let U be the appertaining set 
of undefined fundamental symbols and A the set of its axioms 
(notations as in Chapter Vb, p.33).
Let S«p be one of the syntactical types. The class of 
those elements of U which fall within Sfj> may be denoted by 
Uj (with the exception of the Individual type S, where we 
shall write 'Uq ' in contradistinction to 'U' which denotes
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the union of all the Uj). In the majority of axiomatic sys­
tems, all Uip except those of the zero- and of the first level 
are enç)ty, so that, in this case, the undefined fundamental 
symbols are already exhausted by Uq and
Every syntactical type Sj consists of three mutually 
exclusive sub-classes, namely the variable sub-type vSj, the 
constant sub-type c&p, and the parameter sub-type pS^ (ear­
lier, in Chapter VI, the latter was not taken into account); 
any symbol or symbolial expression of belongs to vS^, cSq,, 
or pSgi, according as it is a variable expression, a constant 
expression, or a parameter expression, respectively.
These three sub-classes will be constructed separately 
in each case.
As concerns vS^, it is a generally accepted convention 
(at least to my knowledge) to admit any required number of
*35 In "Das Unendliche in der Mathematik und seine Aus- 
schaltung" (Leipzig, 1930), F.KAHÏMANN defended the 
principle of admitting only axiomatic systems of 
this kind. We are inclined to replace this view, 
in accordance with CARNAP*s Principle of Tolerance, 
by the weaker assertion that an axiomatic system 
- whose undefined fundamental symbols are confined 
to the zero and the first level, has the practical 
advantage of being simpler and thus easier to 
handle than one for which this is not the case.
It was on account of this, that, in my formaliza­
tion of HILBERT'S axiomatic system of geometry 
(cf. footnote *27, p.43), I decided to represent 
the congruence-relations as relations of the first 
level, although HILBERT'S ariginal treatise sug­
gested their introduction as relations of the se­
cond level.
-  69 -
different variables. They may be denoted by *x', 'y*, or 'z', 
with one of the suffixes »1',»2*,... attached to it if neces­
sary; in addition, in cases where the respective type is not 
obvious from the context, an appropriate type-index may be 
prefixed, for instance* practice, these notations
are unnecessarily complicated, and the same letters may be 
used with "systematic ambiguity"; only for the convenience 
of the reader is it customary to reserve the letters 'x','y*, 
... for vS, »f','g',... and •oc«,‘P',... for vS^, and «R»,'S', 
... for vSg. However, this procedure - which is, for in­
stance, the practice adopted in "Princlpia Mathematica" - 
makes the possible differentiation between variables of dif­
ferent types appear quite incidental, and misleadingly sug­
gests that, on principle, one might as well do with one kind 
of variables only. It can easily be seen that this is not 
the case and that the type differentiation of the variables 
is, in some cases, indispensable. If, for example, 'x' were 
considered to be both an individual vaz*iAble and a relational 
variable (of the first level), then the well-known formal 
definitions of the obj ect-types V and Vg would both have the 
same definlens ;
(43) V =Df x(x = %) , Vg =j3f x(x = x)
which is absurd. Instead of (430, we have to write more ac­
curately* ^
(44) V =Df ®x(°x = °x) , Vg =Df ^x(2x = ^x)
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(Incidentally, the expressions inside the brackets are irre­
levant in this case; they may be replaced by any tautological 
expression 't's V °x(t), Vg =Df ^x(t).)
Anyhow, there are no fundamental problems arising in 
this connexion, and it is mainly a question of an appropriate 
choice of notations, - a question which may be Bedded dif­
ferently in every single instance.
Apart from variables, we have to dispose of the other 
categoiy of variable expressions contained In vSg,, namely, 
the descriptive functions, and this can likewise be done 
quite easily. Whenever 'R' is a 2- or more-termed (say, n- 
termed) predicate satisfying (41) (see p.62), then 'R*(jg,
4® admitted as a descriptive expression, provided 
that the expressions 'jg'»»»«»'Jn' either variables, or 
themselves admissible descriptive expressions. This stipula­
tion is obviously regressive, and in order to make it legi­
timate, we have to add the additional requirement that the 
expression 'R*(jg,...,jn)' has to be of finite "degree", 
where its degree is said to be k, if the highest of the de­
grees of its argument-expressions 'jg'»«»»»*^n* (vari­
ables being given the degree 0). If 'R* belongs to 
°®STT®Tg»-**»ST^’ 'R»(J2»---»Jn)’ will be assigned to
Our next task will be the establishment of the constant 
sub-types cS^. The union of these has earlier been denoted
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*^ u* (Chapter Vb, p.33). Cy thus represents the complete 
system of proper designations of objects (in the wider sense). 
In order to construct the system of these constant expres­
sions, we shall have to carry out in greater detail the pro­
cedure outlined in Chapter Vb,
Before doing this, it may be emphasized again in this 
connection, that the term "constant" is a relative one» By 
calling an expression of an axiomatic system a constant ex­
pression, it is only intended to state that it belongs to 
the syntactical genus of those expressions which, in the 
system in question, have the syntactical properties of con­
stants; however, it does not mean that a constant expression 
denotes an object fixed once and for all, A univocal corre­
lation of this kind is only effected after having undertaken 
an interpretation of the whole system by means of correlative 
définitions. The word "constant" therefore refers only to the 
intra-systematic behaviour of an expression, leaving out of 
account inter-systematic and interpretational relations. If 
one wishes to accentuate the relativity of the constantness 
of expressions, one may - with C.J.KEÏSER - call the 
axiomatic system a "doctrinal function" of U, and one may, 
further, refer to the elements of U as "interpretational
*36 The nature of the doctrinal function; Scripta 2, 
1934.
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parameters" *37,
The transition from U to %  is carried into effect by 
definitions. Every constant term which does not itself belong 
to U, must be capable of being traced back to terms of U by 
a definition chain of finite length. The erection of the 
cSp’s is therefore tantamount to giving a complete list of 
admissible definitions.
Let us make the convention of writing every definition 
in explicit form. This is possible by making use of the 
classial and relational operators ('x’, and of the
descriptive operator (*(i x) •), The method may be indicated 
shortly,
(i) Sentential functions* A definition of the form 
'f(x) =Df F(x)' whose definiens and definiendum are both 
sentential functions ('F(x)' is to be understood as an ab­
breviation of some sentential function of x), can be re­
placed by *f =2f x(F(x))', Similarly in the case of many- 
termed sentential functions,
(ii) Descriptive functions* Instead of *R>x =jjf Q’x', 
we can write *R Q*, In practice, it is frequently more 
convenient to retain the first form of definition, because 
it then follows from the mere form of the definiens that the
*37 O.HELMER, On the syntax of axiom-systerns ; read be­
fore the International Congress for scientific 
Philosophy, Paris 1935,
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uniqueness condition which is required for the introducibi- 
lity of 'R*x*, is fulfilled; while, in the case of the second 
form of definition, this uniqueness condition requires a se­
parate proof,
(iii) Regressive definitions: Instead of introducing 
•R* by the pair of definitions ’R»l a* and 'R»n+1 =>j)f 
Q»R»n', we can write 'R =Df (i S)(S»1= a,(n)S»n+l= Q»S»n)‘ or, 
in order to avoid the objectionable formation 'S»x' where
•S' is a variable, 'E =Df 0 S) {(y)(gix)(x Sy).aSl.(n)(x)
(x Sn+1 3 xQ(Siî) *, The uniqueness condition belonging to the 
latter form of definition must:be fulfilled since the same 
condition is required for the admissibility of the original 
regressive definition. Similarly for cases of more complica­
ted regressive definitions,
(iv) Definitions in use : These are sometimes employed 
for the introduction, not of proper object-designations, but 
of special logical relations and operations which one does 
not wish to introduce as undefined fundamental concepts with 
a corresponding axiom-system. It is usual to apply this pro­
cedure only in the following two cases: (a) the introduction 
of the e-relation, (b) the introduction of the descriptive 
operator,We deal here with these two cases as follows, (a): 
Since we agreed to designate a sentential function and the 
corresponding extension by the same symbol, we are in a 
position to define ’&• explicitly; namely, we put, firstly.
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(45) ^(x) =jyf f , ^(x,y) R , ...
and then
(46) £ =Uf.^(x) *38
(the analogue to the e-relation for 2- and more-termed sen­
tential functions - though usually not introduced - will be 
defined below; in the case of 2-termed sentential functions, 
we simply agree to consider *R(x,y)’ and 'xRy' as synony­
mous) . (b) : The descriptive operator is here not defined at 
all, but plays the part of a syntactical definitional opera­
tor whose application is regulated by these two syntactical 
conventions: o(. A definition of the fom
(47) a =jjf (ox)f(x)
is admissible if and only if the coivesponding uniqieness 
condition holds *39. |3. If a definition of the form (47) has 
admissibly been laid down, then *f(a)' is a true formula.
Explicit definitions - to which we can now restrict 
ourselves - have the advantage that heither side of the de­
finitional equation contains any free variables. We dis­
tinguish the following 6 kinds of definitional processes.
(i) Generalization. Let *F* be a 2- or more-termed 
constant relation. Then the following two definitions are 
admissible :
*38 Cf, formulae (10) and (11) on p,27,
*39 Cf, assumption (iv) on p.30,
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G =Df yz..((x)F(x,y,z,,,.))
®Df yz..((gx)F(x,y,z,...))
(ii) Specialization. If, again, *F» is a 2- or more- 
termed. constant relation and if, further, 'a' is a constant 
suitable for the first argument-place of ' F’, then it is ad­
missible to define:
(50) G yz..(F(a,y,z,...))
(iii) Permu^tation. If 'F' is a 2- or more-termed con­
stant relation, we obtain another constant relation by 
changing the order of its arguments:
(51) G =pf X]_. .^i%hA*1^2. .%(F(x]_,..
^^l:*m*^4n+2* * • :*n) )
(In the case of n=2, (51) degenerates into
Q =Df xiX2(F(xg,xi)) 
and similarly for n=3.)
(iv) Junction. By a "junction" we understand, in the 
first place, the formation of a new sentence out of one or 
two given sentences by means of one of the logical connect­
ing-constants ’•*, ’V», »P', ‘=’. All these are de­
finable in terms of SHEFFER’s stroke-ftmction. Here, we will 
not consider (9§@^@S@@ sentential formations, but the corre­
sponding classial and relational formations. All these are, 
again, reducible to one junction, namely the analogue to 
SHEFFER's sti"oke-function, which we will denote by '/', 
Similarly to ' = we shall employ '/' and the derived junc­
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tions ' — 'uS 'n’,... with systematic ambiguity; that is 
to say, we shall use the same symbol for classial and rela­
tional types and irrespectively of the type level.) If 'f 
and 'g' are any two classes or relations of equal type, ’f/g' 
is synonymous with '-fe/— g*. We now stipulate: if 'f and 
•g' are any twd constants of the same and not of the indivi­
dual type, then
(52) h =Df f/g
is an admissible definition,
(v) Description. If 'f is a constant class (or, 1- 
termed sentential dtunction) of any type level, then the de­
finition
(53) a =jjf (ox)f(x)
is admissible, provided that the uniqueness condition
(54) (2i^ x)f(‘x)
(or, f £ 1) is satisfied,
(vi) The (.-relations. As opposed to (i) - (v), we shall 
here not lay down a definitional schema but state the actual 
definitions of certain symbols which are, incidentally, lo­
gical constants, since their definiens does not contain any 
specific constants of our system in question *40. Let 'R' be 
a variable of the type St (different from the individual
TÏ4Ô Logical constants comply, formally, with the same 
rule as the other constants: they can be traced 
back to the undefined fundamental symbols. They 
are, in fact, defined on the basis of the null 
class of undefined fundamental symbols.
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type S). Then we puts
(55) =Df ^...R(R(x,y,.,.))
In particular, instead of 'tg» (=jjf ^(R(x))), we shall 
simply write '£* , which is in agreement with the usual nota­
tion, since 'e(x,R)' and ’x t R ’ are synonymous expressions 
The six kinds of definitions enumerated above represent 
elementary definitional steps. Other definitions - which are, 
however, theoretically unnecessary - may be obtained by com­
bination of several of these steps at a time. In (iii), for 
instance, only the permutation of two neighbouring argument- 
places is accounted for at first; but by repeated application 
of the same definitional schema, any permutation of the argu­
ment-places may be effected. Further, the definition by means 
of identifying variables,
(56) f =D[f xR(x,x)
(and similar in general), can be built up from our elementary 
steps by using the equivalence
(57) R(x,x) = (gy)(R(x,y).x=y)
As to definitions like
*41 In practice, when the meaning is unambiguous from 
the context, the type-suffix attached to 'e* may, 
of course, be omitted. Further, instead of 
't(x,y,R)S it may prove simpler to write 'x,y tR' 
in analogy to the case of classes; if so, it must, 
however, be remembered that 'x,y' is not a desig­
nation of a couple of objects, but a couple of 
object-designations. The same applies to more than 
2-termed relations.
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(58) R ^(F(x).G(y))
it appears at first sight doubtful whether they can be con­
stituted from our original steps, since @y) seems to provide 
only for definitions like
(59) H =jyf x(F(x).G(x))
(which, in terms of '/', reads: H =-Qf F/G/^/G) ; however, we 
may first introduce
(60) Fi xyF(x) , G]_ =jyf 3^ ^(y)
and then we may put
(61) R =j3f î’i'^Gl
where, of course, 'n* can be expressed in terms of '/'; and 
(61) has the same meaning as (58). Another form of definition 
which is already included above and which might be denoted as 
the inverted forination of classes and relations, is
(62) * “pf f(f(a)) , K =Lf xf(f(a,x)) , ...
It can be obtained by combining (vi) and (ii).
Apart from purely logical constants, the definition of 
a new term requires the employment of certain other constants 
which must either be defined previously or belong to Ü. From 
a consideration of our elementary definitional pro­
cesses we gather that, in general, these constants are of a 
higher type than the one which is being defined, namely, 
either relations of the same type level but with more argu­
ment-places, or - as in the case of descriptions - even of 
a higher type level. In other words, there are definitions
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which effect an abatement with respect to the type *42, as a 
consequence of this, we are not in a position to construct 
the syntactical types separately one after the other, begin­
ning with the individual type S and then proceeding to the 
higher tj^ pes. The construction rather takes the form of an 
inductive procedure. If 'Cy' denotes again - as before, see 
p.33 - the union of all cSj, we may define * Cy consists, 
firstly, of the terms of U and, secondly, of all those terms 
which can be obtained from Ü by applying a finite number of 
times any of the definitional steps (i) - (vi) in an arbitrary 
order. The sub-division of Cy into the different cS^ does not 
involve any new problems, since the type of a defined term 
can always be seen without difficulty from its definiens. We 
have therefore reached the accomplishment of the construction 
of the cSt 's.
The third and last step in the erection of the syntacti­
cal types will now be the construction of the parameter sub- 
types pStp. The path we shall have to follow is already 
clearly suggested by the reflections on parameters in the 
preceding chapter. We Jave spoken there of ordinary para­
meters, of iterated parameters, and of derived parameters.
*42 There are, on the other hand, definitions which 
raise the type level. These are always bound to 
make use of an e-relation - whether explicitly 
or implicitly. Examples are the definitions (17) 
on p.48.
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In the first two cases, it is a question of introducing a new 
symbol, say 'p*, representing any element of some class f, 
where 'f* has been previously introduced ('p' will be an ordi­
nary or an iterated parameter according as 'f* is a constant 
or itself a parameter). On the other hand, in the case of a 
derived parameter, say 'R»p*, *R' as well as 'p' have been 
introduced before, so that it is merely a question of an ad­
missible employment and not one of introducing any new sym­
bols.
The syntactical act of introducing a new constant takes 
the form of a definition and is linguistically formulated by 
means of the syntactical symbol Quite similarly, we
may invent a shorthand standard-form for expressing the in­
troduction of a hew parameter-symbol (either ordinaiy or 
iterated)t
(63) p £jjf f
('f* being a constant or a parameter); here, 'Eyf* is a syn­
tactical symbol,-- corresponding to '“pf '. The "parameter- 
definition" (63) requires that 'f* is a classial symbol and
that
(64) (]x)f(x)
is demonstrable. If 'f belongs to the syntactical type S&p 
(and, in particular, either to cSg^ or to pSg,p), then 'p’
belongs to p8r«
In analogy to denoting by ' Cy' the union of the cSip's,
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let us for the moment understand by *Py* the union of the 
pS^'s. Then it will be sufficient to construct inductively 
the aggregate %, since, again, the sub-division of Py into 
the different pS^'s is a trivial matter.
Similar to the case of the var^fiables - and in contra­
distinction to that of the constants - every ordinary or 
iterated parameter may be introduced in as many "copies" as 
one chooses; in other words, several parameter-definitions 
may have the same definiens. Thus, for instance, the two 
parameter-def ini tions (63) and 'q t-Qf f* are well compatible 
with one another. In what follows, this multiplicity of each 
sort of parameter will not be explicitly expressed but merely 
be tacitly kept in mind.
(i) Ordinary parameters. For every classial constant 'f', 
satisfying (64), (63) is an admissible parameter-definition.
(ii) Iterated parameters. For every classial parameter 
•f (either ordinary, or iterated, or derived), satisfying
(64), (63) is an admissible parameter-definition.
(iii) Derived parameters. Let 'Pi','Pg* >•• •»'Pn* (“ >^) 
be any parameters (either ordinary, or iterated, or derived), 
having the ranges fi,fg,...,fn, respectively; and let ’R’ be 
an (n+1)-termed relation satis^ring
(65) ^(xi){n Xi tf±o(jix)R(x,xi,xg,...,Xn)}
Then the descriptive parameter-function 'R»(p]^ ,Pg,...,Pjj)' is 
called a derived parameter. (Compare (40) on p.62; (39) is
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only a special case of (40) and need therefore here not be 
separately taken into account.)
Now, Py consists of all those parameters which can be 
obtained from Cy by applying a finite number of times az%r of 
the steps (i), (ii), or (iii) in an arvitrary order.
Hereby, the erection of the syntactical types is com­
pleted.
(c) Establishing cardinal numbers
Before turning to the consideration of the object-types 
- which will mainly be, as has been pointed out earlier, an 
investigation of their cardinal numbers - we shall have to 
devote a few pages to reflections on the establishment of 
cardinal numbers in general.
According to the classical theory of cardinal numbers, 
which we will adopt here, the cardinal number of the class 
f is less than or equal to the cardinal number of the class 
g, if there is a one-one-correspondence between f and some 
sub-class of g. If the cardinal number of f is less than or 
equal to that of g, and vice versa, then f and g are said to 
have the same cardinal number; in this case, by a well-known 
theorem by CANTOR, there exists a one-one-correspondence be­
tween f and g themselves. The cardinal number n of f may 
therefore also be defined as the class of all classes g 
which can be univocally correlated with f, so that the two
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expressions "f has the cardinal number n" and "f is element 
of the cardinal number n" are synonymous»
The cardinal number of a given class f is a relative 
magnitude, inasmuch as it depends on the one-one-correlators 
that are declared to be admissible *43, The statement con­
cerning the existence of a certain correlator can be inter­
preted in several essentially different ways, and even within 
each of these possibilities, the truth or falshood of that 
statement depends on the stipulations of the syntactical 
basis.
The most natural interpretation which suggests itself 
(and which has often been solely taken into consideration), 
is the "internal" one, according to which a cardinal number 
statement is an existential sentence of the theory in quest­
ion ("of the object-language" in CARNAP'S terminology); it 
is in this sense that the term 'cardinal number' is used in 
the classical Theory of Aggregates. As usually, the internal 
cardinal number of f vfill be designated by 'Nc»f, so that
(66) Nc’f * Nc*g 
is merely a short form of writing
(67) (]R) R a f ^  g
where 'f @n g' denotes the class of one-one-correlators be-
*43 Cf. R. CARNAP, Die Antinomien und die Unvollstëndig- 
keit der Mathematik; Monatshefte für Math.und 
Fhysik 41, 1934. Embodied in the English edition 
of the "Syntax" (see footnote *8, p.9).
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tween f and g (cf. "Principia Mathematica" I). The existential 
operator occurring in (67) refers, of course, to the corre­
sponding object-type (in the simplest case, if f belongs to 
Vi, to Vg), and the material interpretation of a sentence 
like (67) is therefore dependent on the constitution-rules 
determining the comprehensiveness of the object-types, - 
rules which we are just about to lay down.
While, according to this internal interpretation, a 
cardinal number statement is tantamount to the validity of 
some existential formula asserting the existence of a corre­
lator 'R', one may go further and demand not only existence 
but, moreover, constructibility of an 'R'. A cardinal number 
statement then becomes a syntactical statement asserting 
that a certain constant 'R' is definable in the object-cal- 
culus, satisfying a formula of a certain kind. This "con­
structional" interpretation thus refers to the constant sub- 
types of the syntactical types instead of to the object- 
types, - as the internal interpretation does; and it will 
therefore in general be materially equivalent to the latter 
only in the case of a theory with minimum object-types *44, 
that is, in the case where the object-types are isomorphic 
to the abstractive classes (in respect of the relation of 
identity) of the constant syntactical types.
*44 Cf. p.40.
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It may often happen that, in the internal sense, a class 
f has the cardinal number n or the classes f and g have the 
same cardinal number, without implying the corresponding fact 
in the constructional sense, because a suitable correlator 
cannot explicitly be defined. For instance, in ordinary 
EUCLIDean geometry of two or three dimensions, the cardinal 
numbers of the classes of points and of straight lines, re­
spectively, are incomparable in the constructional sense, 
while, in the ordinary internal sense, their cardinal numbers 
are equal (=c, the cardinal number of the continuum).
The concept of cardinal number - whether in the internal 
or in the constructional sense - is applicable not only to 
nameable classes but, in the form of universal or existential 
sentences, also to unnameable ones. Examples: "There are 
point-classes f of a kind such that the corresponding closed 
point-classes g have a greater cardinal number", "The number 
of roots of an algebraic equation of degree n with real co­
efficients is less than or equal to n".
A cardinal number comparison in the internal as well as 
in the constructional sense concerns object-classes and can 
be effected by merely considering the object-language, - 
though, in the constructional case, the result cannot be 
formulated within the object-language itself. As opposed to 
this, there is a third possible sense in which we can speak 
of cardinal numbers. Statements on cardinal number in this
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sense are not only inexpressible in terms of the object- 
language, but definitely require for their decision an ex­
amination of the syntax-language ; we may therefore speak of 
a "syntactical" interpretation. The interpretation we have 
in mind no longer concerns object-classes and correlations 
between their elements, but one- termed predicate symbols 
(classial symbols) and correlations between their respective 
admissible arguments. The actual definition of the syntacti­
cal cardinal numbers will be carried out in several steps.
Let 'S' be a sentence of an axiomatic system whose 
axiom-system is 'A'. Then, by the "content" of 'S', we under­
stand the class of non-tautological sentences which are de- 
ducible fl*om ' A.S'. Two sentences 'S^ ' and 'Sg' are called 
"equipollent" if they have the same content. In particular, 
any two true or any two false sentences are equipollent. Any 
two undecidable sentences are, however, in general not equi­
pollent; example : an undecidable sentence and its negation. 
(In this connexion, sentences involving parameters are to be 
treated in accordance with the interpretation given on p.56.)
We shall now, first of all, define the term 'syntacti­
cally isomorphic'. Two predicates 'f and 'g' (not the clas­
ses or relations f and g) are called syntactically isomor­
phic, if there is a one-one-correlation between the possible 
argument-expréssions 'a' of 'f and 'b' of 'g' such that the 
correlated sentences 'f(a)' and 'g(b)' are always equipol­
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lent. (By "there is" is meant in this case, that a correla­
tion of the required kind is constructible in terms of the 
syntax-language ; thus it is not regarded as sufficient, if 
merely the existence of such a correlation is demonstrable 
in the syntax-language.) This definition, though its enuncia­
tion coincides with that given by CARNAP *45 ^ has neverthe­
less in our system a slightly different meaning which is - 
I think - more adequate for the purpose intended. The diffe­
rence consists in the fact that the syntactical types of our 
system are richer than those of CARNAP*s, since, apart from 
variable and constant expressions, they also contain para­
meters. Thus, instead of demanding a correlation of constants 
only or of constant and variable expressions (I am not quite 
clear as to which of these two possibilities is the one in­
tended by CARNAP), we make the stricter requirement that pa- 
rameter-arguments also have to be correlated with one another. 
The advantage effected by this procedure will become clear 
presently.
Let us now, in particular, consider one-termed predi­
cates (class-designations). A predicate *f* of this kind - 
and likewise, unless it is undefined, its definition - may 
be called "normal", if, for any suitable argument 'j* what- 
soWever, the sentence *f(j)* is decidable (i.e. demonstrable 
or refutable) in our axiomatic theory under consideration.
If two normal predicates *f* and »g' are syntactically iso-
*45 Cf. footnote *43 on p.83,
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morphic in the sense defined above, then there exists a syn­
tactical one-one-correlation between those of their arguments* 
for which they are true (the remaining consequence that there 
is a like correlation between those of their arguments for 
which they are false,, is irrelevant at the moment). This fact 
suggests saying that, under/these conditions, *f* and 'g* 
have "the same syntactical cardinal number".
It might be asked whether the same definition could not 
be applied to non-normal predicates also, so that "being syn­
tactically isomorphic" and "having the same syntactical car­
dinal number" would mean the same in the case of one-termed 
predicates. A stipulation of this kind would, however, not 
be advisable, since it is a useful convention to reserve the 
term "number" to cases where the customary rules for the 
reckoning with numbers are valid (which is the very same con­
vention that, in the theory of ordered aggre^tM, led to de­
noting the classes of similar aggregates in ^ @@0 general as 
"ordinal types" and to reserve the term "ordinal numbers" to 
the special case of well-ordered aggregates). In our case, 
the definition in question would have the effect that two 
syntactical cardinal numbers would not necessarily be com­
parable with one another in respect of their magnitude (which 
applies likewise to ordinal types).
When it is a question of a definite axiomatic system, 
i.e. one which is void of undecidable statements, then every 
one-termed predicate is bound to be normal. However, when we 
have an indefinite axiomatic system - and these can by no 
means be left out of account - jdien it is, indeed, very dis­
concerting that one cannot get hold of all one-termed predi­
cates by a suitably chosen concept of "syntactical cardinal 
number". Even the following consideration does not offer a
satisfactorily practicable escape from 
this circumstance. One might, firstly, try to proceed by pro­
hibiting all except normal definitions, - a convention (thou^ 
complying with one of FREGE's demands) that would imply a 
disastrous mutilation of the theory in question, not to 
mention the difficult and often inaccessible task of giving 
a proof of its normality and thereby ot its admissibility 
for every definition which one desires to lay down. Thus, up 
to the present day it is, for instance, unknown whether the 
definition of the important term 'rational number's
(68) rat =pf ^(iy)(2z)(y,z tint.z^O.Z3Py)
(where 'inf denotes therclaiss of integers) is a normal de-
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finition. On the other hand, one might admit non-normal pre­
dicates, and might calculate the syntactical cardinal numbers
of the latter by counting only those of their arguments for 
which they are true and leaving altogether out of account 
those for which they are undecidable. In other words, if 'f 
is a predicate, one might assign to it the same syntactical 
cardinal number as to the "corresponding normal predicate" 
•f*', which is true for those, and only those, arguments for 
which 'f is true, and false for all others. It has to be
realized that such a procedure - which, in itself, is well
worth considering - represents an abandonment of classical 
logic with respect to one important point. According to the 
classical view, a given property either does, or does not, 
appertain to a given object; or, syntactically expressed, a 
given predicate is, for a given argument, either true or 
false, - though it need not be decidable which of the two 
takes place. This bipartition of the argument-expressions 
adherii^ to a predicate would have to be replaced by a tri­
partition if we accepted the suggestion under discussion.
This would have the effect, though the comparability of the 
syntactical cardinal numbers of any two predicates would be 
reassured, that, by adding the syntactical cardinal numbers 
of ' f' and •—f•, we should not necessarily obtain the syn­
tactical cardinal number of the corresponding universal 
predicate, say, 'V* (if 'f belongs to Si); which means that 
the formula 'fv—f = V ,  expressing the Law of the excluded 
Middle, would have to be given up, and that we would, again, 
be confronted with the fact that one of the customary rules 
for the reckoning with cardinal numbers had become invalid.
So far, we have only defined equality in syntactical 
cardinal number. If 'f and 'g' are, again, two normal pre­
dicates, we shall say that the syntactical cardinal number 
of 'f is less than that of 'g*, if it is not equal to it, 
and if there is a syntactical one-one-correlation between 
those arguments for which 'f' is true and a sub-class of 
those arguments for which *g' is tine. It follows from this 
definition that, if 'fcg' is demonstrable, then the syntac­
tical cardinal number of 'f is less than or equal to that 
of 'g'.
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Finally, a stipulation has to be added in order to make
possible, not merely the comparison between, but also the
syntactical
establishment of/cardinal numbers. We might simply count up 
all the different constant and parameter arguments for which 
the predicate 'f* is true, and call the number we arrive at 
its syntactical cardinal number. It is, however, more reason­
able - in pafiticular, in view of finite predicates - to pro­
ceed somewhat differently. Let n^ be the number of unequal 
constant arguments 'a',*b',... for which 'f is true; here, 
the constants 'a' and 'b' are called unequal, if the identity 
'a = b' does not hold *46^ Consider, further, the cardinal
numbers of all systems of parameters (ordinary or iterated or
derived) 'p',*q','r', .  for which 'f is true and which are 
mutually unequal and different from 'a','b',..., i.e. which 
satisfy the inequalities 'p + q', 'p + r',... and 'p + a’,
‘p + b*, 'q 4* a',..,; and let ng be the least cardinal number
that is not exceeded by any of them. Then we put
(69) n = n-]^ + ng
and call n the syntactical cardinal nutber of 'f. Examples:
(i) In PEANO(s, system, the predicate *f' defined by
(70) f(x) =j3f X  < 3
is true for the constants *0','1','2' and no others (thus, 
ni = 3); there is no parameter 'p' satisfying the four con-
*46 Incidentally, n^ is the constructional cardinal 
number of f.
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ditions 'p + O', 'p + 1', 'p + 2', 'f(p)' (thus, ng = 0); 
hence, the syntactical cardinal number n of 'f is 3. (Inci­
dentally, we also have Nc’f = 3, and, since the three objects 
with the property f are all explicitly nameable, the cardinal 
number in the constructional sense is likewise 3.) (ii) Con­
sider the predicate 'pt' in HILBERT'S system of geometry; 
there is no constant point (thus, n^ = 0); let p^ be any 
point, let pg be any point different from p^, and so on, and 
let - for any m - p^ , be any point different from Pi,P2,...,%_]ÿ 
it follows easily from the axioms of geometry, that 'p^','Pg', 
' P3 ' , . . .  are admissible parameters, so that ng'»]'<(oî hence, 
n>j\fQ. (The question as to whether n is actually equal to or 
greater than will be discussed below.)
It will hardly have escaped the reader's attention that 
the definition of "syntactical cardinal number" presupposed 
that, in the syntax-language, "we know how to count" ; which 
amounts to the assumption that the syntax-language itself has 
already at its disposal a well-defined concept of cardinal 
number (in the internal or in the constructional sense). Does 
this cardinal number-concept of the syntax-language itself 
necessitate an analysis in terms of the syntax of the syntax- 
language? And are we thus confronted with one of those un­
avoidable infinite regresses? This fear is unjustified. For, 
on the one hand, it is not again syntactical cardinal numbers 
that are required in the syntax-language, but merely either
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internal or constructional cardinal numbers. And on the 
other, there is a circumstance determining the concept of 
'syntactical cardinal number' that has not yet been accounteâ 
for and that has to be stipulated rather than recognized.
This stipulation concerns the way in which we introduce new 
constants or new parameters by means of definitions or para­
meter-def initions , respectively. For on principle it might be 
allowable to employ symbols for constants or parameters like 
'ap* or 'Pp', where the suffix 'r' i-uns through, say, all 
real numbers (of the syntax-language), or all ordinal numbers 
(of the syntax-language), or some similarly terrifying aggre­
gate, any of which would require careful treatment under fre­
quent recourse to the syntax-syntax-language. This possibility 
we shall prohibit in our system by laying down the rule that 
new symbols may only be introduced either singly or in de- 
numerably infinite number by means of complete induction 
(see, for instance. Example (ii) in the preceding paragraph). 
This convention seems to me to be particularly necessary, if 
it is intended to comply to any reasonable degree with the 
requirements of HILBERT'S "finiter Standpunkt", which has 
never been formulated with perfect precision, but which un­
doubtedly tends to treat an object-language involving highly 
indefinite terms by means of a metalanguage whose terms are 
at least indefinite to a lesser degree.
V
Only after this new convention has been laid down, and
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not before, are we in a position to say that every syntactical 
type is denumerable. For it is certainly infinite, but it 
cannot be more than denumerably infinite, because it is cre­
ated by definitional acts carried out one after the
other, each of which introduces at most denumerably many new 
symbols. (Hereby, the desideratum of Example (ii), above, is 
disposed of: the predicate 'pt' is syntactically denumerable.)
When the definition of the term 'syntactically isomor­
phic' was given (p.86), it was maintained that the inclusion 
of parameters is more serviceable in comparison with CARNAP's 
procedure. His main purpose in introducing syntactical corre­
lations besides interaal correlations was the removal of the 
apparent contradiction in FRAENKEL's theory of aggregates be­
tween the existence of non-denumerable aggregates of aggre­
gates on the one hand and the fact that, by the Axiom of Li­
mitation, there are no other aggregates but those which can 
be constructed in a finite number of steps from two initial 
aggregates, and which are thus at most denumerably many; this 
paradox vanishes - as CARNAP has pointed out - if one dis­
tinguishes between internal and syntactical denumerability.
This purpose can, in fact, be attained by considering 
constant and variable arguments only (or even only the for­
mer), without introducing parameters ; but this is only pos­
sible on account of the fact that FRAENKEL's theory of aggre­
gates is a system with a minimum individual type *47, that
*47 Cf. p. 43.
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is, a system with none but nameable individuals, and that can 
therefore be dealt with quite adequately without taking re­
course to the idea of parameters. But if we consider a system 
like geometry where some (in fact, all) individuals are un­
nameable, the definition of syntactical cardinal numbers would 
have undesirable consequences if it only referred to con­
stant and variable arguments - a fact which has apparently 
been overlooked by CARNAP. For let us consider, for example, 
the two fundamental geometrical predicates 'pt' and 'si' *48, 
Constant arguments of the zero-level are not available, so 
that the definiens of 'equal in syntactical cardinal number' 
would be trivially satisfied by 'pt' and 'si' if it referred , 
to constants only. On the other hand, if we admit variables 
as arguments also, we may correlate every variable 'x' with 
itself; then 'pt(x)' and 'sl(x)' are corresponding sentences, 
and since they are both false (not all individuals are points, 
nor are all individuals straight lines), they are certainly 
equipollent ; which means that, again, 'pt' and 'si' are tri­
vially equal in their syntactical cardinal number. Thirdly, 
CARNAP'S intention could have been to include among the argu­
ments to be correlated, not merely variables, but also the 
other kind of variable expressions, namely, descriptive func­
tions. This can only be done, provided that the condition is
*48 Cf.p.43.
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accepted that only those descriptive functions 
are admitted which fulfil the corresponding uniqueness con­
ditions
( 71) Cxg) • • • 1^ 1  ^ ^2  ^• • •
(compare p.31), because otherwise expressions of the form 
*R> (xg, • • • ,Xj^ ) • do not admit of regular substitution and can­
not be treated as arguments in the ordinary sense. But even 
so, if descriptive functions are admitted on this condition, 
the situation is by no means improved, - at least not in the 
case of geometry. For, in geometry, it is impossible to de­
fine a single descriptive function (xg, ...,x^) ' of the in­
dividual type that does not assume every element of V as its 
value ; and a descriptive function of this kind is, for our 
purpose, equivalent to a variable, since *f(R> (x2, • •#,Xj^ ) ) * 
and *f(x)’ are equipollent (namely, true if and only if *f* 
is the universal predicate). Thus, also in this third inter­
pretation of syntactical cardinal numbers in CARNAP*s sense, 
*pt* and *sl* would still be trivially given the same syntac­
tical cardinal number. And moreover, in all three cases, this 
common syntactical cardinal number would be 0, since, on the 
same grounds, and the null predicate ’A* turn out to
have the same syntactical cardinal number.
This consequence does not arise if we consider para­
meters also. Let, for instance, »q* be a parameter with the 
range pt; then ’pt(q)* means the same as  ^(^ )^ (pt(x)) *(x)
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(pt(x)D pt(x))' (compare (23), p.56) or as ' (gx)pt(x)' which 
is a consequence of the axioms of geometry, 'A(..)’>
on the other hand, becomes a false sentence, whatever expres­
sion is put into its argument-place. Thus 'pt(q)' and its 
correlate '/\(..)' are certainly not equipollent seni^ tences, 
which means - by definition - that *pt' and ’A' do not agree 
in their syntactical cardinal number. Also, the fact that 'pt' 
and 'si* have the same syntactical cardinal number, is demon­
strable, but no longer in a trivial manner. It follows, in 
fact, by reconstructing with the help of parameters one of 
the usual proofs whichj^show the equivalence in the internal 
sense of pt and si,
(d) Erection of the ob.iect-types
Some of the objects of the axiomatic theory under con­
sideration need not be nameable. From this fact it is clear 
that it cannot be expected that the erection of the object- 
types takes the form of an enumeration or of a construction 
similar to that of the syntactical types. We are merely’ 
concerned with giving information in reply to the purely ma­
terial inquiry as to which and how many objects belong to the 
various object-types. Though part of this information can be 
given in terms of the object-theory - namely, in the form of 
internal cardinal number-statements - its significant part 
consists of non-formal explanations to be given in terms of
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the syntax-language, embracing comment on those cardinal 
number-staements. And it is thus mainly the material under­
standing of the axiomatic object-language and the undertaking 
of interpreting it, for which the knowledge of the object- 
type structure is essential.
It has been said bes^ fore, that we want to carry out the 
erection of the object-types in such a way that they do not 
contain any elements but those which are nameable in the 
widest sense, that is to say, which are either actually name- 
able, or which are at least - together with other elements - 
collectively covered by a name-substitute, i.e. a parameter. 
This rather vague demand has now to be replaced by a more 
definite stipulation.
There is no need to say very much about the nameable ob­
jects ; except that the term 'nameable object' itself is no 
longer quite adequate, since the revision of our earlier
standpoint has rendered the names primary to the objects. But
this is merely a minor question of terminology. The point is 
that, to every name 'a' belonging to the syntactical type, 
say, S^:
(72) 'a' e Sj
(or, more precisZely, 'a' tcSq»), there is one and only one
'named object' a in the corresponding object-type (a fact
which cannot be expressed through the tautology 'a ; 
compare p.67). In other words, when one interprets the ab-
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stract axiomatic system, it is necessary to provide exactly 
one thing which is intended to bear the designation 'a'. It 
may be mentioned that, unless the interpretation is effected 
by direct ostension, the thing which one wishes to correlate 
with 'a' must already be capable of being talked about, that 
is, it must already have a name, say 'k' (which - apai’t from 
exceptional cases - belongs to a different linguistic system)« 
In this case, the interpretation is an intra-linguistic cor­
relation between symbols of different kinds, and the recourse 
to objects - as the things designated by those symbols - can 
be avoided altogether.
The situation is more involved as regards parameters.
In material interpretation we can say that, to every para­
meter 'p*, there must be at least one object of reference 
belonging to ’p’5 I deliberately do not give it a name, in 
order to avoid the impression that an element of this kind 
must be definitely describable within the object-language. 
Since there are no more than denumerably many parameters (see 
above), it is - from this point of view - not necessarily 
required that there are more than denumerably many elements 
of any type whatsoever (where 'denumerably many* is, of 
course, employed as a cardinal number of the syntax, for 
parameters can only be counted within the syntax-language).
In pursuit of our previously established principles - which 
may shortly be characterized by the name of OCCAM - we will
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now stipulate that the minimum cardinal number thus required 
should not be exceeded by the objects the theory in question 
is concerned with. This can be expressed differently and more 
precisely, thus: when an interpretation of the object-theory 
is to be undertaken, then the number of things provided for 
the object-type Vgi - this number being arrived at by counting 
within a language which firstly comprehends the syntax of our 
theory, and which secondly admits of talking about those 
things - should be equal to the syntactical cardinal number 
of 'Vy' (in the sense introduced above on p,90). Similarly, 
if, instead of the whole type Vj, we consider any of its non­
empty sub-classes f, the nunflier of things provided as ele­
ments of f - and thus covered by the collective name 'p^ ' - 
should be the syntactical cardinal number of the predicate 
'f.
Under these assumptions, the utmost structural similari­
ty between syntactical and corresponding object-types, that 
can be attained at all, is ensured and thus any unaccountable 
abundance of objects is prohibited.
But how have we to interpret materially any internal 
cardinal nunflaer statements that may be derivable in our ob­
ject- theory? As long as we remain within the range of finite 
numbers, the situation is comparatively unproblematic ; it is, 
in the first line, the infinite numbers that require some 
comment, mile, syntactically, we only have one kind of in-
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finity, namely, denumerability, it may well occur that a 
class f - and all the more the corresponding type, say, Vy - 
turns out to be internally non-denumerable :
(73) Nc’f > Ko >
For instance, if the object-theory contains an ordinary arith­
metic, it will be demonstrable that the class of real numbers 
is non-denumerable • How can such an internal fact be recon­
ciled with our external knowledge - which is founded on cer­
tain stipulations - of the material denumerability of every 
class whatsoever? An instance of this only apparently para­
doxical state of affairs - it is, in fact, RICHABD’s antinomy 
in a different formulation - has already occurred on p.93.
We then pointed oiit (with CARNAP) that, to a class f, there 
may be assigned two different cardinal numbers without any 
paradox arising, provided that one is a cardinal number in 
the internal and the other in the syntactical sense. This 
reflection removes the apparent entinomy, but does not yet 
materially explain the possibility of a discrepancy between 
the cardinal numbers in the two different senses. However, 
a formula like 'Ec»f >  always admits of two different 
material interpretations : (i) it may be interpreted as mean­
ing, that f contains too many elements to be capable of being 
univocally correlated with a denumerable aggregate ("richness- 
interpretation^*), or (ii) it may be interpreted as meaning, 
that the class of one-one-correlations is too incomprehensive
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to contain any element which might effect a univocal correla­
tion between f and some denumerable aggregate ( "poomess- 
interpretation"). Thus, strangely enough, if the state of 
affairs arises that, in the object-theory, some of the clas­
ses of objects (in the wider sense) turn out to be non-de- 
numerable, this may be put down either to the richness or to 
the poorness of the object-language with respect to the ex­
tents of its object-types (see footnote *43, p,83). Here, 
in accordance with our previous stipulations, we have to 
choose the second alternative, that is, we have to explain 
the above-mentioned discrepancy by a lack of suitable one-one- 
correlations in the appropriate object-type.
Our finitistic view led us to the assumption that only 
those objects exist whose existence is required by the pre­
sence of a name or a name-substitute (a parameter). It must 
be recognized that it is, not in spite of, but to a certain 
extent on account of this finitistic view, that some of the 
object-types are, in general, non-denumerable *49. Let us 
take as a concrete example - which is at the same time of the 
greatest importance - the aggregate R of the real numbers 
(which can be introduced in every object-theory that is not 
entirely "finite" (see Case (1) in footnote *49)). By means
*49 With respect to the internal cardinal numbers of the 
object-types, there are only these three possibili­
ties: (i) every type contains only a finite number 
of objects; (ii) every type contains an infinite 
number of objects, the individual type being the 
only one which is denumerable; (iii) all types are 
non-denumerably infinite.
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of CANTOR'S famous diagonal method, the non-denumerability of 
R is proved in the following manner. Suppose, there is a one- 
one-correlation between the real numbers and the positive in­
tegers, i.e. an enumeration of R; then a real number could be 
found that does not occur in R, which would be a contradict­
ion; hence, R is non-denumerable. Here, the phrase "there is 
an enumeration of R" is materially interpreted by us as as­
serting the existence of a correlation which is nameable in 
the widest sense. We know, on the other hand, that the syn­
tactical cardinal number of 'R' isjVfo? which means that a 
syntactical enumeration of 'R' - let us call it a "RICHARD- 
enumeration" - is possible. Since R is internally non-de­
numerable , an equivalent to such a RICHARD-enumeration cannot 
be defined within the object-language ; it can, in fact, not 
even be named in the widest sense. How, the ranges of refer­
ence of the existential operators of the object-language are 
the object-types; in our finitistic system, these contain no 
elements but such as are nameable in the widest sense. If one 
is, however, unhampered by finitistic scruples, then one mi^t 
admit the construction of a system of types, where the exist­
ential operators may refer to definitely unnameable objects 
as well, for instance, to those RICHARD-enumerations. Because 
of this abundance of correlations, R would then be denumer­
able. A system of this kind cannot, however, be consistently 
constructed, unless further precautions are taken. These have
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to be of such a kind that, by the diagonal method applied to 
a RICHARD-enumeration of R, a real number should not be ob­
tainable which cannot belong to R (RICHARD'S antinomy). This 
prohibition can be achieved by ruling that a new real number 
may only be introduced on the basis of a constructive pro­
cedure and not on account of a purely existential statement.
A system of the kind just described, but rejected by us, 
would - I daresay - still be compatible with HILBERT's forma­
listic standpoint. On the other hand, we do not exaggerate 
our constructivistic tendencies to the extent practised by 
the intuitionists: we do admit undefinable objects. In the 
case of the axiomatization of EUCLIDean geometry in the 
customary way, this is an obvious necessity. Alsd, if we ex­
amine again the real numbers, we find that our assunq)tions 
lead us to the following situation. According to CARNAP (com­
pare footnote *43, p.83), we can, for every object-language 
allowing the treatment of real numbers, construct a real num­
ber in the corresponding syntax-language, of which it can be 
proved that it is undefinable in the obj ect-language. Simi­
larly, there are arithmetical properties which are definable 
in the syntax-language and yet undefinable in the object- 
language. If one admitted only definable objects as elements 
of the object-types - and CARNAP, for some reason unknown to 
me, at the place quoted, seems tacitly to adopt this con­
structivistic assumption - then, indeed, this fact would lead
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to the result that mathematics could not be formalized within 
one liguistic system, but that it would require an infinite 
sequence of ever richer languages. Prom our standpoint, how­
ever, this conclusion fails, and the infinite regress does 
seem avoidable.
The restrictions effected by the strictly constructivi­
stic view, which does not permit the employment of parameters 
as name-substitutes, is very serious indeed, even in the case 
of a theory whose individuals are nameable without exception. 
Thus, for instance, WEÎYL mentions that, as a consequence 
of the entirely finitistic way in which he constructs his 
system of types, there is no reason to suppose that every 
infinite aggregate contains denumerable sub-aggregates.
Summing up, we may say that our hierarchy of objects is 
not so restricted as the strictly constructivistic one of the 
intuitionists, end yet not necessarily so comprehensive as 
that of the formalists whose only criterion of existence is 
non-contradictoriness. In particular, our object-types are 
neither poor enough, nor rich enough, to prevent the indivi­
dual type from being non-denumerable.
fe) Supplementary remarks
It may be useful to add a few remarks regarding, first-
*50 H.WEYL, Das Kontinuum; 1918 (reprinted 1932).
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ly, axiomatic geometry which has been employed again and 
again as an illustrative example, and, secondly, our position 
in view of certain statements of particular importance, such 
as the axioms of infinity, of completeness, of selection, and 
so on.
It was the consideration of geometry that gave us the 
impulse for the introduction of parameters. Another geometri­
cal example may reassure us of the advantage of having intro­
duced parameters. Before making use of parameters, we were 
able to define the term 'circle', without however being in a 
position to speak about one single circle. But now, we may 
easily introduce single circles. Let, for instance, 'p','q*, 
•r' be three point-parameters, i.e. parameters with the range 
pt. Then the derived parameter 'coiig»(p,q,r)' (compare p.43) 
denotes the circle about p with radius q,r. If *circ’ denotes 
again the class of all circles (see (11% p.48), which are the 
internal and the constructional cardinal numbers of circ, and 
which is the syntactical cardinal number of 'circ'? The con­
structional cardinal number is certainly 0, since there is 
not a single explicitly definable circle. As to the internal 
cardinal number, it follows from the axioms of geometry that 
the formula
(74) Ne»circ = Nc*pt
holds, which reduces the question to the determination of 
Nc»pt. Finally, the syntactical cardinal number n of 'circ'
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is composed of the two numbers n^ and ng (see p.90), Here, 
is equal to 0 (cf. footnote *46 on p.90). Further, for,
if *q' and *r' are kept fixed and 'p' runs through an infinite 
number of unequal parameters (say, through the sequence *Px*» 
'P2*>'P3*>••• 0^ Example (ii) on p.91), then the expression 
'corig»(p,q,r)* likewise represents denumerably many derived 
parameters with the range circ, of which it can be proved 
that they are mutually unequal; hence ng^^^, and thus n = 
n^+ng “ Xq» since no syntactical cardinal number is greater 
than
Thus we notice that, in all three possible senses, the 
cardinal numbers of the points and of the circles coincide.
The internal cardinal number of pt depends on the parti­
cular set of axioms that are laid down, pt is certainly in­
finite (for Nc»pt cannot be less than the syntactical cardi­
nal number of 'pt'). But if one wants to obtain the conven­
tional system of EUCLIDean geometry, arrangements have to be 
made that pt may have the same cardinal number as the class R 
of real numbers. This can either be achieved by incorporating 
DEDEKIND's se ction-postulate (or an equivalent one) among the 
axioms, or by laying down HILBERT*s completeness-postu- 
late as an additional syntactical constitution-rule concern­
ing the comprehensiveness of the object-types (earlier, on 
pp.21-23, we gave reasons why it is impracticable to formu­
late this statement as an ordinary internal axiom). In both
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cases, the fact that pt is non-denumerable does not mean 
that more than denumerably many points can be named by means 
of parameters, but only that - for every given aggregate of 
denumerably many points - another point can be characterized 
éwith the help of parameters); this has the effect that the 
class of internal one-one-correlations between pt and any 
denumerable aggregate is empty.
Similarly to many axiomatic systems, that of EUCLIDean 
geometry does not require the separate erection of a special 
axiom of infinity, since the infinity of the individual 
range is already implied in the other axioms.
The axiom of selection, on the other hand, is independ­
ent of the geometrical axioms, and its validity therefore 
depends on a convention. The difference of the situation 
compared with that in the case of the axiom of infinity is 
not surprising. The latter is a statement about the indivi­
duals of a theory, the former only about certain objects in 
the wider sense ; or, in a very material mode of speech; the 
axiom of infinity states something about reality, while the 
axiom of selection states something about certain mental 
constructions which - no wonder - derive at least some 
of their properties from the pertinent conventions. If, in 
geometry, the axiom of selection is accepted as a valid 
principle, it may have an increasing effect on the internal 
cardinal numbers of some of the higher object-types;
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not because so many new elements can be "created" by succes­
sive acts of selection, but only because the non-existence of 
suitable correlations may be deducible on account of it.
Concerning the axioms of identity (in the case of geome­
try or in general), we can say this. Ear-lier, in Chapter II, 
we saw that we (g® have the choice between the set of axioms 
1% and Ig (formulae (6)) and a set consisting of I]_ and seve­
ral axioms like (8). The latter, as opposed to Ig, do not 
make use of the hi^er functional calculus, but instead they 
contain symbols peculiar to the special calculus that is be­
ing erected, so that they have to be specially adapted to 
every particular case; nevertheless, we preferred the second 
version in view of the indeterminateness of the higher func­
tional calculus. Now, however, we are no longer confronted 
with the possibility of an overwhelming abundance of the 
higher object-types, and universal and existential sentences 
of the higher functional calculus have consequently lost some 
of their frightening appearance. We need no longer worry lest 
the axiom Ig refers to "all" properties of individuals in 
some indeterminate sense; it merely states that, if 'a = b' 
holds, then a and b coincide in those properties which are 
relevant from the standpoint of the theory under considera­
tion, i.e. in those which are nameable in the widest sense. 
From the point of view of the parameter-types, there can 
therefore be said hardly anything which speaks definitely in
-  109 -
favour of one of those possible sets of identity-axioms. Only 
if it is a question of examining the import of the elementary 
functional calculus, then (8)+!^ would be preferable to (6).
X. Special tvne-hierarchies
The system of types underlying any scientific theory 
can be investigated from two essentially different aspects. 
Attention may be concentrated either upon the interior struc­
ture of the single types, or upon the exterior hierarchical 
order in which the types stand to one another. In the former 
case emphasis is laid on the types being aggregates of cer­
tain elements (objects, or designations of objects, of the 
theory in question), in the latter on their being themselves 
elements of a hierarchical system.
Our investigations in the preceding chapters have been 
carried out mainly from the first of these two aspects. And 
concerning the hierarchical oilier of the types, it has sinply 
been assumed that they form an infinite system of levels, 
beginning with the zero-level which consists of the one in­
dividual type. This ordinary infinite hierarchy is by far 
the most important form of hierarchy, since it represents 
the basis on which the majority of theories are erected. We 
were able to restrict ourselves above to the examination of 
this one example, because it sufficed to illustrate all we
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had to say about the interior structure of the logical types.
There are, however, numerous other possible type-hierar- 
chies. In order not to neglect entirely the aforesaid second 
aspect we will enumerate some of these below.
The n^^ level of a type-hierarchy is formed by the fol­
lowing types *51. (i) the various types of classes of ele­
ments belonging to one of the types of the (n-l)th level;
(ii) the various types of 2-termed relations between elements 
belonging to types of the ath ©r bth level, respectively, 
where the maximum of a and b is n-1; (iii) correspondingly 
the various types of 3-termed relations; and so on.
This holds, unless special restrictions are agreed upon. 
It may, for instance, be ruled that, on some or all levels, 
either all relational types, or those types of relations 
whose number of argument-places exceeds k, are banned.
Apart from this, two type-hierarchies can only differ 
by the number and/or arrangement of their levels. The levels 
of the ordinary infinite hierarchy described above and used 
before throughout can be numbered, thus: 0,1,2,3,...; we may 
say, that this particular leve1-system has the "character" 
(0,1,2,3,...). Other possible leve1-systems are those with 
the characters (o,l,2,...,n}, the most important of which is 
that with the character (o,l). The latter is the case where
*51 We put the following down in terms of object-types; 
in the case of syntactical types, everything is 
exactly analogous.
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the convention is laid down, that the theory in question 
should only make use of the elementary calculus of sentential 
functions. Of the corresponding syntactical types, then only 
the individual type contains variables (and pjxrajneters,. if 
desired), while these of the first level contain only con­
stants ; it is in this case impossible to introduce formal de­
finitions of the object-types of the first level,
It may, further, sometimes be expedient to introduce 
transfinite type-leveIs, i.e. a level-system with the
character (0,l,2,...,w,w+l,...) . Thisfcan only occur, if sen­
tential functions with infinitely many argument-places are 
admitted. The function 'f(x^^Xg,. . . . . . ) '  is counted as
belonging to one of the types of the -level, if the vari­
ability- ranges of 'xi','xg',...,'x^',... are types of the
... ,k^ ,... level, respectively, where lim k^= oo. 
Descriptive functions (and hence also sentential functions) 
with infinitely many argument-places have frequently been 
employed in mathematical practice, though - to my knowledge 
- up till now the attempt has not been made either to re­
construct such a procedure axiomatically, or to investigate 
it from the standpoint of the theory of types.
Again, for other scientific investigations (I am think­
ing H especially of biology or similar branches of science), 
it may be required to set up a type-hierarchy which has no 
initial individual type, but in which every element of any
-  112 -
type whatsoever can be conceived as a class of, or a relation 
between, elements of a lower type-level. We would thus arrive 
at a level-system having the character (...,-2,-1,0,1,2, . ;  
here, either only the integers, or even transfinite numbers 
also, may be employed as level-nombers.
Quite different from the level-systems mentioned so far 
is the following. A class x must not be capable of being an 
element of itself, because otherwise RUSSELL's antinomy ari­
ses. But no contradiction appears, if we permit a class o( to 
be an element of a class which, on its turn, is an element 
of (X itself. This brings us to the idea of periodic level- 
systems with the character {...,0,1,0,1,...^  , or, more gene­
rally , (•«.,0,l,..,,n,0,l,...,n,.. « As Dr * POPPER pointed
out to me, it is quite consistently possible to build up a 
theory on this kind of type-hierarchy, and one might apply 
this to the erection of a system of geometry, where straight 
lines are classes of points, and points classes of straight 
lines.
Finally, mention may be made of level-systems with seve­
ral dimensions. By a 2-dimensional level-system, for instance, 
a system is understood which has two separate individual types 
and their respective "pure" hierarchies, together with the 
hierarchy of "mongrel" types, whose elements are classes or 
relations referring back to both individual types. We may 
assign the character ■((0,0) ,(0,1),(1,0),(0,2),(1,1),(2,0),...}
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to a system of this kind, the leve1-numbers being complex in­
tegers. One might imagine that this idea is applicable to 
certain systems of geom&ry (first individual type: points; 
second individual type: numbers) or of psychology (first in­
dividual type: phaenomena; second individual type: human be­
ings). Similarly for more than 2 dimensions. The idea of many­
dimensional hierarchies can, of course, be combined with that 
of any of the systems previously mentioned, thus, for example, 
introducing transfinite levels in each dimension.
Let us now return for a moment to the syntactical types. 
If we examine any sentence of our object-theory, we notice 
that some of the partial expressions of the whole sentence 
are elements of certain syntactical types, and others are not. 
The latter include not only auxiliary symbols like brackets 
and operators like universal operators or logical connecting- 
constants, but also sentential functions and sentences (the 
whole sentence as well as possibly partial sentences). Here, 
to make it quite clear, we understand by a "sentential func­
tion" an expression of the form 'f(x%,xg,...)', and if we want 
to talk about the symbol »f alone, we call it a "predicate" 
or a "class-" or "relation-symbol". In the literature on 
logic, it has often not been thought necessary to distinguish 
between sentential functions and predicates, while, on the 
other hand, predicates and class- or relation-symbols used to 
be carefully differentiated. The situation is now just the
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reverse; for, the latter differentiation has been recognized 
as an unnecessary duplication, and the identification of sen­
tential functions and predicates has been given up, in order 
to prevent dangerous confusion. The difference between sen­
tential functions and predicates can, in fact, hardly be made 
clearer than by pointing out that only the predicates (as de­
signations of objects), and not the sentential functions, re­
quire a sub-division into types. The sentential functions, on 
the contrary, belong - syntactically considered - all to the 
same kind as the sentences (which can be conceived as 0-termed 
sentential functions); for, if 'A* and 'B* are expressions re­
presenting sentential functions (which may also be 0-termed 
sentential functions), and if 'S' is a sentence containing 'A' 
as a partial expression, then the expression resulting from 
'S' after replacing 'A' by 'B' is always again a significant 
sentence. The same thing is, of course, in general untrue with 
respect to the replacement of predicates by one another.
The totality of expressions (sentences, sentential func­
tions, object-designations, auxiliary symbols, and so on) of 
a given object-language is made the subject of investigation 
in the syntax of that ob j e ct-language. Those expressions con­
stitute the individual type of the syntax. Classes of expres­
sions (e.g. the class of sentences) and relations between ex­
pressions (e.g. the relations of replacement and of deducibi­
lity) constitute the types of the first level; and so on.
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It was TARSKI who recognized the desirability and even 
necessity (for instance, for the purpose of finding a satis­
factory definition of 'truth') of constructing a theory which 
simultaneously investigates the objects of the object-theory 
and the objects of the syntax (i.e. the expressions of the 
object-theory). A theory of this kind has been given the name 
"semantics". It not only comprises the object-theory and its 
syntax, but it also admits of dealing with the interrelations 
between the objects of these two theories, the most important 
of which is that of 'designation'.
What is the type-hierarchy of semantics like? To some 
extent its formation depends on conventions. It is possible 
- in particular, if the object-theory is concerned with 
physical objects - to incorporate the expressions among the 
physical objects, and thus to consider them as just one spe­
cial kind of individuals. But it seems more natural to build 
up semantics on the basis of a 2-dimensional type-hierarchy 
of the kind described above, consisting of the hierarchies of 
object-theory and syntax as its "pure" branches and of a 
number of "mongrel" types. The possibility of treating se­
mantics in this way, illustrates the potential significance 
of type-hierarchies with several dimensions.
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I. EinleitungP)
§ I. Bemerkungen zur Axiomatik.
Der axiomatische Aufbau einer Disziplin kann erst dann als ab- 
geschlossen betrachtet werden, wenn seine formal-logische Durch- 
führung vorliegt; denn erst dann 1st die Garantie gegeben, daB jene 
Disziplin die Gestalt eines automatisch funktionierenden Kalküls er- 
halten hat, der von den Mangeln der Umgangssprache nnd dem un- 
bewuBten Gebrauch der Anschauung befreit ist.
Die vollstandige formale Axiomatisierung einer Theorie beginnt zu- 
nachst mit der Angabe der Grundbegriffe (d. h. gewisser Grundzeichen, 
die in die Axiome als Variable eingehen) nnd der Angabe der Axiome 
in logistischer Fassnng.
1st dies geschehen, so entstehen die bekannten Problème, ob das 
angegebene Axiomensystem —  es bestehe ans den Axiomen 
Aj, Ag, . . ., A„, ihre Konjnnktion sei A —  (a) widersprnchsfrei, (d) ent- 
scheidnngsdefinit nnd (c) nnabhângig ist. (a) bedentet, daB mindestens 
ein Modell existiert, nnd (ô), daB samtliche Modelle isomorph sind^ ); 
beides sind Eigenschaften von A, nnabhângig von der Anfspaltnng 
in Ai, Ag, . . ., A„. Mit Hilfe der in dem betrachteten System formali- 
sierten SchlnBweisen die Gnltigkeit von (a) oder (b) nachznweisen, 
stoBt anf erhebliche Schwierigkeiten.^ ) Praktisch wird daher ein solcher 
Nachweis im allgemeinen nnr anBerhalb des formalen Systems ver- 
sncht, indem anf ein anfgewiesenes Modell Bezng genommen wird; 
ist dieses Modell speziell ein physikalisches, so wird man bestenfalls 
zn Anssagen gelangen, denen —  wie alien Erfahrnngssatzen —  nnr eine 
gewisse Wahrscheinlichkeit znkommt ; liegt dagegen ein arithmetisches 
Modell vor, so leistet dies nnter Umstanden eine Znrückführnng der 
fraglichen Problème anf die Losnng von (a) nnd (b) im Falle der Arith- 
metik.
1) Zahlreiche Anregungen zu der vorliegenden Arbeit gaben mir die Herren Pro- 
fessoren G. Feigl und H. Reichenbach. Für Ratschlage bei ihrer Ausführung danke 
ich Herrn Prof. R. Carnap und Herrn Dr. C. G. Hempel.
2) Vgl. R. Carnap, Bericht uber Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik, Er- 
kenntnis I (1930). -
3) Vgl. K. Godel, Über formal unentscheidbare Satze der ,,Principia Mathematical 
und verwandter Système, Monatshefte für Math. u. Physik 38 (1931).
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iy6 O l a f H e l m e r -Hi r s c h b e r g:
Das Problem (c), die Frage der Unabhangigkeit, pflegt aus okono- 
mischen Gründen aufgeworfen zu werden: man wiinscht, mit mog- 
lichst wenigen Axiomen auszukommen und solche zu streichen, die 
bereits aus den übrigen folgen. Im Prinzip kann man eine Theorie genau 
so gut auf einem abhângigen Axiomensystem aufbauen, und die For de­
rung der Unabhangigkeit verliert daher unter diesem Gesichtspunkt 
an Bedeutung. (DaB in anderem Zusammenhang die Frage der Un­
abhangigkeit zu fundamentaler Bedeutung gelangen kann, zeigt das 
klassische Beispiel des Parallelenaxioms, dessen Unabhangigkeit von 
den übrigen Axiomen der Geometrie grundlegend für die nicht- 
euklidische Geometrie ist.) Es sei hier nur noch darauf hingewiesen, 
daB Unabhangigkeit im Gegensatz zu den Fallen {a) und (6) keine 
Eigenschaft von A, sondern von A^ , Ag, . . ., A„ ist; stellt man also A 
auf noch eine andere Weise als Konjnnktion einzelner Axiome dar, 
etwa Bi, Bg, . . ., B„, so ist nun die Frage nach der Unabhangigkeit 
eine ganz andere. Dem Okonomieprinzip folgend müBte man A in 
moglichst viele, d. h. moglichst inhaltsarme Axiome aufspalten und 
von diesen Unabhangigkeit verlangen ; ob aber eine solche Darstellung 
als Konjnnktion moglichst inhaltsarmer Satze stets und eindeutig 
moglich ist, ist bisher nur im Falle des elementaren Aussagenkalküls 
bekannt (konjunktive Normalform). Der Nachweis der Unabhangig­
keit des Systems A^ , Ag, . . A„ geschieht übrigens nach dem Vor- 
gange von H i l b e r t ,  indem man für jedes Ay zeigt, daB seine Nega­
tion zusammen mit den übrigen Axiomen ein widerspruchsfreies 
System bildet (wofür, wie gesagt, die Angabe eines entsprechenden 
Modells ausreicht).
Der axiomatische Aufbau einer Theorie umfaBt nun aber noch eine 
weitere Aufgabe, die mit dem Nachweis der Entscheidungsdefinitheit 
zusammenhangt, aber wohl von ihm zu unterscheiden ist. Wenn hier 
namlich vom ,,axiomatischen Aufbau einer Theorie'' die Rede ist, so 
ist doch .gemeint, daB es sich um die axiomatische Nachkonstruktion 
einer bereits vorliegenden Theorie handelt und also nicht nur darum, 
gewisse Axiome A^ , Ag, . . ., A„ aufzustellen und nachzusehen, was 
allés aus ihnen folgt. Neben der formalen Frage der Entscheidungs­
definitheit des Systems A^ , Ag, . . ., A„ entsteht also die Sachfrage, 
ob die auf diesen Axiomen ruhende Theorie mit derjenigen überein- 
stimmt, deren Nachkonstruktion beabsichtigt war, d. h. ob sie wirk- 
lich die gewünschten Begriffe und Satze enthalt. Dazu wird es not- 
wendig sein, die wichtigsten Begriffe durch formale Definitionen aus 
den Grundbegriffen zu konstituieren, so wie die Beweise zumindest der 
wichtigsten elementaren Satze der Theorie mit den Mitteln der for-
Axiomatischer Aufbau der Geometrie in formalisierter Darstellung
malen Logik zu erbringen. Erst dann wird man sicher sein, daB das 
Axiomensystem seinen Hauptzweck erfiillt, namlich alle Satze der 
gewünschten Theorie zu implizieren.
§ 2. Plan für das Folgende.
Im folgenden soli nun der Versuch unternommen werden, in bezug 
auf den Aufbau der euklidischen Geometrie einen Teil des eben auf- 
gestellten Programms zu verwirklichen. Im AnschluB an die klas­
sische Arbeit von H il b e r t ^ )  soli vorgenommen werden:
(a) eine Vervollstandigung und Formalisierung des H i l b e r t  schen 
Axiomensystems (wobei sich die Vervollstandigung im wesentlichen 
auf die Erfassung von Bemerkungen erstreckt, die bei H i l b e r t  im 
Zwischentext stehen, dagegen für den formalen Aufbau unerlaBlich sind),
(b) die formale Aufstellung der wichtigsten Definitionen, u. a. der­
jenigen, die in H i l b e r t s  Aufbau enthalten sind,
(c) die strenge Ableitung einiger elementarer Satze der Geometrie.
Bei der Durchführung dieser Formalisierung ergab sich zwangs-
laufig eine Klarung, Verscharfung und gelegentlich auch Abanderung 
der vorliegenden Begriffsbildungen. Diese Exaktifizierung, die so er- 
reicht wird, erscheint als der eigentliche Sinn einer derartigen Formali­
sierung und rechtfertigt den mit ihr verbundenen Auf wand.
Die Fragen der Widerspruchsfreiheit, Entscheidungsdefinitheit und 
Unabhangigkeit sollen, wie aus der obigen Aufstellung hervorgeht, 
hier nicht behandelt werden. Vielmehr sei auf die Untersuchungen 
H i l b e r t s  verwiesen, der zu folgenden Ergebnissen kommt : i. Die 
analytische Geometrie stellt ein arithmetisches Modell dar, und jedes 
andere Modell ist diesem isomorph. Das bedeutet, daB Widerspruchs- 
freiheit und Entscheidungsdefinitheit des Systems gesichert sind, so- 
fern dasselbe für die Arithmetik der Fall ist. 2. Die H i l b e r t  schen 
Axiome A^ , A^ , . . ., A„ wurden zu gewissen Gruppen Bi, B2, . . ., B„, 
zusammengefaBt und für diese die Unabhangigkeit (durch Aufweisung 
entsprechender Modelle) bewiesen. Richtunggebend war hierbei nicht 
nur das Okonomieprinzip, sondern auch das Bedürfnis, gewisse nicht- 
euklidische Geometrien herzustellen. (Vgl. S. 176.)
Bevor mit dem formalen Aufbau selbst begonnen wird, sollen nun 
die angekündigten Resultate, die bei ihm erhalten wurden —  be- 
stehend in einer Prazisierung der vorgefundenen Begriffsbildungen —  
zusammengestellt werden. Der eigentliche Ertrag unserer Formali­
sierung wird also, im folgenden Abschnitt enthalten sein.
4) D. Hilbert, Gnmdlagen der Geometrie, 7. Aufl. 1930.
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II. Metalogische Bemerkungen.®)
§ 3. Die im vorliegenden eingenommene Position.
Bei Ausführungen, die sich mit den Grundlagen der Mathematik 
beschâftigen, ist es heute leider noch notwendig, eine UmreiBung der 
eingenommenen Position voranzuschicken. Das bedeutet nicht, daB 
wir uns auf eine philosophische Richtiing dogmatisch festlegen müssen ; 
es bedarf vielmehr nur gewisser Vereinbarungen über die Syntax der 
Sprache, die zur Verwendung kommen soil. Nach welchen Gesichts- 
punkten sollen wir nun aber unsere Sprache auswâhlen ? GewiB gibt 
es keine „richtigen‘‘ oder ,,unrichtigen'‘ Sprachen (vgl. C a r n a p s  
Toleranzprinzip®)) ; ausschlaggebend ist daher allein die Zweck- 
màBigkeit einer Sprache. In diesem Sinne werden wir im Interesse 
der Stringenz der Untersuchungen vor allem die logistische Dar- 
steUung an die Stelle der Umgangssprache se tzen  ; speziell soil dabei 
nach den Grundsâtzen der einfachen R u s s e l l  schen Typentheorie ver- 
fahren werden, da ihre ZweckmâBigkeit für die Vermeidung gew isser  
Widersprüche allgemein anerkannt ist; ans den gleichen Gründen 
wollen wir uns den finitistischen Bestrebungen des Formalismus und 
Intuitionismus môglichst weitgehend anschlieBen. Begriffsbildungen 
wie ,,WiderspruchsfreiheiP', ,,Entscheidungsdefinitheit“, ,,Existenz“ 
usw. sollen ferner stets im formalistischen Sinne ( H i l b e r t ,  C a rn a p )  
verstanden werden, d. h. als formale Eigenschaften oder Beziehungen 
von Zeichenreihen. Nach diesen Vorbemerkungen wenden wir uns nun 
einzelnen speziellen Punkten des geometrischen Auf bans zu, in welchen 
die Formalisierung eine Abweichung von H i l b e r t  erzw ang.
§ 4. Die Kongruenzrelationen.
H i l b e r t  unterscheidet die Relation der Strecken- und die der 
Winkelkongruenz in der Bezeichnung nicht voneinander ; dadurch wird 
leicht der Eindruck erweckt, als gâbe es in seinem System neben den 
drei Art en von Grundelementen nur drei Grundrelationen, nâmlich 
,,Inzidenz'% ,,Zwischen'‘ und ,,Kongruenz“, wàhrend er tatsâchlich 
deren vier gebraucht. Diesem Umstande muB bei einem formalen Auf- 
bau Rechnung getragen werden.
Beide Kongruenzen sind bei H i l b e r t  als logische Gleichheiten, 
d. h. als gewisse zweistellige Relationen aufgefaBt; ihre Argumente
5) Wie üblicli, client der Terminus ..metalogisch" der Kennzeichnung von Betrach- 
tungen über einen vorliegenden Kalkül.
6) R. Carnap, Logische Syntax der Sprache, 1934.
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sind dort Strecken bzw. Paare von Halbstrahlen, d. h. Gebilde, welche 
nicht zu den Grundelementen der Geometrie gehoren. Die Strecken- 
kongruenz ware demnach eine Relation zweiter Stufe, die Winkel­
kongruenz gar eine Relation dritter Stufe. Das hieBe, die relativ ele- 
mentaren Sachverhalte, die in den Kongruenzaxiomen ausgesprochen 
sind, mit all den Streitigkeiten um den hdheren Funktionenkalkül 
(vgl. § 7) belasten; insbesondere verstieBe man gegen jenen Grundsatz, 
der von F. K a u f m a n n ’) und anderen ausgesprochen und befolgt 
wurde, daB jeder Satz der Theorie durch Elimination aller Definitionen 
in einen Satz fiber die Grundelemente allein rückübersetzbar sein soli. 
Diesen Schwierigkeiten und Bedenken wollen wir im folgenden aus 
dem Wege gehen, um so mehr, als dies ohne eine Komplikation des 
Formalismus sowie ohne grundsatzliche Abweichung von der H i l b e r t -  
schen Vorlage geschehen kann: wir werden die Aussage, daB zwei 
Strecken bzw. Winkel kongruent seien, im systematischen Aufbau als 
eine Aussage fiber vier bzw. sechs Punkte auffassen ; beides sind dann 
also Relationen erster Stufe.
Bei der Winkelkongruenz ist insofern noch ein anderer Weg gangbar, als die Kenn­
zeichnung eines Winkels nicht notwendig durch drei Punkte geschehen muG. Man 
kann sogar eine besondere Kongruenzrelation für Winkel vermeiden, wenn man den 
Winkel als Geradenpaar mit Drehsinn definiert. Dann genügt eine vierstellige Kon- 
gruenzrclation, an deren Argumentstellen entweder Punkte oder Geraden stehen dürfen. 
Bei der Formulierung der —  entsprechend geanderten —  Axiome mu G dann stets 
angegeben werden, ob sich die Aussage auf Punkte oder Geraden bezieht, da die 
Axiome nicht für beide dieselben sind (so gilt z. B. A3 2 [vgl. § 12] für Geradenpaare 
nicht). Besonders einfach ist in diesem Fall die Definition des rechten Winkels: das 
Geradenpaar a ,b  ist ein rechter Winkel, wenn es zu 6, a kongruent ist. Die Unter- 
scheidung des Winkels von seinem Neben winkel ist durch die Ordnung des Geraden- 
paares (seinen Drehsinn) bestimmt. Dagegen ist der Winkel von seinem Scheitelwinkel 
nicht unterschieden. Bei Aussagen, in denen von diesem Unterschied Gebrauch ge- 
macht wird, mu G deshalb stets ein dritter Punkt hinzugefügt werden, durch den einer 
der beiden Scheitelwinkel ausgezeichnet wird. —  Damit wird dasselbe erreicht wie 
mit einer besonderen Kongruenzbeziehung für Winkel. Dieser Weg wurde hier aber 
nicht gewâhlt, um môglichst wenig von HILBERTS Aufbau abzuweichen.
§ 5. Vermehrung der Axiome.
Die Anzahl der Axiome muBte —  wie bereits angedeutet — vergroBert 
werden, da bei H i l b e r t  gewisse rein formale Eigenschaften der Grund­
relationen noch nicht ausdrficklich als Axiome formuliert wurden. Es 
handelt sich dabei um einige Reflexivitâts-, Symmetrie- und Tran- 
sitivitatseigenschaften. Ferner wird standig davon Gebrauch gemacht, 
daB zwei Elemente, die in der Inzidenzbeziehung stehen, einen Punkt
7) F. Kaufmann, Das Unendliche in der Mathematik und seine Ausschaltung.
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gemeinsam haben; diese Tatsache mu6 in einem weiteren Axiom ihren 
Ausdruck finden.
Da die Punkte, Geraden und Ebenen im System als gleichberech- 
tigte Grundelemente (Elemente gleicher, nâmlich o-ter Stufe) auf- 
treten, bleibt z. B. die Winkelkongruenzbeziehung noch sinnvoll, wenn 
ihre Argumentstellen etwa samtlich durch Ebenen besetzt sind. Es 
ist daher notwendig, ausdrficklich zu verlangen, daB z. B. die Winkel­
kongruenzbeziehung stets eine falsche Aussage liefert, wenn an einer 
ihrer Leerstellen kein Punkt steht.®)
U m  ferner die formale Entscheidungsdefinitheit des Systems wenn 
auch nicht zu sichern, so doch nicht von vornherein auszuschlieBen, 
wird aus den Axiomen folgen mfissen, daB die Klassen der Punkte, 
Geraden und Ebenen einerseits elementefremd sind und andererseits 
den Bereich der Grundelemente erschopfen.
H i l b e r t  formuliert seine Axiome im allgemeinen so, daB sie nicht 
mehr offensichtlich in eine Konjunktion von Teilaxiomen aufgespalten 
werden konnen ; eine Ausnahme bildet das Axiom von der eindeutigen 
Antragbarkeit eines Winkels, da sich ,,genau ein'' in ,,mindestens ein" 
und ,,hochstens ein" zerteilen laBt. Der einfacheren Formulierbarkeit 
zuliebe soil aber hier die Zusammenfassung in ein Axiom beibehalten 
werden.
§ 6. Halbstrahlen.
Unter den Definitionen, welche H i l b e r t  aufstellt, befindet sich eine, 
aus welcher hervorgeht, daB ein Halbstrahl als eine gewisse Klasse 
von Punkten aufzufassen ist. Mit Halbstrahlen wird dann weiterhin 
in ahnlicher Weise wie mit Geraden operiert; so wird z. B. von der 
Inzidenz zweier Halbstrahlen gesprochen. Wortlich genommen, ware 
dies natfirlich ein VerstoB gegen die Typentheorie, aber die angeffihrte 
Ausdrucksweise wird ja auch von H i l b e r t  zweifellos nur der Ab- 
kfirzung halber gebraucht. Bei einer strengen Formalisierung emp- 
fiehlt es sich, nur eine Gebrauchsdefinition daffir zu geben, was es 
heiBt, ein Punkt liege auf einem durch zwei andere Punkte (dem 
Anfangs- und einem weiteren Punkt) bestimmten Halbstrahl. Ein
8) Hinsichtlich der Inzidenzbeziehung kann man hier zwei Wege einschlagen. 
Entweder führt man sie als Beziehung eines Punktes zu einer Geraden oder Ebene ein 
und sorgt durch ein Axiom dafür, daB sie stets falsch ist, wenn ihr zweites Argument 
ein Punkt oder ihr erstes Argument kein Punkt ist ; oder man versteht unter Inzidenz — 
anschaulich gesprochen — : ,,einen Punkt gemeinsam haben." Im folgenden haben wir 
uns für die zweite Alternative entschieden. (Da man ohne die wichtige Beziehung 
,,einen Punkt gemeinsam haben" auch im ersten Falle nicht auskàme, müBte man sie 
dort dann durch Definition einführen.)
Axiomatischer Aufbau der Geometrie in formalisierter Darstellung i3l
Winkel kann dann nicht als Paar von Halbstrahlen, sondern (wenn die 
Abweichung von H i l b e r t  môglichst gering sein soli) als geordnetes 
Punktetripel eingeführt werden. Ein weiteres Axiom muB dann be- 
sagen, daB ein Winkel A B C  sich nicht ândert, wenn man etwa A 
durch einen andern Punkt A' desselben Schenkels ersetzt.
§ 7. Die Verwendung des hoheren Funktionenkalkiils.
Was die logistischen Hilfsmittel anbetrifft, deren man zur Dar­
stellung der Axiome bedarf, so reicht der elementare Funktionenkalkül 
zur Formulierung samtlicher mit Ausnahme der Stetigkeitsaxiome aus. 
Erst diese erfordern Begriffsbildungen des hoheren Funktionenkalküls, 
speziell das Archimedische Axiom den Begriff R-erblicher Eigenschaf­
ten. Aus einem Satze von L o w e n h e im  und S k o lem ® ) folgt sogar, 
daB der hohere Funktionenkalkül hierfür unvermeidlich ist: Für ein 
widerspruchsfreies System von Aussagen des elementaren Funktionen- 
kalküls lieBe sich nâmlich schon ein abzâhlbares Modell angeben, 
wâhrend doch jedes Modell der euklidischen Geometrie mehr als ab- 
zâhlbar viele Elemente haben soil.
Übrigens offenbart sich bei der Anwendung der Logistik auf einen 
konkreten Fall wie den vorliegenden mit besonderer Deutlichkeit die 
Problematik des hoheren Funktionenkalküls. Wâhrend sich im Rah- 
men des elementaren Kalküls jedes All- oder Existenzzeichen auf 
einen festen Bereich, nâmlich den der Grundelemente, bezieht (in der 
Geometrie auf den Bereich der Punkte, Geraden und Ebenen), sieht 
man sich im hoheren Funktionenkalkül vor der hochst bedenklichen 
Tatsache, daB ein solcher Bereich im allgemeinen weder explizit an­
gegeben noch überhaupt irgendwie gekennzeichnet werden kann. 
Wenn schon die Verwendung des hoheren Funktionenkalküls unver­
meidlich sein sollte, wie es ja in gewissen Teilen der Mathematik der 
Fall zu sein scheint, so sollte man sich wenigstens stets auf solche 
Variable beschrânken, deren Variabilitâtsbereich eindeutig gekenn­
zeichnet ist, weil sonst Sâtze entstehen, bei denen die Entscheidung 
über die Sinnhaftigkeit nur noch eine Frage des Geschmacks und nicht 
mehr der Syntax ist.
§ 8. Das Vollstandigkeitsaxiom.
Besonders deutlich wird dieser Umstand an dem sogenannten 
Vollstândigkeitsaxiom illustriert.
9) T. Skolem, Über einige Grundlagenfragen der Mathematik, Akad. Oslo, math.- 
naturw. Kl. 3; sowie: Einige Bernerkungen zur axiomatischen Begründung der Mengen- 
lehre, V. KongreB der skandinav. Mathematiker, Helsingfors 1922.
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Ein Vollstandigkeitsaxiom vom Typus des H i l b e r t  schen ist an 
und für sich eine metalogische Aussage und laBt sich daher im Rahmen 
des vorliegenden Kalküls nicht ohne weiteres formalisieren, nâmlich 
nicht, ohne vom hoheren Funktionenkalkül in einer Weise Gebrauch 
zu machen, die oben als hochst bedenklich bezeichnet wurde. Stellt 
man diese Bedenken zunâchst zurück, so kann man das Vollstândig- 
keitsaxiom formal so darstellen, wie es in Fassung (a) der Stetigkeits­
axiome geschehen ist (vgl. § 12) ; ich verdanke diese Formulierung 
einer Mitteilung von Herrn C a r n a p .
De facto findet das VoUstândigkeitsaxiom ausschlieBlich bei Be- 
trachtungen üôer das System, also innerhalb der Metalogik, Ver­
wendung. Die Folgerungen, die man aus ihm zieht, bestehen nâmlich 
nur darin, daB man von der analytischen Geometrie zeigt, sie sei —  
abgesehen von isomorpher Abbildung —  das einzige Modell (was die 
Entscheidungsdefinitheit des Systems nach sich zieht). Im Grunde 
soli also das VoUstândigkeitsaxiom nur den Fall ausschlieBen, daB —  
analytisch geometrisch gesprochen —  schon die rationalen Punkte 
allein das Axiomensystem befriedigen. Offensichtlich kann nun aber 
dasselbe auch auf direkterem Wege erreicht werden, indem man das 
VoUstândigkeitsaxiom durch ein unmittelbares Stetigkeitspostulat 
ersetzt. Das kann einerseits durch das Axiom von C a n t o r  ge­
schehen ^°) : Fassung (b); andererseits durch das D e d e k in d  sche 
Axiom, durch welches bekanntlich^ )^ das Archimedische Axiom zu 
einem ableitbaren Satz wird: Fassung (c). Die in (b) und (c) im Gegen- 
satz zu (a) eingeführt en Stetigkeitsaxiome haben den Vorzug, daB ihre 
Anwendung nicht ausschlieBlich auf metalogischem Wege erfolgt.
Gegenüber diesen echten Stetigkeitsaxiomen besticht das H i l b e r t -  
sche VoUstândigkeitsaxiom zunâchst durch seine groBere Eleganz, die 
aber durch eine unvorsichtigere Anwendung des hoheren Funktionen­
kalküls erkauft wird. Sowohl das C a n t o r  sche wie das D b d e k in d  sche 
Stetigkeitsaxiom sprechen nâmlich von gewissen Punktmengen auf 
einer Geraden ; die in ihnen vorkommenden AUoperatoren beziehen 
sich also auf den Bereich der Teilklassen der Klasse aller Punkte, d. h. 
gewisser Teilklassen des gesamten Individuenbereiches. Liegt nun ein 
Modell der Geometrie vor, d. h. hat man u. a. angegeben, was man 
unter einem „Punkt", einer ,,Geraden" und einer ,,Ebene", allgemein
10) Diesen Weg schlàgt z. B. R. Baldus ein, der gleichfalls an Hilberts Vollstandig­
keitsaxiom Kritik übt. Vgl. R. Baldus, Nichteuklidische Geometrie (Goschen 1927), 
sowie: Zur Axiomatik der Geometrie I  (Math. Ann. 100).
11) Vgl. Enzyklopàdie d. Math. I l l ,  I. i, S. 34ff.
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also unter einem ,,Individuum" verstehen will, so kann man sich 
mit Recht auf den Standpunkt stellen, daB damit auch bekannt ist, 
was eine Teilklasse des Individuenbereiches ist. Die Art und Weise, 
in der hier mit dem hôheren Funktionenkalkül operiert wird, erscheint 
daher als einigermaBen einwandfrei. Ganz anders liegt der Fall beim 
VoUstândigkeitsaxiom; denn welches soil der Bezugsbereich der in 
ihm auftretenden AUoperatoren sein? Er besteht keineswegs wieder 
aus den Teilklassen des Individuenbereiches; vielmehr ist im VoU­
stândigkeitsaxiom neben den Grundklassen von gewissen Ver- 
gleichsklassen die Rede, welche umfassender sind als jene, also gewiB 
nicht Teilklassen von jenen sind. FaBt man wieder ein testes Modell 
des Axiomensystems ins Auge, so beziehen sich die im VoUstândig­
keitsaxiom vorkommenden AUzeichen auf den Bereich der Grund­
klassen aller überhaupt denkbaren Modelle, also einen Bereich, der 
nichts mehr mit dem gerade betrachteten Modell zu tun hat. An der- 
artigen Begriffsbildungen, die gewissermaBen aile Objekte des Den- 
kens in eine Menge zusammenfassen, nimmt man aber seit der Ent- 
deckung der Paradoxien in der C a n t o r  schen Mengenlehre berech- 
tigten AnstoB. Dem formalisierten VoUstândigkeitsaxiom kann also 
nicht zugebilligt werden, daB es allen Anforderungen an logische 
Strenge genügt. Seine Angabe unter Ag^ 2 geschieht daher nur unter 
grôBtem Vorbehalt und dient nur der Orientierung über diese Môglich- 
keit der Formulierung.
Es sei noch bemerkt,wie sich die Sachlage vom Standpunkt der RUSSELLschen Typen­
theorie aus darstellt. Der Bereich der Grundelemente einer axiomatisch aufgebauten 
Disziplin werde mit Tq bezeichnet, die Klassen von Grundelementen môgen den Bereich 
Tj_ bilden, die zweistelligen Relationen zwischen Grundelementen den Bereich 
die Klassen von Klassen aus Ti den Bereich T^, usw. ; die so stufenweise entstehenden 
Bereiche werden als ,,Typen", speziell Tq als ,,Grundtypus‘‘ bezeichnet. Die Grundthese 
der Typentheorie besagt dann, daB jede Verânderliche von einem bestimmten Typus 
ist, d. h. aile und nur die Elemente dieses Typus als Werte annehmen darf. Der elemen­
tare Funktionenkalkül ist dann vor dem hôheren dadurch ausgezeichnet, daB in ihm  
nur Variable vom Grundtypus auftreten.
In bezug auf die Stetigkeitsaxiome ist nun folgendes zu sagen. Die Variablen der 
,,echten" Stetigkeitsaxiome sind vom Typus Tq bzw. Tj. Beim VoUstândigkeitsaxiom 
dagegen befindet man sich vor folgendem Dilemma. Entweder deutet man es sinngemâB 
nach HILBERT, dann kommt seinen Verânderlichen überhaupt kein Typus zu. Oder 
man deutet es streng formai als Formel einer nach den Regeln der Typentheorie auf­
gebauten Disziplin; dann sind seine Variablen von den Typen Tj, Tj,!, T ^ ,! ,  T i ,n , i ,  
T i,i ,i , i , i^ m  ersten Fall ist das Axiom mit der Typentheorie unvertrâglich ; im zweiten 
Fall leistet es nicht das Gewünschte, da das Axiomensystem dann Modelle zulàBt, die 
nur abzàhlbar viele Punkte enthalten.
12) Genauer: Grundklassen und -relationen.
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III. Der formale Aufbau.
§ 9. Vorbemerkung fiber die Symbolik.
Die benutzte Symbolik ist im wesentlichen die von R u s s e l l  und 
C a r n a p .  Zur Erhohung der Übersichtlichkeit werden in Abweichung 
davon Klammern nicht durch Punkte ersetzt und die Negation durch 
Überstreichen gekennzeichnet! U m  allzu viele Klammern zu ver­
meiden, werde vereinbart: Die logischen Grundknfipfungen ., v, D, =  
seien in dieser Reihenfolge nach abnehmender Bindungsstarke ge- 
ordnet. p . q v  r =  p  '2) q bedeutet demnach z. B. : {{p . q ) y r ] ~ [ p 2 ) q ) ,
Zur leicht eren Lesbarkeit der Formeln sind durch weg variable 
Punkte mit variable Geraden mit y, variable Ebenen mit z be­
zeichnet (evtl. mit angehângten Indizes).
§ 10. Die Grundbegriffe der Geometrie.
1. Die Grundklassen: Die Grundklassen der Geometrie sind
P (die Klasse der Punkte),
G (die Klasse der Geraden),
E (die Klasse der Ebenen)
und nur diese. P, G und E sind Klassen von gleichem Typus. Die 
Elemente ihrer Vereinigungsmenge sind die Individuen, von denen 
die Geometrie handelt; sie heiBen auch die Grundelemente.
2. Die Grundrelationen: Die Grundrelationen der Geometrie 
sind
l { u , v ) (zwischen u und v besteht Inzidenz),
Z (u, V, w) {v liegt zwischen u und w),
Kst(%; 2^, %/i, (die Strecken %, und sind kon­
gruent) ,
Kw(%, U2, V3) (die Winkel %  und v- ,^V2, sind
kongruent)
und nur diese. Sie stellen samtlich Relationen zwischen den Indivi­
duen dar.
§ II. Definitionen.
Wir unterscheiden rein kalkfiltechnische von geometrischen Defini­
tionen. Jene enthalten im Gegensatz zu diesen keine geometrischen 
Begriffe, konnen also gegebenenfalls auch auBerhalb des Aufbaus der 
Geometrie Verwendung finden.
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I. Kalkültechnische Definitionen:
n
(Djl) = D £  /K) v/(M2) V . . . v/(m„)
î'= I
oder /(^g) oder . . . /(%%) ist wahr/'
(Di 2) jj7 /(w,,) = D f  /(%) ' /(^2) • • • f  i' n^)
r =  I
Sowohl f (u i )  als auch f [ u ^  als auch . . . f{Un) ist wahr/*
n
(Dj 3) JtJt (^ v) • ^2 f • • •> ^ n) —  Df
r =  I
(%) (Wg) . . . [Ur,) . g(%i, U2, U^
y,Für aile u  ^und fü r  aile u  ^ und .. . f ü r  aile Un gilt g {u ,^ %g,..
n
(D, 4) / 7(3«v) • g ( % ,  M2, . . M„) = D f
1’ =  I
(3 % )  (3 wg) . . . {'KUn) . g (%, U2, ...y Un)
yyEs gibt Uly U2, . .  .y Un y fü r  welche g (%, ^2, • • - , giUF 
Die Zeichen ^  und JJ[ sollen im folgenden —  ebenso wie in der 
Mathematik —  auch dann verwendet werden, wenn der laufende 
Index nicht von i bis n làuft. Die entsprechenden (trivial ergânz- 
baren) Definitionen sind hier fortgelassen.
P i  5) (3g »%)/(%) =Df 1J{'3lU,) . r / 7 / W  . =t= ^ 2
r =  I I— y =  I X  4= 2 -
yyEs gibt hbchstens n verschiedene Werte y für welche f {u)  wahr i s t / ‘ 
{n =  0, I, 2, ...)
Pi 6) (3o^ )/(#) =Df ('3.u)f{u)
yyEs gibt kein Uy fü r welches f{u)  wahr ist.''
Pi 7) {'3.nU)f{u) -Df (3g^ )^/(%) . (3g«_i^ )/(^ )
yyEs gibt genau n verschiedene Werte y fü r welche f {u)  wahr ist."
{n= ly 2, 3, .. .)
(Di 8) F {f^^ {^u ,^ . . . ,  Uy_— \y , ... > u>ff) =Df
(3i • f  • • •> —1 ) ) ^ x+l> • • •> '^ n) •
. if3.ufj I^F {ufj . f{u- y^ . . .  y  Uy y  . .  . y
yyEs gibt genau ein Uyy fü r das f[u- y^ wahr ist y und
fü r dieses Uy gilt auch F (w)."
Man sagt auch, /W(%, ..., Uy-^y ^ %+i, ..., sei das durch %, ..., 
U y - x y  x^+i, . .  . y - U n  ÎTi bezug auf / gekennzeichnete U y y  und schreibt: 
Uy =  /(X)(wi, ..., ^ x_i, Uy+xy . .  .y Un). Diese Bezeichnungsweise wird 
spâter hâufig Anwendung finden (vgl. z. B. D2 14, Dg 15, Dg 16).
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( D i 9 )  . . .,Uy^X,Uy + X, . ..,Un) = D f  W [ / ( % ,  ...,Uy, . . . y U^)]
yyDie Klasse aller Uyy fü r welche f  (%, . . . ,  tiy, . . Un) gilt."
Beim Archimedischen Axiom wird eine gewisse Verallgemeinerung 
des Begriff es der R-Kette gebraucht werden. 1st R  (w, v) eine zwei­
stellige Relation, so wird der Begriff der R-Kette bekanntlich 
durch folgende beiden Definitionen eingeführt:
Erb(F,R) — Df P  [((3idF(w) . R(w, î;)) 3 F p ]
(„die Eigenschaft F ist R-erblich", d. h. gilt R(w, v), so kommt sie 
mit u stets auch v zu) und
R* {UyV) —  Df u e C ' R  . (F) [Erb (F, R) . F (w) 2 F (%/)]
(„zwischen u und v besteht eine R-Kette'' oder ist ein R-Nach- 
komme von w", d. h. jede R-erbliche Eigenschaft des u kommt auch 
V zu). Der Übergang von R  v) zu R* (w, v) entspricht genau dem- 
jenigen von der Vater- zur Vorva ter relation (u ist ein Vor vat er von 
Vy wenn zwischen u und v eine ,,Vater-Kette" besteht). Ganz ent- 
sprechende Definitionen sollen nun hier eingeführt werden, wenn es 
sich um eine dreistellige Relation R  (%, v, w) handelt :
(Diio) Erbg (F, R) —  Df (w) [((3 )^ (3%;)F (M). F (%;). R(^ , w)) 3 F (w)] 
yyDie Eigenschaft F ist R-erhlich" (d. h. gilt R{UyVyW)y so kommt 
sie mit u und v stets auch dem w zu).
(Dili) R*3(^, w) — Df weC'R . ï/sC'R .
. (F) [Erbg(F, R) . F(%) . F(v) 2 F{w)]  
yyW ist ein R-Nachkomme von UyV" (d. h. jede R-erbliche Eigen­
schaft von Uy V kommt auch dem w zu).
2. Geometrische Definitionen:
In den folgenden Definitionen werden mit Hilfe der in § lo an- 
gegebenen geometrischen Grundbegriffe eine Reihe von weiteren Be- 
griffen der Geometrie konstituiert. Es handelt sich dabei stets um 
exphzite Verbaldefinitionen, die ausschlieBlich der Abkürzung dienen. 
Obwohl den in ihnen vorkommenden Begriffen erst durch die Axiome 
eine Bedeutung gegeben wird, sind schon hier allé Definitionen zu- 
sammengestellt, um die Aufstellung der Axiome in § 12 und die 
Ableitung von Satzen in dem folgenden Paragraphen nicht zu unter- 
brechen.
13) Siehe R. Carnap, Ahrip der Logistik, § 23 (Wien 1929). Die beiden oben 
angegebenen Definitionen sind dort zu einer einzigen vereinigt.
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(Dg i )  L (y , z) =D f y e G . z e F  . [ x ) [ xe V . l { x ,  y) 2  l[Xy z)]
yyDie Gerade y  liegt ganz in der Ehene z."
3
(Dg 2) Ig (% , %) =D f (3 y) . y e G  . 77[«.■«?• I (* r , y)]
r =  I
yyDie Punkte %, ^3 Uegen in einer Geraden."
4
(Dg 3) 1^  (%i, %g , %3 , Xj^  — Df (3 %) . 2( Ê E  , J^ _[ \_r>v £ p  . I (:^ v , z)J1' = I
Punkte %g, %3, Uegen in einer Ehene."
(Dg 4) St (Aj, X  ^ Df £ P  . %g £ P  . X-^  X2
%g bilden eine Strecke" (d. h. nur: ein Paar verschiedener  
Punkte).
n n—ï
(Dg 5) St% ( y %g , • • •, xf) — Df  ^p  • 4^  ^v+1
V =  I r =  I
yyXi, X2, . .  .y Xn bilden einen Streckenzug."
(Dg 6) IS t|i {x y Xxy X>2 i • • • , ^n) — Df Stf  ^(^1 j 2^ > • • • > ^n) •
- n n — i
, X =  Xy, V ^^ {^Xy y X , Xy l^)
_ r  =  I 1 = 1
yyDer Punkt x liegt auf de^n Streckenzug A3, Ag, . . . ,  a„."
(Dg 7) IS t  (a . Al, Ag) =  Df IStg(A , Al, Ag)
yyDer Punkt x liegt auf der Strecke Ai, Ag."
(Dg 8) E ck |i(A i, Ag , . . . , xf) — Df M4-1 (^1 ) ^2 » ^nj ^1) "
n
. (3%) . z s E  . J J l  (a,,, z)
V =  I
,,A i, Ag, . . . ,  A% bilden ein n-Eck (Polygon), d. h. einen ebenen 
geschlossenen Streckenzug."
(Dg 9) IEck%(A, Al, Ag, . . . ,  xf) =D f Eck%(Ai, Ag, . . . ,  xf) .
n n — ï
^ x =  Xy V ( A,,, A , A„ + i) V Z ( An , A, Aj)
V =  I r =  I
yyDer Punkt x liegt auf dem n-Eck Ai, Ag, . . . ,  a„."
(Dg 10) Polygn (Al, Ag, . . . , An) =  Df Eckn (Ai , Ag, . . . , An) .
I, • ■ •, « n ______________________________________________
• 77 =t= Xl . 77l g ( * v - l ,  *v, * . + 1) • l%{Xn-i ,Xn,  %i) . Ig (* n . %, *2) •
^ 4 = 2  v —  2
■ (x)
n—I
Jtl 2! (A]. , A, A,,1) . IStn (a, Ay 4_i, . . . , An , Ai, . . . , A,,) .
. Z (An, A, Al) . IStn (a,* Ai, Ag, . . ., An) 
,Ai, Ag, ..., An bilden ein einfaches Polygon."
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Unter einem Polygon wird also ein geordnetes Punkte-ft-tupel mit 
gewissen Eigenschaften verstanden. In die Definition wurde die bei 
Untersuchung solcher Polygone hâufig benutze Voraussetzung auf- 
genommen, daB nicht drei aufeinanderfolgende Punkte in einer Ge­
raden liegen.
Hâufig werden Aussagen vorkommen, welche besagen, ein Punkt 
liege auf einem Polygon bzw. auBerhalb oder innerhalb eines Poly­
gons:
(Dg II) IP0lyg„(A; Ai, Ag, . . . , %n) =Df Polygn (Ai, Ag, ..., Xn) .
. IEckn(A; Ai, Ag, . Xn) 
yyDer Punkt x liegt auf dem einfachen Polygon a^ , Ag, ..., a„."
(Dg 12) InPolygn(A; A3, Ag, ..., a„) =Df Polygn (A3, Ag, .. ., a„) .
. AfiP . (z) ZbF , Jf [ l [Xr , z) 2 l [ x ,  z) \  .
L 1' = I J
. (y) -yeG . l ( x , y) . (z)(zeE . f [ l [ X y ,  z) 3 L(y, z))  3
3 (3 x') . I(*', y) . IPolyg„(A:'; x „  x ^ , . . . , *„) 
yyDer Punkt X liegt innerhalb des einfachen Polygons A^ , Ag,..., An." 
(Dg 13) APolygn(A; Ai, Ag, . . . , A„) =D£ Polygn (Ai, Ag, . . ., An) .
AsP . {z) z e F  . J J I (Ay, z) D I (a, z)
. IP o ly g n (A ;  Ai, Ag, . . . ,  An) . I n P o ly g n (A ,‘ A^ . Ag, . . . ,  An) 
yyDer Punkt x liegt auBerhalb des einfachen Polygons Ai, Ag, . . . ,  An."
(Dg 14) g (yy Al, Ag) - D f  G . St (Al, Ag) . I (Ai, y) . I (Ag, y)
„Ai und Ag sind verschiedene Punkte der Geraden y."
Diese Definition gibt Veranlassung zu folgender Kennzeichnung: 
(Al, Ag) —  die durch Ai und Ag gehende Gerade (vgl. Di 8).
(Dg 15) g(z. Al, Ag, A3) =Df Z g E  . ï g ( A i ,  Ag, Ag) .y^AySP. I (A y ,  z)
r = I
,,Ai, Ag, Ag sind drei nicht in  einer Geraden liegende Punkte der 
Ebene z."
Wie oben ist nun g(^)(Ai, Ag, Ag) die durch Ai, Ag, Ag gehende Ebene.
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(Dg 16) S c h n (y i, yg, z:) =d£ x e V . U y ^ s G  , ï (x , y,)
r =  I
y,Die Geraden und y2 gehen durch den Punkt x."
Schn(^) (y i, y^ ist dann der S ch n ittp un k t von  y  ^ und y^.
(Dg 17) ( Al, Ag, A3, A4) = D f  2 (Ai, Ag, A3) . Z  ( Ag, A3, A4) .
. Z(Ag, A4, Al) . Z(A4, Al, Ag)
,,Ai, Ag, Ag, A4 bilden einen Zyklus."
(Dg 18) Z w ( Al, Ag, Ag, A4) —  Df ^(Ai, Ag, Ag) . Z(Ai, Ag, A4) ,
• ^  (^If Ag, A4) . Z (Ag, Ag, A4)
,,A], Ag, Ag, A4 bilden ein Zwischen-QuadrupelP
(Dg 19) V (Al, Ag, %) — Df (3 a) . I (A i, ft) . I ( a ,  ft) . Z (A i, A, Ag)
yyDie Punkte A i, Ag liegen in bezug auf u (Punkt, Gerade oder 
Ebene) auf verschiedenen Seiten."
(Dg 20) Gg[xi , Ag, y) — Df (3z) L(y, z) . J J X y S P  . I (Ay ,  z) .
• (^1 — Ag. I(A i, y) V Al =4 Ag. (3 a) . I (a , y) . IS t(A ; Ai, Ag))^
yyDie Punkte Ai, Ag liegen in  bezug auf die Gerade y auf der 
gleichen Seite."
2
(Dg 21) Ge (Al, Ag, z) — Df z s F . J J x y c V .
. (Ai —  Ag . I (Al, %) V Al =1= Ag . (3 A) . I (A, Z) . ISt (A,‘ Ai, Ag))
y,Die Punkte Ai, Ag liegen in bezug auf die Ebene z auf der 
gleichen Seite."
(Dg 22) DE ( y i , yg) =Df (3 z) . D (y i, z) . F  {^ y 2, z) 
yyDie Geraden yi, yg liegen in einer Ebene."
(Dg 23) H  (a. Al, Ag) — Df St (Ai, Ag) . [Z (Al, A, Ag) V Z (Ai, Ag, a) V
V A —  Al V A —  AgJ
yyDer Punkt x  liegt auf dem Halbstrahl, der in  x^ beginnt und 
durch Ag geht."
(Dg 24) Ih(%, X2 ', x[y Ag) — Df (3 a) . H  (a; Ai, Ag) . H  (a; x [ , Ag')
yyDie Halbstrahlen Ai, Ag und x [ , Ag haben einen gemeinsamen 
Punkt." (Inzidenz zweier Halbstrahlen.)
190 O l af H e l m e r -Hi r s c h b e r g:
(D g25) W (A i, Ag, As) = D f Polygg(A i, Ag, As)
y,Die Punkte Ai, Ag, A3 hilden einen Winkel m it dem Scheitel Ag."
E in  W inkel is t also nur ein  T ripel von  P u n k ten , w elche n icht in 
einer G eraden liegen .
(Dg 26) I n W ( a ; %, Ag, Ag) =D f W ( a i , Ag, Ag) .
' Gg(A, Ai; g(^)(Ag, Ag)) . G g(A , Ag; g(^)(Ag, Ad) 
yyDer Punkt x liegt im  Innern des Winkels Aj, Ag, Ag."
(Dg 27) ASSf (a , Ai, Ag, Ag) =D f (Aj, Ag, Ag) .
. [V (A, Ai; g(^)(Ag, Ag)) V V (A, Ag; g(l)(Ag, Ad)] 
yyDer Punkt x liegt im A u f  eren des Winkels Aj, Ag, Ag."
(Dg 28) N h w  (A i, Ag, Ag, Ai, Ag, Ag) Df ( A ,^ Ag, Ag) . Ag — Ag .
. [Z (A i, Ag, x[) . H(Ag; Ag, Ag) V Z (A i, Ag, Ag) . H  (Ai'; Ag, Ag) V 
V Z (Ag, Ag, Ag) . H  {x[y Ag, Ai) V Z (a !, Ag, Ag) . H  (Ag; Ag, A )^]
,,A i, Ag, Ag und Ai, X2y Ag sind ein Paar von Nebenwinkeln."
(Dg 29) S ch w (A i, Ag, Ag; Ai, Ag', Ag) =D f W  (Ai , Ag, Ag) . Ag =  Ag .
* ^2; ^3) • 2/(A i, Ag, Ag) V Z (A i, Ag, Ai) . Z(Ag, Ag, Ag)]
„Ai, Ag, Ag und Xl, Ag, Ag sind ein Paar von Scheitelwinkeln."
(Dg 30) <  St (%1, ^2) =  Df (3 a) . Z (Ai, A, Ag) . Kst (Ai , Ag, Ai, x)
yyDie Strecke Xi, Ag ist kleiner als die Strecke x[, Ag."
(Dg 31) !>St(Ai, Ag, Ai, Ag) =D f St (A i, Ag, Aj, Ag)
yyDie Strecke Xi, Ag ist grower als die Strecke Ai, Ag."
(Dg 32) R W  (Ai, Ag, Ag) = D f (3 a)  . N b w (A i, Ag, Ag; a ,  Ag, Ag) .
• K\v (Ai , Ag, Ag, A, Ag, Ag)
,,Ai, Ag, Ag ist ein rechter Winkel."
(Dg 33) < w ( a i ,  Ag, Ag; Ai, Ai, Ai) — Df (3 a) . In W  (a; Ai, Ai, Ai) .
. K w (A i, Ag, Ag, Ai, Ai, a) 
yyDer Winkel Xi, Ag, Ag ist kleiner als der Winkel x[, Ai, Ai."
(Dg 34) > w (Ai , Ag, Ag; Ai, Ai, Ai) =D f <w (^^i, %i, ^2, %s)
yyDer Winkel A3, Ag, Ag ist grower als der Winkel x'l, Ai, Ai."
(Dg 35) S tu W  (a i, Ag, Ag) — Df (3 a) . InW  ( a ;  Aj, Ag, Ag) .
. R W  (a i , Ag, a)
„%!, Ag, Ag ist ein stumpfer Winkel."
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(Dg 36) S p iW (a i ,  Ag, Ag) (3 ^) . InW (A g; Ai, Ag, a) .
. R W  (Al, Ag, a )
,,A i, Ag, Ag ist ein spitzer Winkel."
(Dg 3 7  W d D (A i, Ag, Ag; A i, A i, Ai) — Df W (A i, Ag, Ag) . W (A i, Ai, Ai) .
. [ ( a ) (In W (A ; Al, Ag, Ag) 5= In W (A ; Ai, Ai, Ai)) v
V (A )(In W (A ; Al, Ag, Ag) =  In W (A ; A i, Ai, Ai)) v
V (a) (In W {A ; Al, Ag, Ag) =  In W (A ; Ai, Ai, Ai))] 
,,A i, Ag, Ag ist ein Winkel des Dreiecks Ai, Ai."
(D g 3 8 ) A W d D (A i, Ag, Ag; Ai, %i, %i) - D f  (3Ai) (3 A )^ (3A3') .
. N b w (A i, Ag, Ag; Al, Ag, A3) . W d D  (a'/, Ag, A3 ; Ai, Ai, Ai)
,,A i, Ag, Ag ist ein Aufenwinkel des Dreiecks Ai, Ai, Ai."
(Dg 39) K pU n(A i, Ag, . . . ,  An,' Ai, Ai, . . . ,  A%) = D f (3 y) . y  £ G .
. (3y') . y ' s G . n i { x , y  y) . I ( a ; ,  y') %;., 4 ,
v = i % 4=2
„A i, Ag, ..., An und Ai, Ai, ..., A% sind kongruente Punktreihen."
n
(Dg 40) (^1, ^g, . , ^n) “  Df J^J Ay £ P  . J[J[ A% =b A;,
v — r % 4=2
,,A i, Ag, ..., An sind paarweise voneinander verschiedene Punkte" 
(dafür se i im  fo lg en d en  g e sa g t:  s ie  b ild en  e in e  F igu r).
(Dg 41) E b F g n  (A l, Ag, . . . , An) = D f  Fgn ( A i , Ag, . . . , An) .
n
. (3lZ) . ZsE  . J J l  (Ay, z)
y =  1
,,A i, Ag, . . . ,  An bilden eine ebene Figur."
(Dg 4^) (A l, Ag, ... y An, Ai, Ag, . . ., A«) — Df Fgn (A i, . . ., An) •
JL (A%, Xx y A% , Xx) . JJ^i^ (A%, Xl y Xp) 2 K w (A%, X i , Xp , A%, X i , A )^
X4= 2 X, p
,,A i, Ag, ..., An und Ai, Ai, ..., Xn sind kongruente Figur en."
A n s d en  A x io m en  der K on gru en z  (s. S . 195) fo lg t , daB m it  Ai, . . . ,  a„ 
au ch  Ai, . . . ,  x'n e in e  F ig u r  u n d  m it A%, Ai, Xp au ch  Ai, Ai, x'p e in en  
W in k e l b ild en .
(Dg 43) f^D (Ai , Ag, Ag ; A l, Ag, A3) — Df Kpga (A i, Ag, Ag, A i, Ag, A3)
yyDie Dreiecke Ai, Ag, Ag und Ai, Ai, Ai sind kongruent."
(Dg 44) PU (yi, ÿg) — Df Le (yi, yg) . I (yi, yg) 
,,yi und y2 sind parallèle Geraden."
15
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(Dg 45) ^(Ai, Ag, A3) — Df Ag, Ag) . Kst (Ai , Ag, Ag, Ag)
,,Ag ist der M ittelpunkt der Strecke Ag."
(Dg 4b) m  ((%, ft) Df ^ P ^  (ft)
,,(x ist die Menge der Punkte y aus denen u besteht."
Vermoge D^ 8 ist dann also (ft) die Menge der Punkte, die mit ft 
inzidieren.
(Dg 47) gebg {(XyZyf) —  Df z e F  . ocKj f  C {z) .
. (ai) (Ag) (a) (xicoc . X2SOC . ISt (A; Ai, Ag) 2 xe f )  
,,(x ist ein 2-Gebiet der Ebene z, das durch die Punktmenge'f defi­
niert ist."
(Dg 48) gebgn {ocy Zy f) — Df z e F  . oc u  f  C (z) . {Xj} (a„) [xisoc .
. XnCOC 2 JJi'KXy) . Stn(Ai, . . . , A«) . (a) (ISt^CA,* A^, . . ., X j 2 Xsf)]
y =  2
yyOc ist hochstens ein n-Gebiet der Ebene z, das durch die Punkt- 
menge f  definiert ist" (ft —  3, 4, ...).
(Dg 49) gebn((%, z, jg) —Df gebgn((%, z, ,g) . gebgn-i((%, z, /^ )
,,<% ist ein n-Gebiet der Ebene z, das durch die Punktmenge f  defi­
niert ist" (ft —  3, 4, ..,).
§ 12. Die Axiome.
I .  Die Verkniipfungsaxiome:
(Ai i) (ft) ft e P u G u E
yyDer Grundbereich besteht nur aus Punkten, Geraden und Ebenen."
DaB die Klassen P, G, E elementefremd sind, braucht nicht gefordert 
zu werden, da den Elementen jeder dieser Klassen durch das Axiomen­
system ohnehin unterscheidende Eigenschaften zugeschrieben werden.
(Ai 2) (a) A £ P D I (a, a)
yyfeder Punkt steht zu sich selbst in  der Inzidenzbeziehung."
Dies reicht schon aus, um die Reflexivitat von I (ft, v) zu sichem 
(vgl. S I ,  § 13).
(Ai 3) (ft) [v) I (ft, %;) D I {Vy ft)
yyDie Inzidenzbeziehung ist symmetrisch."
(Aj 4) (^1) (^2) ^i^P • AgfiP . I (Ai, Ag) 2 Aj —  Ag
yyDie Inzidenzbeziehung besteht niemals zwischen zwei verschiedenen 
Punkten."
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(Al 5) (x) (u) (v) x eF  . l {u,  x) . 1 (x, v) 2 l  (u, v)
yyDie Inzidenzbeziehung ist dann transitiv, wenn das Mittelglied 
ein Punkt ist."
Wenn das Mittelglied kein Punkt ist, ist I nicht transitiv, wie man
am Beispiel zweier windschiefer Geraden sieht, die von einer dritten
Geraden geschnitten werden.
(Al 6) (u) (v) I{Uy ?;) D (3 a) . AfiP . I {u, x) . I (a, y)
y,Stehen zwei Grundelemente in der Inzidenzbmegung, so haben sie 
einen gemeinsamen Punkt."
(Al 7) (%i) {x^ St(*i, x )^ 3 (ay) . y e G  . I (%, y) . I (x ,^ y)
yyZu zwei verschiedenen Punkten gibt es stets eine Gerade, die mit 
beiden.in  der Inzidenzbeziehung steht." (H; Ii. D: Dg 4.^ )^)
(Al 8) (%i) (*a) St (%1, Xs) 3 (3aiy) . yeG . I {x„ y) . I {x ,^ y)
yyZu zwei verschiedenen Punkten gibt es nicht mehr als eine Gerade, 
die m it beiden in  der Inzidenzbeziehung steht."'^ )^ (H: Ig. D: Di 5, 
Dg 4.)
(Al 9) (y) yeG D (3giA) . A6P. I(A, y)
y y A u f jeder Geraden gibt es mindestens zwei verschiedene Punkte." 
(H: Ig. D : D i5.)
(Al 10) 77 (a z:.) . 77*v e P • Ig (%. «2, %)
y s= I y =  I
yyEs gibt mindestens drei Punkte, welche nicht in einer Geraden 
liegen." (H: Ig. D: Di2, D14, Dg2.)
3 3   3
(Al II) 77(^v) 77*v £ p  . Ig (*1, Xi, X3) D  (3z) . zfiE . 7 7 1  (Xv, z)
I' =  I y =  I y =  I
yyZu drei nicht in einer Geraden liegenden Punkten gibt es stets 
eine Ebene, die m it jedem von ihnen in der Inzidenzbeziehung 
s t e h t . " (H: I4. D: Di2, Dg2.)
14) H: Nummer des Axioms bei Hilbert [Grundlagen der Geometrie, 7. Auflage
1930)-
D: Nummern der herangezogenen Definitionen aus § 11.
15) A. Wald [Ergebnisse d. Menger-Kolloqu. 3 (1932)] gelang die Ableitung dieses 
Axioms. Da dabei das Parallelenaxiom von ihm benôtigt wird, mit welchem man 
die elementare Verknüpfungs- und Anordnungstheorie nicht belasten môchte, ist 
Al 8 hier trotzdem nicht gestrichen worden.
16) Ersetzt man A j i i  mit Weinlôs durch die stàrkere Aussage, daB es zu je 
drei Punkten eine zugehôrige Ebene gebe, so wird Aj 10 ableitbar. Vgl. S. Wein­
lôs, Fundamenta Mathematicae 11 (1928).
15*
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(Ai 12) {z) zeE D (3%) . A&P. I (a, z)
,J n  jeder Ehene gibt es wenigstens einen Punkt." (H: I4.)
3 3 ______________  3
(Ai 1 3) ]J{x,) 11 Xy f P . Ig (%, Xi, Xi) D (3giz) . zeE . H i  (x, . , z)
r =  I r =  I V =  I
,,Zu drei nicht in einer Geraden liegenden Punkten gibt es hoch­
stens eine Ebene, die m it jedem von ihnen in  der Inzidenzbeziehung 
steht." (H: I5. D: 2, Di5, Dg 2.)
(A1I4) [Xi) [Xi) {y) [z] g(y, AJi, . ^reE . I(a;i, z) . I(z:2, z) 3 L(y, z)
,,Liegen zwei verschiedene Punkte einer Geraden in  einer Ebene, 
so liegt jeder Punkt der Geraden in  dieser Ebene." (H: Ig. D: Dg i,
Da 14O
(Ai 15) {zO (zg) ZisE . ZgsE 3 (3i a) . AfiP . I (a, . I (a, %g)
yyZwei Ebenen haben keinen oder mindestens zwei Punkte gemein­
sam." (H: I7. D: D  ^3.)
4 4 ______________________
(Ai 16) (3 Ay) ' J J • Io(Ai, Ag, A3, A4)
y =  I r =  I
,,Es gibt wenigstens vier nicht in einer Ebene gelegene Punkte." 
(H.-Ig. D:Dg3.)
2. D ie  A n o r d n u n g s a x io m e :
3
(Ag l) J J  (Ay) Z (Aj , Ag, Ag) 2 St (Ai, Ag) . St (Ai, Ag) . St (Ag, Ag)
r =  I
,,Die Zwischenbeziehung kann nur zwischen drei verschiedenen 
Punkten bestehen." (H: H i. D: D24.)
3 3
(As 2) I l{x y )  Z (%, £^3) D (3y) . y e G . / J l  (x,, y)
y =  I r =  I
,,Besteht zwischen drei Punkten die Zwischenbeziehung, so liegen 
sie in einer Geraden." (H: H i.)
In Hi fordert H i l b e r t  auBerdem, daB Z (ai, Ag, Ag) stets Z (Ag, Ag, Ai) 
nach sich ziehe. Dies ist T s c h e t w e r u c h in  zufolge ableitbar i"^) ; vgl.
s 5 (§ IS).
17) N. Tschetweruchin, Jahresber. D. M. V. 33 (1925).
Axiomatischer Aufbau der Geometrie in formalisierter Darstellung
(Ag 3) (■^1) (^ 2) (-^ 1 > 2^)  ^(3 A3) . Z ( Aj, Ag , Ag)
,,Zii zwei verschiedenen Punkten und Ag gipt es stets einen Punkt
Ag so, daf Ag zwischen x^  und Ag liegt." (H: Ilg. D: Dg4.)
3__________________________ ________
(Ag 4) JTZ (^ v) ^ (^ 1 ) 2^> •^ 3)  ^ !^ (^ 1> 3^> 2^)
r =  I
,,Unter irgend drei Punkten giht es hochstens einen, der zwischen 
den beiden andern liegt." (H: Ilg.)
3 _ _________________
(A2 5) II{Xv) (y) (z) (e (z, x„ X3, X3) . 'L{y,z)  .1 (*3, y) . (3 x^ ) .
V —  X
. l {Xi ,  y) .Z{xi ,  Xi,x^ 3 C3.X3) . I(%3, y) . \Z{x, ,  X3, X3)  ^Z{X3, X3, X3)])
,,Liegt eine Gerade ganz in der Ebene eines Dreiecks und trifft sie
eine Dreiecksseite, aber keinen der Eckpunkte, so trifft sie noch
mindestens eine weitere Dreiecksseite." (H: II4. D: Dg i ,  Dg 13.)
3. D ie  K o n g r u e n z a x io m e :
4
(Ag l) JJ[ i v^) Kst i^i i 2^> ^3> •^ 4)  ^ Kst {^3} 2^)
V =  1
,,Die Streckenkongruenzbeziehung ist symmetrisch in bezug auf die 
Paare ihrer ersten beiden und ihrer letzten beiden Argumente."
4
(Ag 2) /Z(Ay) Kst(%1, A;g, Ag, A4) 3 Kst(%1, 2^. ^4, 3^)
y =  I
,,Die Streckenkongruenzbeziehung ist symmetrisch in bezug auf ihre 
letzten beiden Argumente."
Die Symmetrie für die ersten beiden Argumente folgt aus Ag i  und 
Ag 2.
4
(As 3) Kst(%, %2, 3 St {x„ X3)
y =  I
,,Die Streckenkongruenzbeziehung kann nur zwischen Paar en ver­
schiedener Punkte (d. h. zwischen Strecken) bestehen." (D: Dg4.)
3
(A3 4) ri{X y) [x) St (x, , X3) . St (Xs, %) 3 (3 X3) . Z {x, X3, X4) .
y =  I
• Kst 3^} ^ 4)
,,Zu jeder Strecke là jit sich auf jeder Geraden von einem gegebenen 
Punkt aus nach einer gegebenen Seite eine kongruente Strecke ab- 
tragen." (H: IIIi. D: Dg4.)
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(A3 5) U  Kgt ( %!, Ag, A3, A4) . Kst(^3> '^5 ) ^c)
y =  I
2 Kst (^1 » ^ 2, ^ 5,
„Die Streckenkongruenzbeziehung ist transitiv in  bezug auf die Paare 
ihrer ersten beiden und ihrer letzten beiden Argumente."
In Abweichung von H i l b e r t  ist hier die Symmetrie von Kst in A3 i 
als besonderes Axiom ausgesprochen und dafür H i l b e r t s  Transiti- 
vitatsaxiom IIIg durch die schwachere Form A3 5 ersetzt worden. 
Aus Ag I  und Ag 5 folgt Illg (vgl. S 7, § 13); umgekehrt folgen Ag i 
und Ag 5 aus Illg unter Heranziehung von Ag 4 (H: 111^) (vgl. H i l ­
b e r t ,  Grundlagen der Geometrie, S. 12).
3 3
(A3 6) n . { x , )  U i X y )  Z (%, X3, X3) . Z (x-i, x'i, X3) .
v =  1 r = I
. Kst (%1, ;^2, ^2) . Kst (^ 2, ^ 3, xL Xs) 2 Kst (%1, Xs,  x [ , Ag)
,,Hat man zwei Strecken durch je einen Teilpunkt im Innern in
je zwei Teilstrecken zerlegt, der art, d a f  die T  eilstrecken der einen 
Strecke denen der andern kongruent sind, so sind auch die ganzen 
Strecken einander kongruent." (H: Illg.)^®)
3 3
(Ag 7) n{.Xv) JJ[{Xvj K\v(Ai, Ag, Ag, Ai, Ag, Ag) 2
V =  I V =  I
2 K\v ( Ai, Ag, Ag, Ag, Ag, A%) 
,,Die Winkelkongruenzbeziehung ist symmetrisch in  bezug auf ihr 
viertes und sechstes Argument."
3 3
(A3 8) U{Xv)  U ( x ’y) Kw (xi, Xi,X3, xi,  Xi, xi) D
V =  I 1 = 1
2 W{Xi , Ag, Ag) . W  (Ai', Ag, xi) 
,,Die Winkelkongruenzbeziehung kann nur zwischen Tripeln von 
nicht in  einer Geraden liegenden Punkten (d. h. zwischen Winkeln)  
bestehen." (D : Dg 23.)
6
(Ag 9) JJL{Xv) (%) H (Ai; Ag, A'l) . Ai =b Ag . Kw {x-i, Ag, Ag, A4, Ag, Ag) 2
y =  I
:) Kw(%L :^ 2, Xs, %4i Xs, Ag) 
„Zwei kongruente Winkel bleiben kongruent, wenn man den ersten 
Punkt des ersten Winkels durch einen andern Punkt desselben 
Schenkels ersetzt." (D: Dg 23.)
18) Ag 6 ist A. Wald zufolge ableitbar [Ergebnisse d. Menger-Kolloqu. 3 (1932)]. 
Weil der Beweis noch nicht publiziert ist, wurde A , 6 oben trotzdem auf genommen.
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(A3 10) / / (x „ )  (x() (xi) (x) I W(Xi, «2, X3) . w  (x(, xi, x) 3
y =  1 l
3 [(3 x^ ) Gg(%L %: gW(x(, xÿ) . K w(xi, x^, X3, x[, xi, xi)] .
5
• (Xi) (xi) ] j G g ( x ’r, x; X2)) • Kw(xi, %2, X3, x(, X2, xl) 3
= 4
3 H (xi; xi, xi)
,,Zu jedem Winkel là fit sich an jede Gerade m  einem gegebenen 
Punkt nach einer gegebenen Seite einer Ebene hin genau ein kon- 
gruenter Winkel antragen." (H: III4. D: D^ô, Dg 14, Dg20, Dg2g, 
D225.)
Der Zusatz H i l b e r t s  z u  III4, daB Kw reflexiv ist, ist A. R o s e n ­
th a l^ ® ) zufolge entbehrlich.
3 3
(A3 I I )  JjJ (xj) J[J_ (Xv) K w  (^1) X2, A3, A l ,  Ag, Ag) . K s t  (^1 , X2, A l ,  Ag) .
y =s I r =  I
. K s t  (%2, Xs, Ag, Ag) 3 Kw (%g, Xl, Ag, Ag, x[, Ag) 
,,Sind in einem Dreieck zwei Seiten und der eingeschlossene Winkel 
einander kongruent, so sind auch die übrigen Winkel eina^ider kon­
gruent." (H: III5.)
4. D a s P a r a l le le n a x io m :
(A4 i) (x)(y) x e F . y e G  , l ( x ,  y) :> CKÿiy') . l ( x ,  y') . P\ l (y,  y')
,,Zu jeder Geraden gibt es durch jeden nicht auf ihr liegenden Punkt 
hochstens eine Parallèle." (H: IV. D: D i5, Dg44.)
5. D ie  S t e t ig k e i t s a x io m e :
Fassung a):
(-^ 5 a (^ 1) (^ 2) (x) Z(Xi,  Ag, a) 2 (3i Ag) . (3i A4) . M*g (Al, Ag, Ag) .
• 3 (^ 1 ) X2, A4) . Kst(^i, X2, Ag, A4) . Z(Ai, a, Ag) . Z(Ai, a, A4)
,,Liegt Ag zwischen Xi und x, so làjit sich durch endlich oftmaliges 
Antragen der Strecke Ai, Ag an sich selbst über Ag hinaus der Punkt 
A überschreiten" (Axiom von ARCHiMEDES). (H: Vi. D: Di 7, 
Di II, Dg 45.)
Es môge nun Konj (P, G, E, I, Z, Kst, Kw) die Konjunktion aller bis- 
herigen Axiome bedeuten. Dann lautet das HiLBERTsche VoUstândig­
keitsaxiom f olgendermaBen :
19) A. Rosenthal, M. A. 71 (1912).
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(A^ a 2) (PO (GO (EO (P) (ZO (Kst) (Kw) P C P\ G C G\ E C E\ 
. I G r . Z G Z\ Kst G Kst. Kw G Kw . 
. P-F. G - G'. E-E'. I-r. Z-Z'. Kst = Kst. Kw=KW :
D Konj (F , GO E% 1% Z% Kst, Kw)
,,Die Grundelemente sowie diejenigen Paare, Tripel, Quadrupel 
hzw. Sextupel von Grundelementen, die ziieinander in der Inzidenz-, 
Zwischen-, Streckenkongruenz- hzw. Winkelkongruenzbeziehung 
stehen, bilden ein System, das unter Aufrechterhaltung aller bis- 
herigen Axiome keiner Erweiterung fàhig ist." (Vollstandigkeits­
axiom von H ilb ert.) (H: Vg.)
Fassung b):
(Agb i) Wie (Aja i)
Agb 2) { y ) [ x ) [ P) i yeG . oc u  p  C (y) . IJ { x , )  [xy^ &oc . x^eoc.
\  V — ï
. Aggjg . D Z(Ai, Ag, Ag) . Z(Ag, Al, A4)] . (A6)(A6)[St(A6, Ag) ^
D (HA?) (3Ag) . A? g (% . Aggjg . <st(%7, Xs, Ag)] D
3 (3 A*) . (a „) (A&) [XaEOC . A&£jg . A^  4= Xj, 2 ISt (A*j Ag, A&)]^
,,Haben zwei Klassen oc und f  von Punkten, die samtlich in einer 
Geraden liegen, folgende Eigenschaften:
1. kein Punkt von f  liegt vor einem Punkt vvn oc,
2. es gibt stets je einen Punkt aus oc und f , die zusammen einen 
kleiner en Ab stand haben als ein beliebig vorgegebenes Punkte- 
paar,
so gibt es auf der Geraden einen Punkt derart, daf kein Punkt 
von oc hinter und kein Punkt von f  vor diesem liegt" (Axiom von 
Cantor). (D: D i3, Dg4, Dgy, Dg30, Dg4Ô.)
Fassung c):
(A5C l) (oc) (^ ) (Ai) (Ag) (^ St (Al, Ag) . (a) [Z (Al, A, Ag) =  A £ (X W ^] .
* (xf) (Xh) [XaEOC . XsSf 2 Z(x^, Ag, A&)] 3 (3 A*) . Z(Ai, A*, Ag) .
• (Xa) (Xf,) [Ag £ (% . Xj,sf . Ag =}= A* . Aj =4 X^  2 Z (Ag, A*, A^ )]^
,,Stellt man innerhalb der Punkte auf einer beliebigen Strecke einen 
DEDEKiNDschen Schnitt her, so gibt es stets einen Punkt, der diesen 
Schnitt erzeugt" (Axiom von D edekind). (D: D24.)
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IV. Beweis einiger Sàtze.
§ 13. Beweis einiger Satze.
(S i) (u) I [u, u)
,,Die Inzidenzbeziehung ist reflexiv."
Beweis :
a [u) fteP u G u E nach i.
h [u) u sP  2 l[u,  u) nach Ai 2.
c (u) u eG 2 [A x) . X eV . 1 [x, u) nach Ai 9; dann auch 
d I [Uy x) nach Ai 3, also wegen Ai 5 
e l [u, u)  für ft £ G.
f  (u) u e F  2 {'R x) . XeP . 1 {x, t^) nach Ai 12, also wie eben
g  l{u,  u) für ft£E. Aus b, e, g  folgt aber wegen a
h {u) l [u,u) .
(S 2) (%i) (Ag) St (Al, Ag) D (3 A3) . A3£? . Ig(Ai, Ag, Ag)
yyZu zwei verschiedenen Punkten gibt es stets einen dritten, der mit 
ihnen nicht in einer Geraden liegt."
Beweis :
5 5 __________________
a 77(3 Ay) . 77Ay £ P . Ig (A3, A4, Ag) nach Ai 10.
y = 3 1=3
h y  =  g(i) (Al, Ag) zulâssig nach Ai 7, Ai 8 wegen St (ai, Ag).
5 ________
c ^I(Ay, y) wegen a, also etwa
y = 3
d I ( A3, y). Ware nun
e Ig (Al, Ag, Ag), d. h. nach Dg 2
3
f (3yO . y'eG . 77  ^{xv, y ' ) , so ware wegen
r =  I
g  y' =  (Al, Ag) =  y
h I (Ag, y) im Widerspruch zu d.
(S 3) (y) ycG D (3 z) . L(y, z)
yyfede Gerade liegt ganz in mindestens einer Ebene." 
Beweis :
a (3 Al) (3 Ag) . y =  (Ai, Ag) nach Ai 8, Ai 9.
b (3 Ag) . Ag £ P . Ig (Al, Ag, Ag) nach S 2. Folglich
3
c (3z) . Z£E 771 [Xv, z) nach Ai 11. Für dieses % gilt
y =  I
d  L (y, z) nach Ai 14.
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(S 4) (j'l) (ya) yi« G . G . yi 4= ya  ^ (3 si^ ) • x«P . I (x, y , ) . I (x, y^ )
,,Zwei verschiedene Geraden haben hochstens einen Punkt gemein­
sam."
Beweis :
I, 2
a (3 Ai) (3 Ag) . Ai £ P . Ag £ P . Ai 4= Ag. //l (Ay, yi) sei angenommen ;
y.,1
h St (aj, Ag) gilt dann nach Dg 4 ; folglich nach 7 , A^  8
c (3i y) . y £ G . I (ai, y) . I (a2, y ), d. h. wegen a
d  yi — yg entgegen der Voraussetzung; Widerspruch.
3
(S 5) JJ{Xy) Z(Xi, Xg, Xs) 3 Z(Xs, Xg, Xl)
y = I
„Die Zwischenbeziehung ist symmetrisch in  bezug auf ihr erstes und 
drittes Argument."
Beweis (nach T s c h e t w e r u c h in ) o^) :
a Z(a'i, Ag, Ag) 2 St (ai, Ag) nach Ag i ,  also
6 (3 A4) . A4£P. Ig(Ai, Ag, A4) nach S 2.
c A'l 4= A4 gilt hierbei gewiB. Also
d (3 Ag) . Z(ai, A4, Ag) nach Ag 3. Nun ist
e I (Ag, g(^ )(Ai, A4)) nach Ag i, Ag 2, A^ 8, wâhrend
f  I (^ 21 ^4)), da sonst nach S 4
g  Ag — Schn(^) (g(^ ) (Ai, A4), (Ai, Ag)) =  Ai, was der Voraussetzung 
widerspricht. Aus e und f  folgt aber
h Ag 4= Ag, mithin ist
i y  =  g(i) (%g, Xs) zulâssig nach A^  7, Aj 8. Man wende nun Ag 5
mit Ai, Ag, A4, Ag, y, (aj, Ag, A4) statt Aj , Ag, Ag, A4, y, z unter 
Beriicksichtigung der Voraussetzung an;
j  (3 Ag) . I (Ag, y) . [Z (ai, Ag, A4) V Z (as, Ag, A4)]. Gàlte nun
k  Z (ai, Ag, A4), so wâre
I Ag =  Schn( )^ {g^ H^xi, A4), y) =  Ag, d. h.
m  Z (ai, Ag, A4) entgegen d nach Ag 4. Also liefert j
n  (3Ag) . I (Ag, y) . Z (Ag, Ag, A4). Unter Benutzung hiervon wende
man nun Ag 5 mit Ag, A4, Ai, Ag, y, (%!, Ag, A4) statt Aj, Ag, 
%3, 4^» y>  ^ an:
o (3 A?) . I (A?, y) . [Z(Ag, A?, Ai) V Z(a4, Ay, A^ )]. Es ergibt sich
20) N. Tschetweruchin, Über die Bedeutung des Axioms von Pasch für die linearen 
Anor dnungsaxiome, Jahresber. D. M. V. 33 (1925).
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p  Z(a4, Ay, Al) wie eben, also mu6 
q Z (Ag, Ay, Al) gelten; nun ist aber nach S 4 
r Ay —  Schn( )^ (g(^)(Ai, Ag), y) =  Ag, so daB q  übergeht in 
s  Z (Ag, Ag, Al).
(S 6) (Al) (Ag) Kst (%i, X2, Xl, Ag)
yyjede Strecke ist sich selbst kongruent."
Beweis :
a (3Ag) . (3 A4) . Kst (%, Ag, Ag, A4) nach Ag 4. Dann gilt auch
b Kst ( 3^, %4; Al, Ag) nach Ag i. Aus a und 6 folgt nach Ag 5
c  Kst (%1, Xl, Ag).
6
(S 7) 77(Xv) Kst(^i) X5, Ag) . Kst (^ 3 > 4^ > Xs, Ag) 3
V =  I
2 Kst {Xi, Ag, Ag, A4)
,,Sind zwei Strecken einer dritten kongruent, so sind sie auch unter- 
einander kongruent."
Beweis :
a Kst [xz, A4, Ag, Ag) 2 Kst (%, Xq, Ag, A4) nach Ag i.
b Kst (Xi, Ag, Ag, Ag) . Kst (Xs, Xq, Ag, A4) 3 Kst (%, ^2. x^ , A4) nach
A3 5.
Im Prinzip kônnte man die Formalisierung der Be weise geome tri- 
scher Sâtze beliebig fortsetzen; allerdings empfiehlt sich bei kompli- 
zierten Sâtzen eine streng formale Herleitung nicht mehr, da die 
Beweise dann zu lang und daher unübersichtlich werden. Gemischt 
inhaltlich - f ormales Vorgehen scheint dann zweckmâBiger, etwa in 
der Weise, daB man diejenigen Beweisschritte nur noch inhaltlich 
voUzieht, deren Logisierbarkeit aus früheren Beweisen schon be­
kannt ist.
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